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This thesis presents the first historical study of twentieth-century road construction and 
maintenance on a global scale, and the first comparative study of roads outside Europe and 
the United States (US). From 1930 to 1970, the roads of Latin America, Africa and Asia 
experienced considerable length increase and, especially in the post-1945 period, the 
modification of their material characteristics. This transformation enabled the road structures 
and surfaces to withstand the rapidly increasing heavy traffic of a globalising and 
nationalising world. This thesis shows the importance of unpaved roads and freight transport, 
particularly in the developing world. It argues that many roads, especially in the developing 
world, were built as what were called low-cost roads. Built down to a price, rather than up to 
a standard, low-cost roads were designed to last half as long as high-quality roads. However, 
these roads were meant to be upgraded over time, therefore making maintenance and 
improvements essential to ensure future circulation. In fact, this thesis shows that 
maintenance and upgradeability were the crucial factors that allowed low-cost roads to bear 
the rapidly growing heavy traffic of the post-1945 period. This thesis therefore represents a 
shift away from the main themes of the existing historiography, which focus on private 
automobiles, motorways, tourism and leisure, and policy for road building.  
This thesis makes the case for studying the materiality of twentieth-century roads. Road 
length alone did not guarantee the circulation of rising motor traffic: to talk holistically about 
roads is to talk about maintenance. Studying the physical properties of roads tells us not only 
about the link between maintenance, upgrades and the changing load-bearing capacity of 
roads, but also about the emergence of new road construction and maintenance tools and 
techniques that originated in the US and spread across the world. Indeed, adding to our 
understanding of the international influence of the US in the twentieth century, this thesis 
shows that American road-related standards, methods and equipment were the predominant 
model for the construction and maintenance of low-cost roads in the developing world, from 
the 1930s onwards, but especially during and after the Second World War. Professional 
networks of engineers, and their international exchanges, were crucial for the circulation and 
adaptation of this model to various environmental and traffic conditions across the world.  
This thesis focuses on the cases of the Algerian Sahara, French West Africa, Argentina and 
Colombia – allowing for a comparison of varied extreme natural environments and complex 
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relationships between rail and road transport. Yet, this thesis also discusses the work of 
American engineers in the US and abroad in the context of the Second World War, and the 
approaches of British and French engineers in their empires. This thesis emphasises the period 
after the Second World War, when the particularly rapidly expanding traffic of the developing 
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From 1930 to 1970, land transport experienced a revolution that conditioned and enabled 
globalisation. It was mainly related to the building, increased use and maintenance of roads. 
A rough estimate suggests that the number of motor vehicles in use in the world (excluding 
the Eastern Bloc) saw an increase of over 490 per cent from 1930 to 1971.1 In contrast, the 
world’s road network length increased by roughly 30 per cent from 1930 to 1967; although 
excluding Europe and the United States, this percentage rises to 53.7 per cent.2 The world’s 
railway mileage, on the other hand, decreased about 1 per cent from 1930 to 1965 (and about 
6 per cent if the USSR is excluded).3 As one would expect, rail traffic increased even so.4 
However, road transport generally increased much faster and, in particular, at a much more 
rapid pace than the road length itself. Rising traffic exerted increasing pressure on road 
networks, prompting the modification of road construction and maintenance processes.5 This 
thesis explores this remarkable transformation in the carrying capacity of roads, focusing in 
particular on the case of the developing world.6 
This thesis is the first historical study of this major change at a global scale, and the first 
comparative study of roads outside Europe and the United States.7 This thesis argues that 
from 1930 to 1970, the roads of Latin America, Africa and Asia experienced considerable 
length increase and mostly major transformations of their material characteristics that allowed 
them to respond to the unprecedented transport demands of a globalising and nationalising 
world.8 This thesis focuses on the cases of the Algerian Sahara, French West Africa, 
Argentina and Colombia – allowing for a comparison of varied extreme natural environments 
 
1 Estimation based on figures on Annexe C.  
2 This estimation is based on Annexe A and includes only the countries/colonies for which data is 
available on the Annexe for both 1930 and 1967. It excludes, in particular, the USSR. 
3 Directory of Railway Officials & Year Book 1966-1967 (London, 1967), 572-74. Estimation based on 
selected countries, see Annexe B. 
4 In fact, the 1954 Oxford Economic Atlas estimated that the world’s railway freight traffic increased from 
705,625 million ton-miles in 1938, to 1,317,500 million ton-miles in 1951. Oxford Economic Atlas of the 
World (London and Oxford, 1954), 109.  
5 Estimation based on figures on Annexe C.  
6 I will refer to Latin America, Africa and Asia as the developing world in order to avoid repetition. I will 
use the term developed world to refer to Western Europe and the United States. 
7 Unless explicitly mentioned, this thesis will not discuss road development in the Eastern Bloc.  
8 This thesis focuses on motorable roads, by which I understand roads that have been designed and built 
to accommodate motor vehicles. I will also make some references to tracks when relevant, i.e. routes used 
by motor vehicles but that were opened with minimal or no engineering intervention. I do not study 
motorways (or similar types of roads with limited access and designed for fast traffic), and unless 





and complex relationships between rail and road transport.9 However, the approach of this 
thesis is much broader, as it also discusses the work of American engineers in the US and 
abroad in the context of the Second World War, and the work of British and French engineers 
in their empires. This thesis emphasises the period after the Second World War, when the 
particularly rapidly expanding traffic of the developing world accelerated road development 
and the modernisation of road construction and maintenance processes.10  
Unlike most of the literature on the history of roads, this thesis focuses not on why roads were 
built, but on how roads were built and maintained. The work of engineers therefore acquires 
a central place in this analysis. These professional road engineers, coming from both Europe 
and the US as well as from Latin American countries, were educated in prestigious 
institutions (often American ones) and often belonged to the social elites of their countries.11 
Challenging the predominant historiographical focus in road history on passenger transport 
and limited-access highways, this thesis argues that the decisive phenomena of the period 
were rising freight traffic and ‘low-cost’ roads. A product of the prioritisation of network 
length over quality, low-cost roads were deliberately substandard and were only meant to last 
half as long as roads in developed countries. However, they were intended to be upgradeable: 
some of their characteristics were expected to be improved over time when funds became 
available and traffic demands made it absolutely necessary. Low-cost roads were the main 
type of road built in Latin America, Africa and Asia during this period. Although the US and 
Europe also built low-cost roads, these usually played secondary roles within the transport 
systems of developed countries, whereas they acquired a major role in the developing world.  
These low-cost roads were mostly (but not necessarily) unpaved. And yet, they won a rising 
share of the transport of goods by land during the period, sometimes even surpassing railways. 
Roads also started being preferred to railways for the opening of new routes. This thesis 
suggests that this shift to roads was due to the low-cost road’s lower initial investment 
requirements, the promise of upgradeability, and the possibility roads offered of providing a 
service without optimal infrastructural conditions.   
 
9 Although Chapter 1 studies entire road networks, the remaining chapters of this thesis focus on main 
road networks. For the French colonies this means the roads considered vital for the territory in particular, 
and the empire in general. For the case of Argentina and Colombia this means national road networks, as 
opposed to provincial/departmental and municipal.  
10 By modernisation, I refer to the adoption of the latest methods, equipment, and machines available for 
road design, construction, and maintenance. 
11 This thesis focuses on engineers working for public administrations, although engineers working for 




This thesis recognises, for the first time, not only the extraordinary and almost wholly 
unappreciated significance of the low-cost road, but also the influence of American road-
related standards, techniques, and equipment in the evolution of the methods and tools 
associated with it – from the 1930s onwards, but especially during and after the Second World 
War. Even French and British engineers used and adapted American approaches to road 
building and maintenance at home and in the colonies, which shows that the exchange of 
engineering knowledge and practices often took place in ways that do not correspond to the 
commonly studied connections of metropole/colony and centre/periphery. Indeed, in order to 
understand the transformation of road construction and maintenance that the developing 
world experienced in this period it is necessary to take into account local and international 
engineering communities (including exchanges within the developing world). These 
communities adapted American approaches to local demands and conditions, creating 
variations around the predominant American model. Sometimes this generated solutions that 
did not emerge anywhere else, and the steps taken to accommodate animal-drawn traffic in 
some Asian countries illustrate this phenomenon.  
Engineers working in the developing world were well aware of the need to adapt American 
techniques to local contexts. Although environmental conditions were indeed extreme in 
some cases, it was more the lack of knowledge about the environment, rather than the 
conditions themselves, which made road building particularly challenging. Therefore, even 
if engineers were open to using local knowledge, new knowledge about local materials and 
conditions had to be produced in order to accelerate construction and make road design more 
precise. When roads failed, it was usually not because of their neglect of the complexities of 
local environments and conditions, but because the novelty of the task of building motorable 
roads in certain contexts and at a rapid pace entailed certain risks.  
Adaptation extended beyond technical measures, as both public and private organisations had 
to modify their road planning and management activities, a process that was particularly 
difficult for countries and colonies that were only just starting their modernisation of road 
development in the post-war period. The unexpectedly rapid growth in traffic during this 
period further complicated long-term planning. 
Finally, in contrast to most histories of technology and mobility, maintenance occupies a 
central place in this thesis. To talk holistically about roads is to talk about maintenance: this 
issue was crucial for road engineers, even from the design stage. In the developing world, 
low-cost roads made maintenance even more crucial, as roads built to low standards required 




innovation characterised not only road construction, but also maintenance. In addition, 
closely linked to improvement over time, maintenance was at the very centre of the notion of 
upgradeability. Thus, road maintenance in this context was often more about progressively 
creating something new, rather than returning the road to its original condition.  
Roads and road freight have attracted much less attention than railways and automobiles in 
the historiography of the twentieth century, and this is especially the case in road development 
outside Europe and the US.12 As the following review of the historiography shows, roads 
have generally remained in the background in accounts of globalisation, national histories, 
and even histories of transport and the automobile. This results from an overly narrow 
understanding of what the significant transport developments of the century were, which has 
focused on railways and the airplane, and from an emphasis by transport mobility historians 
on automobiles and consumers, at the expense of freight and the material aspects of road 
infrastructure. I further suggest that problematising roads by taking seriously their materiality 
offers important insights into how roads were made to respond to changing traffic demands, 
as well as the evolution of engineering and scientific knowledge, practices, and tools in the 
developing world in particular, and on a global level more generally. This introductory 
chapter finishes by laying out the structure of the thesis and briefly presenting the sources 
used.  
 
Roads as both factors and results of globalisation and national development 
 
Although there is no consensus about the definition of globalisation (or even whether it is a 
useful term for historical analysis), historians usually identify transport technologies as either 
factors, catalysers, or at least a necessary prerequisite of this phenomenon.13 Historians of 
globalisation, in particular, highlight the role that certain transport and communications 
innovations had in the increasing volume and speed of the movement of people, ideas, capital, 
and goods that took place in this period. Transport innovations such as railways, steamships, 
containers, and airplanes usually sit alongside innovations in communications, such as 
telegraph, radio, satellites and the Internet, as fundamental elements in globalisation. 
 
12 In this thesis, I will use the term automobile to refer to specifically private cars. In the literature review 
I have retained the terms used by the authors. 
13 For a critique of the concept of globalisation and its usefulness for historical enquiries see F. Cooper, 
‘What is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian’s Perspective’, in African Affairs 




However, roads rarely, if ever, feature as causative factors in histories of twentieth-century 
globalisation. For instance, for the historian Bruce Mazlish, at the forefront of the New Global 
History initiative, the unprecedented levels of global interdependency and interconnectedness 
that characterised the world in the last three decades of the century, which compressed time 
and space, were prompted by sea vessels (and other unspecified transport methods), the 
telegraph, the radio, and satellites.14 Indeed, transport technologies play only a limited role in 
his analyses, as unproblematic instruments that actors such as multinational corporations and 
inter-governmental organisations used in order to carry out their actions.15 In fact, he 
attributes a much larger role to nuclear weapons, rockets, satellites, and computers as the 
technologies that have had the most important implications for the transcending of national 
boundaries.16  
Even authors that explicitly seek to give ‘technology’ a major explanatory role in the history 
of globalisation tend to refer to the same transport and communications innovations and 
ignore roads. For example, in Wiring Prometheus, the editors Peter J. Lyth and Helmuth 
Trishler’s argue that over the last two centuries ‘a technology-driven process has steadily 
raised the level of connectedness between different parts of the world; and globalisation is 
the result’.17 They identify two main waves of globalisation, and thus of technological 
advances: first, from 1840 to the start of the First World War, a wave propelled by the 
expansion of European communications and transport innovations (telephone, radio, 
telegraph, canals, railways, steamships and refrigeration); and second, from the 1970s and 
1980 onwards, the rapid proliferation of ‘radical new technologies’ that accelerated and 
widened the flow of goods and information to the point that it has made of globalisation a 
synonym of capitalism, and in particular aerospace, air transport, satellites, lasers, microchips 
and fibre-optics.18 Neither the introduction, nor any of the other chapters mentioned roads or 
 
14 The New Global History is an initiative born in the US in the late twentieth century led by Mazlish that 
seeks to trace the historical factors of globalisation. It attempts to distinguish itself from world history and 
from ‘weaker’ approaches of global history due to its planetary scope, its conception of the present as 
distinctive, and its specific aim of contributing to contemporary debates around globalisation. Bruce 
Mazlish, ‘Comparing Global History to World History’, in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 28 
(1998), 391. 
15 See e.g. the role of faster transport and improved communications in the expansion of the scope of 
multinational corporations: Bruce Mazlish, The New Global History (New York, 2006), 36. 
16 Mazlish, The New Global History, 27-29. 
17 Peter J.  Lyth, and Helmuth Trischler, Wiring Prometheus: Globalisation, History and Technology 
(Aarhus, 2004). 




even road transport, focusing instead on railways and steamships, bicycles, textiles, the 
telephone, and computers.19  
Roads have also been excluded from world histories that do not revolve around the 
historization of globalisation. For instance, in his environmental history of the world during 
the twentieth century, John McNeill dedicates significant space to the automobile, which he 
claims ‘is a strong candidate for the title of most socially and environmentally consequential 
technology of the twentieth century’, not only because of the air pollution it generated, but 
also due to its impact on territorial organisation.20 However, besides mentioning the massive 
area that roads occupy worldwide (about one to two per cent of the land surface by the late 
twentieth century), he neglected the major transformation of ecosystems that such an 
expansion entailed, and pays no attention to the way in which road construction and 
maintenance were (and are) conditioned by climate, topography, soils, and geological 
formation.21 
More recently, the Cambridge World History dedicated a whole chapter to transport and 
communications, in which Daniel Headrick argues that the age of transport and 
communications revolutions in which we live started two and a half centuries ago and resulted 
from two causes: the application of new machines and energy sources to transport methods, 
and what he calls the liberation of communication from the need to transport objects.22 
Headrick proceeds to make a chronological list of the most significant transport and 
communications innovations since 1750, which include animal- and human-drawn carts, 
steamships and railways, the telegraph, the telephone and central power stations (in relation 
to electricity), motor vehicles, airplanes, radio, satellites and computers. His essay is an 
exception in that he does highlight the importance of lorries for the movement of goods and 
points out the transformation that road networks experienced accordingly.23 In fact, he states 
 
19 Other historians, such as Peter N. Stearns, Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Peterson adopt similar 
narratives by highlighting two different waves of industrialisation (one in the nineteenth century and 
another in the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War) that reduced transport costs and 
increased the volume and speed capacities of the transport of goods and people. They do not make any 
explicit mention to roads playing a role in this process. Peter N. Stearns, Globalization in World History 
(London, 2009); Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Peterson, Globalization: A Short History (Princeton, 
2005). 
20 He also mentioned the importance of tractors for the evolution of agricultural production. John R. 
McNeill, Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New 
York, 2000), 310. 
21 McNeill, Something New under the Sun, 311. 
22 Daniel R. Headrick, ‘Transportation and Communication, 1750 to the Present’, in John R. McNeill and 
Kenneth Pomeranz (eds.), The Cambridge World History (Cambridge, 2015), 401. 
23 Paul Josephson’s contribution to this volume on twentieth-century technology also included a section 
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that roads became increasingly smoother and resistant to varied weather conditions, and that, 
although they were necessary for the spread of motor vehicles (and bicycles), their quality 
lagged behind the rise of the automobile until the first decades of the twentieth century when 
asphalt roads started to become ‘standard’.24 In the second half of the century, accelerated 
motorisation created congestion problems, to which governments in the West responded with 
the construction of limited-access highways, whereas ‘non-Western countries with a similar 
proliferation of cars but less money to spend’ were left with ‘even more serious problems of 
congestion and pollution’.25 The format of listing innovations means he does not note the 
persistence of unpaved roads, or the continued use of animal-drawn vehicles in countries such 
as India and Indonesia. Headrick’s analysis illustrates some of the limitations of the 
historiography on roads. As the following section explains, the history of motorable roads has 
mostly revolved around the construction of motorways and the use of the automobile, leaving 
much of the world out and giving a misleading picture of the industrialised world as well.  
The limited attention given to roads in twentieth-century world and globalisation history, if 
problematic, is not surprising. As the historian David Edgerton has pointed out, the history 
of technology of the twentieth century has until recently focused on the invention and 
innovation of only certain technologies whose significance has been more assumed than 
demonstrated.26 This focus has had two consequences: first, we have an incomplete (or rather, 
misleading) account of twentieth-century invention and innovation, and second, we are 
missing a careful examination of technological use (not just users) and imitation. Roads and 
freight traffic present a good example of a vital technology whose development and role 
throughout the twentieth century have been systematically ignored, and its overall nature 
misunderstood. Moreover, once we start looking into the construction and maintenance of 
motorable roads, it quickly becomes evident that to talk about innovation in road development 
we also need to take seriously maintenance, adaptation, and use (see below). This perspective 
allows us to, not just include both the developed and the developing worlds in the history of 
roads, but also to deepen our understanding of their unequal and changing relationship, and 
of the way people, ideas, and things have moved around the world.  
 
this immense project of controlled-access highways can hardly be considered representative of road 
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In contrast to the little attention given to roads in world and globalisation histories, roads have 
been awarded a larger place in histories of some nation-states, especially in Latin America. 
In this context, roads have been portrayed as playing significant roles in processes of nation-




As Colin Divall and Ralf Roth note, compared to how much we know about cars, we know 
little about the rise and expansion of the modern road network, and in particular about its 
competition and interdependency with railway lines.27 Although ‘mobility’ history seeks to 
move away from the study of the economic impact of transportation methods by producing 
an integrated vision of the movement of people and goods and including the perspective of 
the users, roads are still underrepresented.28 Furthermore, there are significant gaps in what 
we know about roads. The following section presents a brief survey of the literature on roads 
in Europe and the US and in the developing world.  
Modern networks in the US and Western Europe  
The histories of road networks in Western Europe and the US during the twentieth century 
deal mostly with the emergence of modern limited-access highway networks (known as 
motorways in Britain, autoroutes in France, autostrade in Italy, and Autobahnen in Germany) 
in the United States and Western Europe. Indeed, the mileage they attained and the speed 
with which they were built make the American Interstate Highway System (41,000 miles of 
limited-access expressways) and the German Autobahn network (over 2,200 miles of 
concrete limited-access highways by 1942) ideal examples of the modernisation of roads.29  
The aspect that has attracted the most attention has been the question of road policy, i.e. how 
the systems became politically, financially and administratively possible. Here, the work of 
Bruce Seely has been crucial for the American case.30 Criticising interpretations he calls 
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‘deterministic’, Seely rejects the idea that the American highway system was solely a result 
of the popularity of the automobile and its private and recreational use, and argues instead 
that in the early twentieth century road policy emphasised the enhancement of rural 
development and integration. In fact, not only associations of cyclists, but also farmers and 
even railway companies were crucial actors exerting pressure for the improvement of road 
surfaces.31 The policy of extending road networks, not only from farms to markets, but also 
in-between cities, was also related to the emergence and rise of the lorry. The success of 
lorries during the First World War opened the path for the construction of new roads, while 
the damage caused by the rise in heavy traffic made evident the need to rebuild and adapt 
road construction techniques to these new vehicles. By the 1930s, when opinions on what 
sort of roads should be built started to diversify, lorry drivers were part of an expanding group 
of auto manufacturers and urban planners, among others, who were pushing to have a say in 
shaping road policy.32 For Seely, however, the most decisive actors were the road engineers 
of the federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), since they shaped road development not only 
in their technical characteristics, but also in the political and financial aspects, in great part 
because they succeeded to establish a reputation as apolitical experts.33 The actions of the 
BPR were therefore crucial for the approval in 1956 of the Interstate Highway System, which 
funded urban expressways as part of a network of trunk line highways.34  
In the case of Europe, the state’s promotion of tourism and automobile use has been accorded 
a major role in the emergence of modern road networks. The book Road History, Planning, 
Building and Use (2007) edited by Gijs Mom and Laurent Tissot is a good example of this 
approach. Moving away from interpretations that focused on the economic impact of 
transport systems, the authors of this book explore the roles of tourism, national style and 
identity, as well as centralisation and authoritarianism in the emergence of highway networks 
in Europe during the interwar years. An important argument in the book is that highway 
systems emerged in this period not as a result of the widespread use of the automobile (or any 
other motor vehicle) but rather in anticipation of demand. In both Italy and Germany, the 
construction of highways was seen as having an important propagandistic function since the 
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automobile and the highway corresponded to a vision of modernity and national pride that 
suited both Fascism and Nazism.35  
The role of the private sector has also been highlighted in the emergence of European 
highways. In Italy, for example, most highways built during the Fascist period were designed, 
constructed, and managed by private groups or companies (such as Fiat), and most provided 
a link between large cities and tourist destinations.36 Nevertheless, even in cases in which the 
state controlled and centralised road development, the lobby of the tourism industry and that 
of car manufacturers and other related industries (such as tyres, cement, amongst others) have 
been considered crucial motors of highway building.37  
According to Mom, however, a level of centralised organisation is necessary for the 
emergence of a road system (in the way that Thomas Hughes understands them).38 This means 
that, since in the early stages of a road network there is no central control over privately 
owned vehicles, it is only when the national authorities gain control of road networks through 
regulating mechanisms (such as traffic and tax laws, road signs and a traffic police) that we 
can talk about a road system with an identifiable builder who has ‘enough executive power to 
implement his plans’.39 For him, ‘modern road building’ has to take place at a national scale 
since regional governments do not have the power to render ‘automobile mobility measurable 
and calculable’, which is, according to Mom, a ‘necessary condition for modern road 
building’.40  
Although most authors studying European and American road networks have indeed adopted 
a national scale for their studies, the scholars attached to the ‘Tensions of Europe’ project are 
a notable exception. This initiative seeks to study the social tensions around the construction 
of the transnational technological networks that have been connecting and unifying Europe 
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since the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 41 The networks they study are mostly transport, 
communications, and electricity. Also borrowing from Hughes’ large technological systems, 
these scholars concentrate on finding system builders and examining the negotiations that 
they had to undertake to materialise their visions of these networks.42 With this objective, 
authors such as Johan Schot have highlighted the role of technical experts in shaping 
European road and electrical networks and transport policies before and after the Second 
World War.43 Although this research consortium claims to be interested in the relationship 
between the material basis of the networks and the political developments that affected their 
shape, materiality actually occupies a small part of its work.44 The Tensions of Europe 
initiative is mostly concerned with the genesis of Europe as a political and cultural entity.  
Studies that explore the materiality of twentieth-century European and American road 
networks are, in fact, rare. First, the interactions of roads with the natural environment have 
remained in the background in most analyses, even when landscape transformations are put 
to the fore. In a volume edited by Thomas Zeller and Christof Mauch, the use of motor 
vehicles is portrayed as a new lens through which nature would be perceived: the 
windshield.45 From the Alps to the Appalachians, many roads were designed to offer not only 
transportation but also impressive views that were meant to feed national pride for the beauty 
of the landscape and the technical achievements of the nation. This prompted the emergence 
of what Zeller called national ‘styles’: while the objectives and basic forms of highway 
networks were similar, their outlook and organisation were different.46 This 
‘commodification of landscapes’ did not go uncontested, and from the 1940s onwards a 
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utilitarian vision of roads became dominant, as the cases of the US and Germany illustrate.47 
The flow of people and commodities was not to be interrupted or delayed as the efficiency 
and high speed of the circulation were seen as necessary conditions for economic growth.48 
Although the focus on landscapes presents roads as part of an environment and not as isolated 
elements, this perspective tells us more about the functional and aesthetic goals of roads than 
about the interactions between the natural environment and road design, construction and 
maintenance. 
Second, road freight has attracted limited attention despite its impact on road development. 
Authors like Mom, Seely, Mark H. Rose and Paul F. Barrett have signalled the importance 
of lorry drivers in the road lobby in the US.49 The drive towards modern road construction as 
a result of the increasing use of lorries from the First World War onwards (for military and 
commercial purposes) and the related damage caused to the roads has also been noted.50 
However, most histories of highway networks give a predominant place to the automobile, 
particularly in the context of urban road building.51 And while there are many examples of 
sophisticated analyses about the production, distribution, and use of the automobile, we know 
much less about the specificities of lorries and other goods vehicles.52 A deeper examination 
of the relationship between road development and freight transport opens valuable research 
avenues, as Richard Vahrenkamp’s recognition of the role of road freight in the competition 
between roads and railways illustrate (see below).  
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Third, the study of the technical aspects of roads, advocated by Mom in 2003, still occupies 
a relatively small place compared to issues of planning, financing and automobile uses.53 A 
significant exception is Seely’s recent chapter in the book From Rail to Road and Back 
Again? (2015) in which he calls for the understanding of the American highway system as 
the product of technical developments, and not only organisational and financial ones. 
According to Seely, confronted with the challenge of building durable roads for an increasing 
number of ever heavier lorries from the 1920s onwards, American engineers adopted a range 
of slow, steady developments of ‘mundane elements’ which ultimately determined the 
specifications of the freeway system (and not the ‘flashy, highly-publicized work labelled 
revolutionary’).54 However, Seely himself points out that, although new soil treatments and 
road pavements were important technical innovations, the widespread mechanisation of 
earth-moving equipment in the US after 1945 had such an impact in road construction, that 
topography stopped being a concern for American engineers since the movement of ‘millions 
of cubic yards of earth’ became economically viable.55 Bulldozers, mixers and rollers, 
amongst other machines, made physically possible the very fast construction of the large 
American highway system. Francesca Russello Ammon also contributed to the history of the 
bulldozer during and after the Second World War by exploring its employment for building, 
clearing, and even fighting, and by tracing the use of bulldozers in the US in the context of 
post-war urban development projects and the first decade of the construction of the Interstate 
Highway System.56 Nevertheless, such analyses remain largely isolated and authors who deal 
with road construction equipment are mainly enthusiasts.57  
There are other material aspects of road construction and maintenance that have attracted only 
limited attention. Irving B. Holley contributed to the history of American road construction 
by telling the story of small contractor firms in the early stages of road construction from 
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1895 to 1925. He contends that small-scale operators were the ones that undertook most road 
construction during this period and that, by the mid-1920s, the infrastructure to build the large 
American system was already in place.58 The elements that contributed to this success were: 
the adoption of machinery previously used for agriculture and railway building (which made 
road projects economically feasible despite the increasing costs of labour), the creation of 
varied mechanisms to circulate engineering knowledge that did not depend on professional 
engineers and their networks (since most operations during the period were not led by 
engineers), and the growing experience of small and medium contractors. The experience of 
both workers and managers was essential to minimise risks in both technical and managerial 
terms.59 Nonetheless, generally speaking, the evolution of maintenance and construction 
practices, techniques and machinery over the course of the twentieth century are still largely 
unexplored. 
Finally, another important issue that has only started to attract attention recently is the 
relationship between rail and road infrastructure. The volume edited by Divall and Roth sets 
out to examine this issue the context of Europe and the US from the early twentieth century 
onwards, although it focuses mostly on the interwar period and the twenty first century.60 
They note that the idea of two separate railway and automobile ‘ages’ is misleading, as 
railways were very unevenly distributed around the world and trains continued to be used 
despite the major shift from rail to road that took place over the course of the twentieth 
century. In fact, in absolute terms rail transport increased in some countries.61 The editors 
also suggest that roads responded to limitations of railway transport such as cargo freight and 
door-to-door services.62 In particular, in the case of Britain during the interwar years (the case 
discussed in most depth in the volume), Divall and Roy Edwards argue that these limitations 
were partly the result of a tariff policy that was meant to place railways as the national 
transport method in charge of evenly spreading the economic benefits of transport, and partly 
the consequence of the short-sightedness of the Ministry of Transport which was slow to 
recognise the benefits of combining road and rail haulage activities.63 Railway companies 
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struggled to compete against road haulers who had the liberty to set their own prices, choose 
the most profitable routes, use increasingly larger and heavier lorries, and benefit from rising 
public road investment. In contrast, even after nationalisation, the railways seem to have 
suffered from a comparative shortage of investment, a situation that was aggravated by the 
restricted loading gauge of the British rail infrastructure at a time in which 40-foot sea 
containers were becoming popular in the national and international transport market.64 
Although these are important advances, much remains to be studied about the relationship 
between roads and railways.  
In particular, a global vision of this issue is much needed. Why did road transport grow so 
rapidly outside the Eastern Bloc whereas railways appear to have dominated within it? 
Although there appears to be no studies that tackle this question at this scope, Richard 
Vahrenkamp shows, building on Lewis Siegelbaum’s work, that the predominance of 
railways in the Soviet Union did not result from an ideological bias against road transport.65 
Siegelbaum noted that after a slow start to road development with propagandistic objectives 
in the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union turned towards roads in a more decisive way in the 
mid- to late-1950s with the mechanisation of road construction, the corresponding 
professionalisation of road-building crews, and the reorganisation of labour for road 
construction and upkeep.66 According to Vahrenkamp, in the post-war period similar 
arguments about the modernity and advantages of road transport circulated in both the West 
and the Eastern Bloc.67 However, road development faced many obstacles in the communist 
world. First, economic shortages made investments in a new form of transport infrastructure 
less appealing (especially since the railway infrastructure was for the most part already there), 
which meant that road networks remained poor in terms of coverage and conditions.68 Second, 
motor vehicle production did not take off, the car lobby was weak, and the lack of 
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standardisation in lorry production across the Bloc made the repair and maintenance of the 
fleet very difficult. These factors, added to the preference for the heavy industry and the 
limitations of the production of consumer goods, made for a comparatively low demand for 
road construction and maintenance.69 In contrast, by the interwar period Western countries 
had already begun to develop new distribution channels and with them the proliferation of 
new packaged manufactured goods, department stores, and retail chains, which in turn 
changed the needs of warehousing centres and networked distribution to the benefit of lorry 
transport.70 The development of mass consumption societies increased the demand for 
smaller, but more urgent deliveries (including fresh food) – a task the railway was ill-prepared 
to perform. While lorry traffic was becoming faster and cheaper and road construction was 
relatively less capital-intensive, the railway handling points were getting congested and their 
capacity was not easy to increase. Therefore, for Vahrenkamp, lorries were better suited than 
railways for the functioning of mass consumption societies, with the exception of bulk 
transport.71   
Roads in developing countries and colonies 
The history of twentieth-century roads in the developing world is difficult to trace because 
there have been few attempts to draw general conclusions at the scale of countries, empires 
or regions. Generally speaking, the subject of roads occupies a chapter or only a couple of 
pages in general histories, which are much more inclined to discuss the history of railways 
than any other transportation method. However, over the last ten years or so, a rising interest 
for roads in developing countries/colonies is visible, for instance, in the Journal of Transport 
History.72  
As with developed countries, the relation between roads and the state (both national and 
colonial) has also been one of the major concerns in the literature about road networks in the 
developing world. Going back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the emergence of 
colonial road networks has been interpreted as playing an important part in the consolidation 
of empire. As road networks grew over the twentieth century, they not only had administrative 
and military functions, but also the responsibility of allowing the export of agricultural 
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commodities at a competitive price while opening markets for metropolitan manufactures.73 
According to Libbie Freed, writing about French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon from 1890 
to 1960, these political, commercial and administrative functions of road networks made 
them, in the eyes of the colonizers, crucial instruments for ensuring control over the 
conquered land, its resources and its inhabitants.74 In fact, road development was a way of 
imposing direct imperial control over the local people given the importance of forced labour. 
In the Gold Coast, Portuguese Guinea, French West Africa and the Dutch East Indies, for 
instance, road construction and maintenance relied extensively (or sometimes entirely) on 
unpaid labour.75 This was not unusual in the construction of public works in the colonies.76 
However, as forced labour gradually disappeared over the course of the twentieth century, 
traffic regulations and tax collection (related to and facilitated by roads) contributed to the 
control and ‘disciplining’ of the population.77 
Various authors have suggested that the local populations contributed to road construction 
and maintenance not only with unskilled labour, but also with their knowledge and practices. 
Existing indigenous paths and engineering skills were often used as guidance, or were at least 
acknowledged by colonisers. For instance, in the hills of the North-Eastern Indian frontier, 
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indigenous roads were built with the easiest gradients possible and British officials 
occasionally praised the multiple ‘scientific’ mechanisms adopted by natives to avoid damage 
from the rain.78 In addition, local practices also shaped roads regardless of the 
acknowledgment of colonisers even if it was, as Freed puts it, filtered ‘through the lens of 
forced labour’.79 It is, however, very difficult to measure or even describe the indigenous 
input in road construction in most cases. Notwithstanding, many authors have noted that it 
would be mistaken to consider that there was no native influence in colonial road 
construction, or that there were no local initiatives to build and maintain roads. In Nigeria, 
for example, the Native Administrations (village communities under the leadership of their 
chiefs who in turn were under the control of the District Officers and the Public Works 
Department) maintained almost three times as many kilometres of roads as the Public Works 
Department itself (24,325 km against 9,454 km in 1938).80 Moreover, in some regions the 
Native Administrations – and not the Public Works Department – maintained the few 
motorable roads.81  
Another way in which native agency has been emphasized is through the use of commercial 
vehicles. Users, drivers, repairers, sellers and often owners of vehicles, the local population 
was actively involved in the meeting of its own transport needs.82 Jennifer Hart’s book on 
mobility in Ghana in the twentieth century is a good example of this type of contribution.83 
She shows how in a colonial context Africans embraced imported motor vehicles, 
transformed them, and used them to serve their own purposes. Beyond the appropriation of 
vehicles, Hart argues that the rise of motor transport in Ghana resulted in a uniquely African 
culture and practices of automobility that provided a new language for African aspirations. 
This was considered a threat by both the colonial and the postcolonial states, which attempted 
to regulate and control traffic in order to consolidate their own power. Hart’s analysis also 
highlights that in Africa automobility was more often about commercial motor transport than 
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about private cars, and was shaped by poverty, weak infrastructure development and 
underfunded public services.84 Motor vehicle ownership in Africa was therefore, according 
to Hart, not a question of personal autonomy and freedom (as it was for Europe and the US), 
but mostly of commercial use and entrepreneurship.85 
Related to this focus on native agency is the argument that roads did not only serve the 
purposes of the state, but also fostered indigenous activities which were considered threats 
by the authorities. For instance, in French central Africa the recruitment of forced labour, and 
particularly the resettlement of communities alongside the roads for the ongoing maintenance 
of the surfaces, generated resistance and severe tensions between the administrators and the 
local populations.86 Moreover, local political allegiances and inter-relations did not disappear 
under the colonial regime. The distribution of road work was often manipulated by 
communities with influence over other groups, which meant that road labour would often be 
in the hands of troublemakers or simply the powerless and poor.87 In addition, as more and 
more administrators used automobiles, the spaces away from the motorable roads offered a 
shelter from the colonial vigilance and supplied ‘important spaces in which to conduct 
economic and social life’.88 
The issue of who controlled road access has attracted some attention, revealing the major role 
that social, political, and economic inequalities have played in road development and 
circulation. Recently, Simón Uribe showed that the construction and use of a road near the 
southern frontier of Colombia (stretching from the city of Pasto to the port of Puerto Asís) 
had a history characterised by conflict and violence. After forcing indigenous communities 
to work on the construction and maintenance of this road, in the 1910s Capuchin Missionaries 
condemned indigenous practices on the roads for being damaging to the surfaces.89 In the 
second half of the twentieth century, road access was still a source of conflict in Colombia, 
as traffic on several rural roads far from urban centres could be interrupted not only by army 
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checkpoints or the police, but also by illegal armed forces (guerrillas and paramilitaries), 
which could demand the payment of tolls as high as they considered appropriate.90  
If the history of roads in developed countries is a story of gradual modernisation, in colonial 
contexts road use has been characterised as having contradictory effects. In a recent article, 
David Arnold discussed the issue of Indian urban traffic and modernity in the early twentieth 
century. While the increasing presence of motor vehicles and their use by both Europeans 
and Indians created a ‘problem of traffic’ that could be considered typical of a modern city, 
the ways the local populations used the streets were different from those of modern European 
urbanites. ‘Pre-modern’ methods of transportation were still in use and early attempts to 
modernise the people’s habits as pedestrians, bicycle riders and motor vehicle drivers 
encountered resistance.91 Given that these conflicts intensified over the course of the century, 
for Arnold Indian streets both symbolically and practically represented a ‘fractured, disputed 
modernity’.92 However, Arnold did not study the circulation of ‘pre-modern’ vehicles outside 
urban centres, nor the effects they had on road construction and maintenance, and by insisting 
on the contrast between ‘old’ and ‘modern’, he misses the story of the evolution of these non-
motorised vehicles (e.g. bullock carts acquired rubber tyres over the course of the twentieth 
century), as well as the emergence of other types of vehicles that were invented in ‘modern 
times’, such as auto-rickshaws.93  
In postcolonial contexts, roads have been generally related to national economic 
development, while mass motorisation has been associated with a process of democratisation 
and citizenship (as in developed countries). In Latin America, for instance, the scope and the 
speed of the construction of railways and roads have been considered key factors of economic 
growth through the reduction of transport costs, which in turn fostered exports of raw 
materials, imports of goods, activities directly or indirectly related to foreign investment, and 
a ‘rising share of modern manufacturing output’.94 William Summerhill contends that by the 
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1930s roads replaced railways as the central component of infrastructure expansion policy.95 
Brazil is a good example of how discourses from the state and private American enterprises 
(such as Ford, General Motors or Firestone) presented the automobile as a consumer good 
essential to a modern lifestyle and as a simple formula to bring progress and unity to the 
nation.96 The manufacture of motor vehicles in Brazil from the second half of the 1950s was 
also meant to create a worker class with ‘discipline’ and ‘no racial bias’, two aspects that 
Brazilians thought characterised American autoworkers.97 Moreover, due to the 
popularisation of car ownership, it has also been suggested that automobiles were vessels of 
democracy and that, overall, the automobile became a symbol of the quest of a modern, 
developed and democratic nation.98  
However, focusing on the discourses of democracy and nation-building and on the data on 
economic growth can mask many inequalities and socio-political conflicts that have 
characterised road construction and maintenance in developing countries. Michael Bess 
contends that in Mexico during the 1940s and early 1950s, although road building was an 
essential element of the economic modernisation of the country, behind the rhetoric of 
regional economic integration and development the government prioritised the road projects 
that would facilitate access to Mexico’s production centres and ports, neglecting the 
connections in areas less significant for international trade.99 Although the interests of local 
agents sometimes conflicted with those of the state, cooperation between them was possible 
because they attributed sufficiently similar functions to road construction.100 In this way, Bess 
concludes that road construction can be understood as a metaphor for the formation of modern 
Mexico, ‘revealing it to be the sum of fragmented, but often overlapping social and economic 
interests’.101  
Other kinds of inequalities are related to race and socio-economic marginalisation. In the case 
of South Africa, road infrastructure was designed to serve the state’s mechanisms of 
surveillance and control over African movement during the apartheid period (1948-1994). As 
Mark Lamont and Rebekah Lee point out, roads were planned to facilitate the commute of 
African labourers from the townships into the city, as well as the access of state security 
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forces in case of mobilisation or social unrest.102 However, in residential areas there was very 
little consideration for the need of public transport (mostly used by Africans) or the needs of 
pedestrians, making difficult the mobility of the African working class.103 Despite recent 
efforts to improve this situation in post-Apartheid South Africa, many problems remain 
unresolved, such as the difficult connection between the expanding townships.104  
There is another important element about the history of roads that is frequently mentioned in 
the literature: the influence of the US. For instance, it has been noted that even in certain 
British colonies imports of Ford, General Motors and Dodge lorries consistently surpassed 
the imports of Austin and Bedford lorries, while in Brazil Ford passed from assembling to 
manufacturing lorries in 1957.105 In response to British attempts to limit American sales by 
prohibiting left-hand drive vehicles in their colonies American companies started making 
vehicles according to the British specifications.106 Other important American companies 
related to motor transport also permeated the world’s market, such as Firestone and 
Caterpillar.107 Many engineers around the world received their professional education in the 
US and closely followed American engineering conferences, publications and public works 
construction (as did the ones who did not study in American institutions).108 This could 
influence not only road construction practices, but also the institutional organisation of the 
road and transport public sector, as Valeria Gruschetsky argued for the case of the Argentinian 
road authorities.109  
The evolution of road technical specifications has occupied some space in the literature. The 
development of motor traffic particularly after the First World War, and the different road 
surfaces used to respond to their needs has been noted by authors such as Philip Havik, Marie-
Louise ten Horn-van Nispen and Wim Ravesteijn for the cases of Portuguese Guinea and the 
Dutch East Indies, respectively.110 Ten Horn-van Nispen and Ravesteijn linked motorised 
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traffic with asphalt paving and argued that the challenges that local conditions in the Indies 
imposed to road construction stimulated the creation of innovative solutions that not only did 
not lag behind metropolitan developments, but were even ‘at least a decade ahead’ of them.111 
These obstacles mostly consisted of a limited access to machinery and of various tropical 
environmental characteristics, which, along with an increasing motor traffic from the 1920s 
onwards, required the creation of new knowledge, skills and regulations.112 The existence of 
a laboratory to test construction materials from 1912, the road programmes that started in 
1914, and the use of asphalt from the 1920s onwards, were all considered as cutting-edge at 
the time.113 Yet, as the authors note, there is no evidence that engineers in the Netherlands 
learned from the ones in the Indies.114  
Freed also noted for the case of French central Africa that the introduction of increasingly 
heavy lorries in the 1920s put rising pressure on earth roads. She demonstrated that, however, 
unpaved ‘low-budget’ roads were considered ideal: they could respond to immediate needs 
while keeping down the expenses – since forced labour made maintenance costs negligible.115 
Freed noted how ‘economic’ roads continued to be preferred after the Second World War, 
with the difference that in the post-war period the colonial state invested heavily in road-
building machinery and science research.116 Nevertheless, she did not recognise how 
widespread this phenomenon was, nor the major role these roads played in transport systems 
across the developing world.117 
These are isolated examples and the historiography has until recently told us little about the 
evolution of roads’ technical characteristics and about the techniques and tools used to build 
and maintain them after 1945, when motorisation grew exponentially in the developing world. 
Katie Valliere Streit’s recent thesis on mobility in today’s Southern Tanzania during the 
twentieth century is an example of the important avenues that considering the materiality of 
roads can open. Studying the relationship between transport infrastructure and the economic, 
social and political life of the region, Valliere Streit shows that, despite being a symbol of 
marginalisation and impoverishment in the eyes of the state during both colonial and 
postcolonial times (a situation the state was partly responsible for), the seasonal dirt roads of 
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Southern Tanzania nonetheless fostered the emergence of local dynamic socioeconomic 
initiatives.118 In particular, in the late colonial period, Indian entrepreneurs created successful 
transport firms which quickly came to dominate the sector. Valliere Streit’s research therefore 
illustrates the importance of paying attention to links that go beyond the metropole/colony 
dualism, as well as of recognising the implications of the material characteristics of roads. 
However, she does not attempt to make comparisons or connections with road development 
in other parts of the British Empire, and by focusing on the activities happening on the road 
she misses the story of the dynamic transnational adaptation of knowledge and practices that 
was at work in the construction and maintenance of the roads themselves.  
The literature on twentieth-century roads in developing countries/colonies has therefore 
contributed to the examination of state power and exploitation, modernisation discourses, 
economic growth and activity, political and social struggles, and the cultural appropriation of 
motor vehicles. It has told us much less about roads, especially in the second half of the 
century. Since roads materialise particular visions of the state and economic development, 
they have not only fostered growth and facilitated integration, but they have also determined 
what sort of exchanges should be prioritised and which could be neglected, thus marginalising 
(both symbolically and physically) certain social groups and their interests. However, the 
very activities around the construction and maintenance of roads were closely linked to these 
processes of integration and fragmentation, and influenced their outcomes. The study of the 
materiality of the road also forces us to look beyond the familiar dualities of metropole/colony 
and centre/periphery. Thus the history of the road appears as necessarily global, not only 
because the motorable road spread worldwide, but also because it features international 
exchanges of money, people, knowledge and practices, machines and other objects, as well 
as the actions of public and private institutions and organisations with a wide international 
scope. 
Moreover, only by problematising roads and taking seriously their materiality can we 
understand the specificity of roads (as compared to other transport methods) and begin to 
appreciate the distinctive and dynamic technological development of the developing world 
(see below). In fact, our accounts of twentieth-century roads need to tell us about unpaved 
roads, lorries and animal-drawn vehicles, machines and manual labour, laboratories and 
make-do practices, and, indeed, railways and ports. In addition, a comparative perspective 
outside the developed world allows us not just to extend the geographical scope of the current 
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literature, but, above all, to highlight the transformation that roads and road transport 
experienced in the developing world in the post-war period. 
 
Problematising materiality in the history of technology in the developing world 
 
The historiography on technology in the developing world has been, since the 1980s and 
especially since the 1990s, mostly concerned with challenging what has been called the 
‘diffusionist approach’.119 Critiques of this approach have placed its origins in the three-stage 
model of the spread of Western science elaborated by George Basalla in a short paper in 1967, 
and have denounced it for assuming a passive absorption of Western ‘science’ or ‘technology’ 
in the colonies.120 Daniel Headrick is often identified as one of the major representatives of 
technological diffusionism. However, upon reflection, his arguments do not seem to merit 
this description. In his books, Headrick sets out to study the relationship between technology 
and European imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For him, certain 
European innovations (such as steamships and railways, weapons, and the prophylactic use 
of quinine) served different purposes in the process of colonisation as tools of penetration, 
conquest, and the consolidation of exploitative regimes.121 By focusing on the transfer of 
these technologies as part of colonising initiatives, Headrick awarded little room to the study 
of the reactions of local populations to these innovations. Nevertheless, his objective was not 
to make a statement about technology in general, but about the technological means that 
shaped colonialism and that had, in the first place, made empire possible and cost-effective 
for the colonisers.122 He also argued that the transfer of European technologies to the colonies 
was not accompanied by the diffusion of what he calls the ‘culture of technology’.123 By this 
he means that Europeans deliberately withheld significant technical knowledge from the 
colonised in an attempt to maintain their control over their colonial subjects. Although this 
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argument assumes that technological knowledge had to be transferred from Europe to the 
colonies, the institutionalisation of the exclusion of colonised peoples from technical 
education and managerial positions, among other discriminatory measures, was a significant 
part of the technological history of the colonies. This was far from a diffusionist argument.  
Critiques of technological diffusionism (an approach that seems to lack any significant 
representatives) have emphasised local agency, arguing that the adoption of any ‘technology’ 
requires an active process of appropriation from the colonised. Thus, for example, histories 
of colonial railways emphasise how local populations used trains in ways the colonisers did 
not always expect or approve of, and the ways in which these forms of socialisation spurred 
new social struggles and collective self-understandings, while they could also perpetuate 
existing inequalities.124 Similarly, local agency has occupied a prominent place in studies of 
postcolonial contexts. Often in response to the state’s use of technologies as instruments of 
political power and legitimation, local populations have been portrayed in the literature as 
actors whose appropriation of technological innovations has frequently questioned and 
undermined the state (whether intentionally or not).125  
Since most analyses focusing on local agency revolve around certain modern innovations that 
have been prominent in political discourses, large-scale schemes have been prominent in the 
literature. One of the responses to the widespread focus on large-scale technological projects 
in both colonial and postcolonial contexts was the turn to the ‘small’. In a special issue of 
Modern Asian Studies and in his book on everyday technology in colonial India, David 
Arnold presented a new perspective that seeks to focus on small-sized technologies that 
despite their apparent unimpressiveness in fact had a significant impact on the experience of 
everyday life in India, such as the typewriter, the sewing machine or the bicycle.126 However, 
apart from the inclusion of small artefacts, this approach remains mostly concerned with 
highlighting the agency of local populations as users of imported innovations, and it is 
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therefore unclear what this perspective adds to the historiography on technology in the 
developing world.127  
In fact, perhaps concerned with staying away from the spectre of diffusionism, historians 
have tended to circumvent, rather than tackle, the issue of the movement of technological 
objects, knowledge and practices around the world. Studying the reactions of local 
populations (negative or not) to the introduction of foreign technologies (large or small) tells 
us little about how this movement happened. By concentrating on the relationship between 
colonisers and colonised, and state and local populations, other interactions and exchanges 
that go beyond these dichotomies have been neglected. Thus, exchanges within the 
developing world or extra-imperial connections have only recently started to receive 
attention, as well as the influence of the actions of colonial engineers back in the metropole.128 
Studying these exchanges can helps us advance our understandings of technology in the 
developing world without assuming that its significance is limited to the realm of the 
immaterial – as the focus on appropriation practices implicitly suggests. 
Recently, some historians have adopted a material perspective that allowed them to move 
beyond commonly studied innovations and question existing historical accounts of the 
twentieth century. For example, in this PhD thesis, Kapil Subramanian called into question 
the picture the literature has painted of the so-called Green Revolution in India.129 His 
research shows that High-Yielding Varieties did not play a role in the increased wheat yields 
of the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, the advantages of these seeds were only attainable at very 
high doses of inputs – and there is no evidence that any substantial section of Indian wheat 
cultivators applied a high-enough fertiliser dosage. Instead, the increase in yields was driven 
by an expansion in the area of wheat irrigated, a process that took place largely due to an 
increase in the number of privately-owned tubewells (and not due to public irrigation 
schemes). Subramanian therefore shows how taking materiality seriously allows us to 
deconstruct accounts based on assumptions of what the most significant technological 
innovations have been – thus yielding new understandings of technological change in the 
twentieth century. Another recent approach that seeks to take materiality into account, and 
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move away from the innovation-centric histories that David Edgerton has criticised, is the 




Maintenance is a topic that has received considerable attention from Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) scholars over the past three decades.130 The influential work of the sociologist 
Susan Leigh Star represents an important example of the way in which maintenance work has 
been studied from the 1990s onwards. Star notes that one of the main characteristics of 
infrastructure is that it remains invisible until it breaks down.131 For her, although 
maintenance is essential to guarantee the good performance of infrastructure, maintenance 
work is often taken for granted and thus rendered similarly invisible, which has important 
negative consequences for the workforce in charge of repairing and maintaining.132  
Two major themes stand out in the way maintenance has been studied more recently: first, 
how commonplace and necessary it is for the stability of social and material orders, and 
second, its link with innovation and transformation. In a 2007 article, for example, Stephen 
Graham and Nigel Thrift call for the study of maintenance and repair not just because these 
activities are part of modern societies, but because they are the very processes that keep them 
going: ‘Repair and maintenance are not incidental activities ...they are the engine room of 
modern economies and societies’.133 For them, maintenance is connected to innovation 
because over time new objects and techniques are created to perform it, and because repair 
can generate the invention of solutions that go beyond the original objectives of the designer. 
Graham and Thrift also state that there is a politics of maintenance. Not only do different 
ways of maintaining produce distinct outcomes which are more or less efficacious, some 
objects are less maintainable than others.  
More recently, Steven Jackson linked the notion of maintenance with ‘broken world thinking’ 
to argue that repairing is the action that determines the growth and advancement of complex 
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sociotechnical systems.134 For him, once we appreciate the natural, social and technological 
fragility of the world we are able to recognise that maintenance is the activity that keeps 
modernity from falling apart. Yet, although repair and maintenance are essential for stability, 
they are also transformative forces. Breakdown generates innovative solutions that are, in the 
end, the ones that make sociotechnical systems expand and improve. Jackson also suggests 
that maintenance can be understood as a main source of technological difference. According 
to him, in contrast with ‘working technologies’, breakdown and repair are often ‘the aspects 
or portions of broader technological systems that show the most variation across national, 
cultural, or other comparative contexts’.135 
The sociologists David Pontille and Jérôme Denis also start from the recognition of the 
material fragility of the world. They present maintenance work as a ‘care practice’ because it 
is an activity that recognises and acts on the fact that vulnerability is the natural state of things 
and people (and not a temporary deviation).136 They emphasise that maintenance can be both 
transformative and restorative, and they highlight the importance of improvisation and skill 
in maintenance work. In fact, for them continual adaptation is required in maintenance 
because it is not possible to predict in advance what work will be needed, and the ‘skilled 
vision’ of the worker is necessary to judge what activities are necessary.137  
In general, maintenance has been presented as an activity that is detached from the design 
stages. Even when maintenance is seen as innovative, and breakdown presented as providing 
essential feedback, the way in which technologies are designed (more or less) maintainable 
has attracted less attention. An exception is an article by the anthropologist Marianne de Laet 
and the political philosopher Annemarie Mol on a hand water pump produced in Zimbabwe. 
They point out that in the case of this pump, adaptability was built into the design, and the 
resulting flexibility of the pump was the factor that facilitated its widespread adoption.138 
Tinkering and maintenance were therefore not incidental but essential to the design and 
subsequent success of this artefact.  
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Historians of technology have also started to include maintenance and repair in their 
analyses.139 An important example is the work of Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell. By 
focusing on maintenance they seek to highlight the ‘work that goes into preserving technical 
and physical orders’.140 Although these authors recognise the fact that maintenance is 
creative, their approach highlights the role of users and that of the workforce in charge of 
performing routine repair and maintenance tasks.141  
Maintenance has become a dynamic topic in the history of technology field. Vinsel and 
Russell created ‘The Maintainers’ conference in 2016, and maintenance has acquired a more 
prominent space at the annual meetings of the Society for the History of Technology 
(SHOT).142 International workshops dedicated to maintenance have also emerged, attracting 
both young and prominent scholars.143 Broadly speaking the topics that have attracted the 
most attention are the maintenance and repair of objects, machines and certain large-scale 
systems (such as the electrical and telephone ones), routine maintenance/care of homes, cities, 
bodies and animals, and maintainers as an undervalued workforce. However, other themes 
have received limited attention such as the maintenance and maintainability of infrastructures, 
the role of professional engineers in keeping things working, and the influence of income in 
the way maintenance is done and the role it acquires.  
 
Experts in the history of development  
 
Scientific and technical experts have long been prominent actors within histories of 
development. In his well-known book Seeing Like a State, James Scott studies a few examples 
of large social engineering projects of the twentieth century (such as agricultural and 
villagization schemes) and seeks to explain why they failed. These projects originated, 
according to him, from the desire of authoritarian states to control their people and 
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environment, and from their faith in a ‘high modernist ideology’, i.e. confidence in an 
uncritical version of scientific and technical progress mostly preoccupied with the aesthetics 
of modernism.144 The realisation of the schemes was only possible due to the combination of 
a state willing to use force and coercion to bring high-modernism, and the existence of a 
weakened society uncapable of resisting the State. For Scott, the schemes failed first because 
high-modernism relied on making peoples and environments ‘legible’ for the state, which 
implied the simplification of complex realities, a process that ultimately prevented any real 
understanding of the local conditions. Second, experts ignored or actively attempted to 
eliminate local knowledge both because of prejudice and as a way to undermine local 
populations.145 Along similar lines, Timothy Mitchell examined large techno-political 
projects linked with modernisation or development initiatives in Egypt in the twentieth 
century and linked their failure with the experts’ inability to anticipate problems.146 
Although Scott has been widely criticised for the peripheral place he provided to the agency 
of local populations, authors such as Helen Tilley and Suzanne Moon have questioned the 
argument that development projects and their experts were always large-scale schemes that 
ignored local knowledge and had no understanding of the complexities of local conditions.147 
Both authors belong to a recent trend in the history of development which sees the origins of 
development practices and ideas not in the post-war period, but in earlier colonial efforts.148 
In her study of the Netherlands East Indies in the late colonial period, Moon shows that the 
technological development programmes that emerged at the time were based on small-scale 
schemes that had a (biased) interest in local practices and knowledge, and a certitude that the 
combination of Western technologies with an ‘understanding’ of indigenous people would 
guarantee the improvement of the welfare of the subject population.149  
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Tilley on the other hand argues that from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century 
certain scientific disciplines in British colonial Africa not only did not ignore local 
knowledge, but actually stressed the heterogeneity of the colonies’ environments, and the 
complexity of the interrelations among the various problems they studied.150 Although 
scientists ultimately worked to ‘modernise’ Africa, they sought ways of achieving this that 
highlighted site specificity and even local knowledge.151 Although the work of these scientists 
did not necessarily change the views of policymakers or the direction of scientific and 
technical work in the colonies, it did open the door for a positive consideration of African 
expertise, and for a critique of the way empire worked in practice.152 Moreover, Tilley points 
out that even though scientific structures and activities were cognisant of empire, 
international intergovernmental organisations and private philanthropies also had a 
significant influence on the activities of colonial scientists, especially American ones.153 
Another move against the model proposed by Scott has been to question the overarching 
power that he attributed to experts, and the coherence of development discourses and 
practices. For example, in his recent book about the Gezira scheme in Sudan, Mauritus Ersten 
argues that this project needs to be understood as a process that was mediated by both 
European colonial officials and African farmers.154 Ersten proposes to see development 
schemes as the result of constant negotiations that, although unequal, nuance the power of the 
colonial state by highlighting the agency of colonial subjects and especially that of colonial 
officials and engineers, who all had individual agendas. In addition, the actions of the latter 
were continually conditioned by the environment and were often the result of improvisation 
rather than calculated planning and flawless execution.155 Improvising, experimenting, and 
using make-do practices in road development do appear as important activities in the 
developing world, where particular restrictions in terms of machinery, equipment, and 
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materials, as well as challenging climatic and topographic conditions (and even factors such 
as long distances and isolated road sites) required the provision of such solutions.  
Moreover, Ersten and other authors have noted that portions of the local populations were 
also able to take some advantage from development schemes by using them for their own 
purposes. Expectations about economic benefits often surrounded road projects, even in 
colonial times.156 For example, the historian Marcus Filippello points out that the 
mechanisation of road construction in the post-war period changed the perception of a local 
community in Dahomey (French West Africa) towards road projects led by the colonial 
authorities.157 Although at first wary of the project to rebuild a road in the late 1940s, the local 
community soon saw in the improved road surface an opportunity to facilitate the transport 
and commercialisation of their goods, and in the use of earth-moving machinery a way of 
avoiding strenuous work.158 Thus, the community not only welcomed the reconstruction 
works, but in fact demanded that the authorities build an additional road that would join the 
ongoing road project, offering to help with its construction on a voluntary basis.159 By 
contributing to road construction, the members of the community did not feel they were 
recognising their status as colonial subjects, but, on the contrary, they considered they were 
confirming their sense of independence.160  
As Uribe illustrates, the political and economic meaning that roads acquired for local 
populations in independent contexts also led them to actively demand the construction and 
maintenance of roads.161 Finally, as the anthropologists Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox 
show, in the twenty-first century not only roads in general, but roads with all-weather surfaces 
in particular, are still generally seen today as infrastructures holding promises of social, 
political and economic benefits, especially in sparsely populated areas (whether or not those 
expectations are fulfilled is a different issue).162  
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The thesis: major interventions, structure and sources 
 
This thesis responds to Mom’s call for the study of the technical aspects of roads and advances 
the historiography that takes into account the materiality of roads, which until now consisted 
of isolated examples. Thus, this thesis presents for the first time a comparative account of 
twentieth-century road construction and maintenance in Latin America, Africa and Asia – an 
area whose road development has largely gone unnoticed. Instead of simply adding new 
cases, this thesis recognises the major role roads played in these areas and seeks to paint a 
general picture of the major characteristics of road development in this period. This approach 
reveals complex exchanges and interactions at a global scale that considerably advance our 
understandings of the way knowledge and technologies have moved around the world.  
Taking the material seriously gives maintenance a central place in this thesis. Building on 
new studies of maintenance, I argue in this thesis that maintenance is relevant not only 
because it refers to the use and upkeep of technology, but also because it is a highly innovative 
area in itself. Understanding innovation in maintenance, and its significance not least to 
professional engineers, reminds us that maintenance has not been just a matter of low status 
routine work. The case of roads shows that maintenance was a central concern (albeit in 
different form) in all stages of road development: from planning and construction, to use and 
upkeep.163 My thesis therefore provides elements to understand how intertwined 
technological maintenance and innovation are. In fact, road maintenance in the developing 
world was closely related to improvement and therefore did not aim to keep things the same, 
but indeed to create something new. Ultimately, new construction and maintenance were both 
a question of state/colonial power and economic success. Yet, maintenance was usually 
neglected in the face of funds scarcity. Who maintains, who pays for it, and with what 
objective are questions that can yield new insights into our understanding of the link between 
infrastructure technologies and power at different scales. 
The shape that infrastructural development projects took on the ground is a subject that is 
attracting increasing attention, and this thesis aims to advance the study of the mutual 
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interactions between the natural environment and transport infrastructures.164 Considerations 
about the natural environment are necessary in every stage of any road project: from planning 
and design, to construction and maintenance. Indeed, it is difficult to talk about a road without 
mentioning topographic or climatic conditions since any road directly transforms its 
surrounding area while the environment, in turn, constantly modifies the road itself. These 
interactions are intertwined as the effect of the road upon the natural environment can in turn 
generate other effects on the road. For instance, the deforestation, the extensive earth 
movement, and the use of explosives involved in the construction of a road in a mountainous 
area, can cause erosion and destabilise the terrain, thus increasing the risk of landslides. This 
is not specific to the developing world, but the distinct interaction between environmental 
and work conditions made for particular problems that were rarely found in developed 
countries.  
The serious consideration of environmental factors allows me to build on Tilley’s arguments 
in two ways. First, this thesis highlights the fact that the complexity of local environments 
was at the heart of the road engineer’s concerns. Road design, maintenance, construction 
materials (and the way these were employed) were all directly affected by environmental 
conditions and road engineers were aware of the difficulties of adapting knowledge produced 
in different conditions, and worked towards finding the most appropriate solutions to fit every 
site. In addition, although road engineers could sometimes use local knowledge to learn about 
the terrain or certain drainage techniques, in general the construction of motorable roads was 
a novel task that required the production of new knowledge, especially about soils. 
Unprecedented traffic densities, as well as the proliferation of heavier (and more heavily 
loaded) vehicles (both new motorised and animal-drawn) generated particular demands that 
roads were not previously meant to answer.  
Analysing the way in which this need to produce new knowledge was satisfied yields new 
insights into the way techniques, practices and equipment were produced and moved across 
the world. The predominance of American road-related techniques from the 1930s onwards, 
but especially after the Second World War, point to the need of taking into account exchanges 
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beyond commonly studied relationships (such as metropole-colony) as well as of considering 
the dynamics of professional technical networks both at the local and international scales.  
Moreover, the influence that colonial engineering activities had in the metropole has also 
started to attract some attention. As Casper Andersen noted for the case of British engineers 
in Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the experience of colonialism was 
felt in the growing importance of the central engineering institutions, in the business 
platforms from which leading figures of the profession worked, and in the public and self-
perceptions of the civil engineers.165 This thesis shows with the case of the French materials 
laboratories that the experience engineers acquired in the colonies shaped the development 
of road engineering techniques and related scientific institutions in France after 1945 – an 
experience that was, in turn, influenced by the work of the US Army Corps of Engineers.166  
Finally, this thesis also follows recent histories of development such as those by Tilley, Moon, 
and Joseph Hodge in identifying the roots of development in colonial times, and highlighting 
the continuities that such discourses and practices had in the postcolonial period.167 Following 
this vision of development in the long-term makes evident continuities between the colonial 
and postcolonial periods, as well as opens the door to the comparison of (post)colonial Africa 
and Asia with Latin American nations in the twentieth century. In fact, as Hodge pointed out 
for the case of colonial agricultural and natural resource experts, this thesis notes that colonial 
road engineers were also found working for international organisations such as UNESCO or 
the World Bank in the postcolonial period.  
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This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first two chapters offer a global perspective of 
road construction and maintenance around the world from 1930 to 1970, focusing on the 
developing world and on the post-1945 period. Chapter 1 provides a global overview of the 
general trends of road development. It first presents the massive growth that road transport 
and networks experienced, not only in Europe and the US, but also, significantly, in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia. This growth involved high proportions of unpaved roads and heavy 
traffic. This chapter suggests that maintenance and improvements (rather than the expansion 
of road networks) were the main factors that allowed for the rise of heavy traffic after the war 
– an argument that is further developed in Chapters 3 to 5. Chapter 1 also briefly considers 
the issue of why roads acquired such importance within the transport systems of the 
developing world in that they could compete with, and sometimes surpass, railways as 
carriers of goods. I suggest here that the arguments that were put forward in favour of road 
development were generally not linked to superior technical efficiency or the reduction of 
transport costs, but were instead connected to their relatively low initial investment, their 
flexibility, and the possibility they offered of responding to transport demands without having 
optimal standards. Further, I argue that due to the rising transport demands and the limitations 
of funds, a particular type of road became widespread in the developing world: the low-cost 
road. Built keeping costs to a minimum to the detriment of quality standards and circulation 
conditions, this type of road increased the risks of needing future expensive reconstruction 
and maintenance works. However, it provided a quick and relatively cheap solution and this 
justified the construction of roads that would need reconstruction or considerable repairs 
faster than they would have done if they were built with normal standards. This chapter ends 
with a brief account of the evolution of the definition of the low-cost road and its key 
characteristic: upgradeability.  
After the first chapter has presented the general trends and logic behind road development, 
the second chapter explores how the latter took place, focusing on the period after the Second 
World War, when the rising traffic densities required faster and more efficient road 
construction and maintenance tools and techniques. This chapter argues that, from 1930 to 
1970, and especially after 1945, road construction in Latin America, Africa and Asia was 
transformed by American road-building approaches adapted to different contexts. In fact, 
road development in these areas cannot be understood without taking into account the work 
of a growing international road engineering community that adapted and combined American 
approaches with others, coming from both Europe and other developing countries. Given the 
varied and peculiar conditions in some of these countries and colonies, these adaptations were 




techniques due to the use of different materials or due to the type of traffic (sometimes 
including high proportions of animal-drawn vehicles). Organisational and managerial 
capacities seem to have adapted at a slower pace than engineering techniques to the new and 
growing demands, and the limitations of the former often represented a considerable obstacle 
for the adoption of certain tools and methods. Finally, this chapter suggests that apart from 
shaping construction and maintenance, scarcity of funds justified the deferral of certain 
solutions considered ideal and the application of palliative measures.  
The remaining chapters of the thesis present three case studies: the main road networks of 
French colonial Africa, Argentina, and Colombia. These cases were chosen because of their 
complex relationship between roads and large railway networks, and their particularly 
challenging environmental conditions. Prioritising these factors contributes to my objective 
of taking seriously the competition between the two land transport methods, as well as the 
interactions of roads with the natural environment.  
The chapter on French colonial Africa focuses on French West Africa and the Algerian Sahara 
from the Second World War until independence.168 Both territories were highly important for 
the metropole in economic, political, and military terms. Rising transport demands prompted 
the adoption of American modern road-building and maintaining machines and techniques. 
Private firms played an important role in this process and in the development of road 
engineering in general during colonial times. This chapter examines roads in two distinct 
environmental contexts that represented particular challenges for the French civil engineers. 
However, the chapter suggests that it was the engineers’ lack of knowledge about the 
environments (and more precisely about how to build roads in those contexts), rather than the 
conditions themselves, which made these particularly challenging. Despite the engineers’ 
interest in using local knowledge (as they did by, for example, employing artesian wells in 
the Sahara), often this knowledge was not translatable for their particular purposes, which 
was to build and maintain motorable roads.  
Unlike the rest of the case studies in this thesis, the section on the Algerian Sahara focuses 
on construction and deals with very expensive paved roads. The exploration for and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Sahara created dynamics that differentiated this context 
from the rest of the French empire. In contrast, in French West Africa in the post-war period 
a regime of mechanised maintenance was established to ensure the circulation of lorries on 
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low-cost roads that were mostly unpaved – phenomena comparable to the developments that 
characterised the cases of Argentina and Colombia in the 1950s and 1960s, albeit at a different 
scale.  
Although the discussion on French West Africa starts to explore the issue of road/rail 
competition, the Latin American cases provide a more in-depth reflection on this topic, in 
territories served by large railway systems (especially in Argentina) but with different 
economic histories and geographical contexts. Although both countries adopted an inward-
looking model of economic development after the Second World War, Argentina’s growth in 
the first three decades of the century, as well as the success of its industrialisation policies in 
the 1950s and 1960s, put the country in a much better position than Colombia by 1970 – 
although the latter also experienced high rates of GDP growth during the period.169 
Nevertheless, from 1945 to 1970, both countries suffered from constant balance-of-payments 
problems, inflation, and political instability.  
Argentina’s economic growth, aided by its comparatively easy topography, had left the 
country with a transport infrastructure and traffic densities that competed with those of 
Western Europe by the 1930s. However, from the middle of the century, the road authorities 
started to struggle to respond to the increasing transport demands with the funds at their 
disposal. In fact, from 1950 to 1970, roads consolidated their predominance as the main 
carriers of goods. Chapter 4 examines how the national road authorities responded to these 
demands. I argue that Argentina’s national road network was able to withstand rising lorry 
traffic after 1945 mostly due to maintenance and improvement works, as well as to the shift 
from building mostly seasonal roads to building almost exclusively all-weather roads. I 
further suggest that the success of these developments was facilitated by the previous building 
and maintenance experience that road authorities and construction firms had acquired since 
the interwar years. I first briefly present the road building experience of the 1930s and 1940s, 
highlighting the influence of the American model in the construction of concrete and low-
cost roads, as well as in the mechanisation and creation of materials laboratories and use of 
soil mechanics principles. I then explore the challenges that the road authorities had to face 
in the post-1945 period: rising road freight traffic and the scarcity of funds resulting from the 
state’s inability to adapt tax legislation to accommodate growing inflation, and to its 
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prioritisation of the interests of a state-owned energy company. After presenting the varied 
road policies adopted during the period, this chapter ends by showing how the materialisation 
of these policies was built on the modernisation efforts of the previous two decades.  
In contrast to the Argentinian case, on top of financial difficulties, the Colombian state had 
to deal with the challenges of a rugged topography and a tropical climate. The country’s 
environmental diversity could be seen as offering the possibility of building a complex 
intermodal transport system. Nevertheless, although in 1950 roads and railways were carrying 
the same amount of freight, by 1970, roads surpassed railways like in the previous case study. 
Chapter 5 explores how the Colombian national road infrastructure was able to withstand 
such growing traffic. It argues that since the state was unable to coordinate the transport 
methods at its disposal, it put increasing pressure on the road network, and maintenance and 
improvements ended up being the factors that allowed for the growth of traffic – even if it 
was not the state’s policy to prioritise road repairs. The chapter also illustrates how 
administrative and organisation issues hindered road development in developing countries. 
Unlike Argentina, Colombia did not experience an early modernisation of road construction 
and maintenance. Therefore, although new machines and techniques were adopted, the 
Ministry of Transport’s failure to coordinate maintenance, supervise construction, and 
provide clear technical standards limited considerably the effectiveness of its efforts. 
However, roads could still allow the circulation of traffic (even if slow and expensive) in the 
context of funds scarcity, a poorly planned transport policy, and poor maintenance conditions, 
which seems to have put them in an advantageous position in front of railways.  
These three chapters show roads acquiring a considerable share of the transport of goods in 
contexts with both small and large railway networks, with different economic conditions, in 
colonial and independent settings. Natural environments determined the costs and influenced 
the methods and demands of road development, but lorries carried goods over long distances, 
deserts, steep mountains, and under heavy rains. Paving advanced significantly, but by 1970 
main trunk networks still featured a high proportion of unpaved roads, and some main routes 
were not paved continuously.  
* 
This thesis is the result of research conducted in five different countries, in over ten 
repositories, in three different languages, and based on archives produced by road engineering 
associations and conferences, public administrations, and the World Bank. Given the 




and congress reports. Apart from national engineering publications, the Permanent 
International Association of Road Congresses (PIARC) provided a valuable perspective of 
the state of road engineering in the world, although concentrated in Europe and its colonies. 
Figures about the evolution of road lengths are far from uniform and comparisons are difficult 
to make. Not only did road categories vary greatly between countries/colonies, they also did 
over time in the same territory. Since the evolution of vehicle fleets also presented similar 
problems, I have prioritised sources that present data and information in a relatively 
systematic way, such as those from the International Road Federation (IRF) and the World 
Bank’s Staff Appraisal Reports. Even though the PIARC reports and proceedings, as well as 
the World Bank reports and several other documents, are freely available online their use has 
been minimal in the historiography. Other significant sources were the archives of the British 
Road Research Laboratory (RRL)  and the library of the American Highway Research Board 
(HRB) found, respectively, at the National Archives in London (United Kingdom) and the 
National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (Washington D.C., US). Several 
archives and libraries in France, Argentina and Colombia were used for the case studies. The 
material used corresponded not only to engineering publications but also to the archives of 
the ministries of public works or their equivalent. 
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Chapter 1 Low-cost roads: an overview of road development in the 
developing world, 1930-1970 
 
This chapter presents an overview of road development from 1930 to 1970 based on my own 
analysis of the sources. As I have noted, the historiography has no account of the scale or 
type of road building in this period and has focused on very particular aspects. Starting from 
a global perspective, this chapter focuses on Latin America, Africa and Asia.1  
In the developing world, the rates of growth of motor vehicles in use and road length 
extension were fast. The growing road networks were mostly unpaved during the period, and 
often carried a high proportion of heavy vehicles. Road transport was increasingly competing 
with railway networks for the transport of goods over long distances, a phenomenon that was 
facilitated by the rising deficit and declining condition of railways. In addition, roads started 
to be preferred over railways for new construction, mainly because they required lower initial 
capital investment, but also because they were able to function with low quality standards 
and were relatively easier to upgrade over time.  
Given the rising transport demands during the period, in order to build as many kilometres of 
road as possible with limited funds, a particular type of road became widespread in the 
developing world: the low-cost road.2 These roads were meant to last longer than wartime 
supply routes, but half as long as the main roads of the developed world were designed to 
last. The provisional character of low-cost construction in the developing world was not 
questioned, it was an integral part of the advantages that made it attractive. The low-cost road 
was built keeping costs to a minimum to the detriment of quality standards and circulation 
conditions. Such roads also increased the risk of needing future expensive reconstruction and 
maintenance works. However, the life of the roads and the conditions of circulation depended 
on whether routine maintenance and timely improvements were carried out – and it was 
difficult to plan this in advance, as neither road engineers, nor the new experts involved in 
 
1 Unless otherwise stated, the Eastern Bloc is not included. Middle Eastern countries appear occasionally.  
2 In a recent edited volume, Maria L. Sousa notes the use of the term ‘low-cost road’ at the 1950s 
Permanent International Road Association Congresses by French, British and Portuguese engineers. 
However, she does not explain in detail what this type of road entailed in practice, nor does she study how 
widespread the concept was or the important influence of American standards, methods and tools for the 
construction and maintenance of this type of road (see below and Chapter 2). Maria Luísa Sousa, 
‘Colonial Centres and Peripheries: Low-Cost Roads and Portuguese Engineers in the 1950s’, in Simone 
Fari and Massimo Moraglio (eds.), Peripheral Flows: A Historical Perspective on Mobilities between 




the appraisal of road projects were able to accurately predict future conditions (especially 
traffic growth). When many roads built in the early 1950s were in need of reconstruction a 
few years after being built, their failure was not a surprise, although the speed at which it 
arrived was. Although low-cost roads were also built in the developed world, they acquired a 
much more important role within transport systems in the developing world. 
Even though this chapter presents the growing use and length of low-cost roads, it also points 
out that road length tells us little about the rising load-bearing capacity of these roads. The 
maintenance and upgrades of roads’ surfaces and structures are at the centre of the story of 
road development, especially after the Second World War. This chapter presents the link 
between low-cost roads and upgradeability, and Chapters 3 to 5 illustrate the importance that 
maintenance and improvements acquired in parts of the developing world in which road 
expansion was relatively limited in the post-1945 period.  
The first section of the chapter starts with a brief description of the general trends of road 
development from 1930 to 1970. Section 2 examines the motives behind road development 
concentrating on why roads started acquiring such a large role within land transport systems, 
competing against railways, and sometimes even replacing them as main carriers of goods. A 
few examples are presented to illustrate this phenomenon and its relation to the amounts 
invested in road development by national or colonial governments. This section introduces 
the question of what type of arguments in favour of road development seem to have been 
influential within road engineering circles and the World Bank.3 I argue that the advantages 
of roads, especially when discussing freight traffic, were generally not linked to technical 
efficiency or a reduction of transport costs, but were instead connected to their relatively low 
initial capital requirement, their flexibility, and the possibility they offered of serving traffic 
under technical conditions that were not optimal.  
The last section discusses the concept of the low-cost road. After briefly explaining what I 
consider to be a temporary road through the example of the work of the US Army Corps of 
Engineers during the Second World War, I examine the relationship between upgradeability 
and the design life of the low-cost road.4 Despite the changing meaning of the concept of 
 
3 This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive study of this phenomenon since such an 
endeavour would require the analysis of topics such as the lobby from the petroleum and motor vehicle 
industries, the pressure from private enterprises ranging from small transport carriers to large 
multinational companies, and the struggles to maintain and modernise railway networks in a changing 
global geo-political climate, amongst many others. 
4 The example of the US Army Corps of Engineers is also relevant given how influential their work 




upgradeability from the early-1950s to the late-1960s, and despite the lack of consensus on 
how it was best applied, an implication of its adoption became increasingly apparent: this 
type of road was inherently linked to a future plan of engineering works and expenditure that 
was hard to plan given the difficulty of predicting the evolution of certain conditions, such as 
traffic growth. Therefore, low-cost roads were not only a palliative solution, they were also 
an option that increased the risk of facing high costs of maintenance and reconstruction in the 
(not-so-distant) future. 
The data used to illustrate the evolution of railway and road transport, as well as the growth 
of road and rail networks come mostly from the world statistics of the International Road 
Federation (IRF) and from the World Bank’s Staff Appraisal Reports of road and rail projects 
during the period. As previously mentioned, the figures are not precise and are only meant to 
give an idea of the magnitude of the phenomena discussed. The reports of the Permanent 
International Association of Road Congresses (PIARC) meetings and varied documents that 
the World Bank has made available online were also useful. Although the World Bank was 
not the only international funding agency involved in road projects at the time, it was one of 
the most important ones and had a wide geographical scope. The section on road construction 
during the Second World War (in this chapter and the following one) was mostly based on 
two official histories of the US Army Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment and War 
Against Japan, although an official training film from the Defense and War Departments 
found online was also a valuable source.  
 
The rise of motor vehicles, the rise of the road 
 
Although measuring the rise of road transport is not as straightforward as evaluating the 
growth of other transport methods, such as railways, the increase of both road lengths and 
motor vehicles in circulation can give an estimation of the growing significance of roads. The 
US was the leading country of motorisation and road expansion throughout the period. By 
1930, the US had about twenty times as many motor vehicles in circulation than France and 
Great Britain – the countries with the highest number of motor vehicles in use outside the US 
at the time.5 By 1952, the number of vehicles in use in the US had increased rapidly and the 
country had by far the largest number of vehicles in circulation per capita (337.4 vehicles per 
 
5 The US had about 26.5 million motor vehicles in circulation, while Great Britain and France had 1.4 
million and 1.3 million respectively. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), A Statistical Survey of 




1,000 inhabitants, against 68 and 54 in Great Britain and France respectively); by 1970 the 
US continued to have the largest fleet, although Western Europe and Japan were starting to 
catch up.6 The US also had the largest road network of the world throughout the period; in 
fact, Japan’s network, the second largest by 1970, amounted to approximately 1 million km 
of roads, while the US had about 6 million km (see Graph 1.1). In comparison with our case 
studies, the US had, in 1930, approximately 106 times more kilometres of roads than French 
West Africa, 139 times more than Algeria, 22.8 times more than Argentina, and 157 times 
more than Colombia.7 By 1951, although some countries such as France, Great Britain and 
Belgium had longer networks in relation to the size of their territories, the US had the highest 
road length per 100,000 population – i.e. 3,949 km, followed by Argentina with 2,589 km.8  
 
Graph 1.1 Road length in Japan and the US in 1930, 1951 and 1970 (km) 
  
(a) Figure for Japan is from 1956. 
 
6 In 1970, the US had about 529 motor vehicles in use per 1,000 inhabitants, while Great Britain and 
France had about 244 and 281, respectively. Japan had significantly increased its number of vehicles, and 
followed closely with 171 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants. International Road Federation (IRF), World 
Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition (London, 1953), 16, 118-20; IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-
1971 (London, 1972), 52-54, 66-69. 
7 See Annexe A.  














(b) Figures for Japan from 1930 and 1956 include city, town and village streets.  
Sources: International Chamber of Commerce, A Statistical Survey of World Highway Transport (Paris, 
1931), 18-19 (hereinafter: ICC, A Statistical Survey); International Road Federation (IRF), World Road 
Statistics, Revised Second Edition (London, 1953), 13; IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971 (London, 
1972), 19; Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, Historical Statistics, 
Chapter 12 Transport, Table 12-4 Length of roads and paved roads (CY 1894—1935, FY 1936—2004) 
Available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/12.html (06/06/2019). 
 
From 1930 to 1970, outside the US, Japan and Western Europe, the countries with the largest 
road networks throughout the period were India and Brazil (see Graph 1.2). In 1928, British 
India had about 337,600 km of roads, and by 1952, independent India had around 432,800 
km (although this figure includes urban roads), and by 1967 the network almost doubled with 
about 884,159 km.9 In Brazil, while in 1930 there were 113,253 km of roads, in 1948 there 
were about 416,800 km and in 1967 the number doubled to 826,425 km.10 This meant that, 
by 1970, India and Brazil had larger road networks than France and Great Britain (See Graph 
1.2). The extension of road networks in India and Brazil was certainly related to the 
considerable size of their territories. The densities of roads per square kilometre in these two 
countries were considerably lower than the densities in France and Britain: 0,29 km and 0,10 
km of road per square km in India and Brazil respectively, in contrast to 1,42 km and 1,45 
km in France and Great Britain.11 In fact, the density of road networks in relation to 
geographical area in the developing world was, in general, markedly inferior to that of 
developed countries, even by 1970. For instance, as Annexe A shows, in 1970, countries such 
as Ivory Coast, Chile, and Indonesia had, respectively, a road density of 0,10 km, 0,09 km, 
and 0,04 km per square km; while Italy, Great Britain, and France had road densities that 
went from 0,95 km to 1,45 km per square km, and Japan, the country with the densest network 
after Belgium, had 2,74 km of road per square km.12  
The rate of growth of road lengths in the developing world was in some cases considerably 
faster than in Western Europe, Japan and the US during the period (see Graph 1.2). In fact, 
in general in the 1930s road networks were expanding despite the limiting effects of the Great 
Depression, and although networks continued to grow during the 1940s, in some countries 
 
9 ICC, A Statistical Survey, 20-21; IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 13; IRF, World 
Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 19. 
10 ICC, A Statistical Survey, 18-19; IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 14; IRF, World 
Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 18. 
11 See Annexe A. 




the rate of construction was particularly rapid after the Second World War, often as a result 
of programmes of nation building (especially in the case of Brazil).13 In general, in this period 
road, not railway, building was a core part of nation building. The road networks of certain 
(ex)colonies also grew considerably after 1950 (such as Nigeria, Malaysia and Uganda), 
albeit to a significantly smaller scale, as Annexe A shows. In fact, the massive post-1945 
growth of Brazilian and Indian roads seem to have been rather exceptional.14 Several 
countries and colonies experienced relatively limited road length expansion after the Second 
World War, and in particular the cases studied in this thesis (Chapters 3 to 5). For instance, 
while the length of Colombia’s total road network experienced an increase of about 120 per 
cent from 1951 to 1970 (with the construction of about 24,200 km of roads), during the same 
period Brazil’s total road length increased by approximatively 240 per cent (with the 
construction of about 664,400 km of roads).15  
Graph 1.2 Road length in selected countries in 1930, 1951 and 1970 (km) 
 
(a) Figure for Japan is from 1956. 
(b) Figures for Japan from 1930 and 1956 include city, town and village streets.  
 
13 See Joel Wolfe, Autos and Progress: The Brazilian Search for Modernity (New York, Oxford, 2010). 
14 In some countries the length of road networks appears to decline over certain periods of time (such as 
Argentina and Mexico, see Annexe A). This could be related to the disrepair of roads, but was also often 
linked to administrative changes in the way road lengths were measured (see Chapters 4 and 5). In 
particular, urban roads (streets) and tracks or earth roads were sometimes included and sometimes 
excluded from national statistics of road networks.  
15 See Annexe A. In Colombia, the expansion of the national network (excluding Departmental, 
Municipal and other categories) was much slower. From 1951 to 1970, only 7,400 km of national roads 
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(c) Figures for France and India are from 1929. 
(d) Figures from France and India include urban streets. 
(e) Figure from France excludes 698,000 km of rural roads. 
Sources: ICC, A Statistical Survey, 18-23; IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 11-14; IRF, 
World Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 10-26; Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Japan, Historical Statistics, Chapter 12 Transport, Table 12-4 Length of roads and paved 
roads (CY 1894—1935, FY 1936—2004) Available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/12.html 
(06/06/2019). 
 
Figures about road length and density tell us little about the characteristics and conditions of 
roads, and therefore about their load-bearing capacity. However, data about road surfaces can 
provide a general idea about road characteristics. Roads during this period were mostly 
unpaved (see Graph 1.3), especially in the developing world.16 In fact, by the late 1960s there 
were very few countries with a majority of paved roads: Great Britain, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, and France; which were also countries with relatively dense road 
networks in relation to their area.17 Even as late as 1971, a country like Brazil, which by then 
had a network of 1,138,444 km and a growing and increasingly industrialized economy, only 
had 5 per cent of its roads paved.18 India, a country that also experienced a significant post-
war industrial expansion, had by 1971 about 983,000 km of roads and only 35 per cent of 
them were paved.19 Graph 1.3 shows that Japan also had a small proportion of paved roads 
and, even in the US, where in 1971 there were 6,003,007 km of roads, 55 per cent of the roads 
were unpaved.20  
 
Graph 1.3 Total and paved roads in selected countries in 1970 (km) 
 
16 These figures refer to the road networks in general, and not just to new roads built during the period. 
17 IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 12-22. 
18 IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 19. 
19 IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 19. 





(a) Figures exclude 698,000 km of rural roads. 
Source: IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 10-26. 
 
Considerable paving did take place during the period, especially after 1945. As the case 
studies of Colombia and Argentina illustrate (Chapters 4 and 5), the portion of the national 
road network (which consisted of the most important roads at a national level) that was paved 
passed from less than one per cent in Colombia and no more than 10 per cent in Argentina in 
the early 1950s, to about 24 per cent in Colombia and 44 per cent in Argentina in the late 
1960s.21 Yet, these two cases also stand as an example of the fact that most road networks in 
the developing world (both main and secondary) were still mostly unpaved by 1970.22 It is 
difficult to determine how much traffic unpaved roads were carrying in relation to the paved 
ones, as traffic surveys were rare during the period. It is likely that the roads which carried 
the most traffic were paved, at least by late 1960s. However, as Chapters 4 and 5 show, certain 
important routes connecting large cities or production areas to other cities or international 
ports were not continuously paved even in the late 1960s.23 Moreover, in developing countries 
 
21 Dirección Nacional de Vialidad, Panorama Vial de la República Argentina, Situación Actual de la 
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (Buenos Aires, 1970), Fig. 14, 27; Álvaro Pachón and Maria Teresa 
Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia Durante el Siglo XX: Una Descripción desde el 
Punto de Vista Económico (Bogotá, 2006), Anexo II.37. 
22 A few exceptions were Malaysia, Morocco, and Mexico to a lesser extent, see Annexe A. 
23 In Colombia, for example, there were no continuous paved roads between the centre of the country 
(where the capital is located) and the coasts, even in 1969. In Argentina, several national road stretches 
carrying on average 100 vehicles per day were not paved in 1960 (especially, but not exclusively, those 
roads located relatively far from Buenos Aires, such as those in Patagonia). For instance, the road 
between Neuquén and Mendoza was unpaved for about half of its length (and it was even just a track at 
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and colonies, lightly trafficked roads often served high proportions of heavy vehicles. This 
means that even when traffic density was low, roads could carry relatively high proportions 
of lorries or other types of heavy vehicles (such as tractors, trailers, etc.), the circulation of 
which caused severe degradation even in relatively small numbers, as Chapter 2 explains in 
more detail.  
The growth of road networks was spurred by a massive increase in motor traffic, which was 
particularly rapid in Latin America, Asia and Africa.24 In the most motorised country, the US, 
the number of registered vehicles went from 23,386,542 in 1928 to 51,291,600 in 1952.25 In 
less developed countries the rate of traffic increase was in some cases faster. In Brazil, for 
instance, the number of vehicles trebled, from 136,000 in 1928 to 488,900 in 1952.26 By 1970, 
the number had risen to over 3 million vehicles (see Graph 1.4).27 As another example, in the 
Gold Coast there were about 7,500 registered vehicles in 1939 and by 1957 (when it became 
the independent Republic of Ghana) there were approximately 35,480 vehicles, about 4.7 
times as many in less than twenty years.28 Although the rise in the number of vehicles in 
circulation was less rapid in the 1960s, by 1973 Ghana had about 1.6 times more vehicles in 
use than in 1957 (i.e. 56,000 vehicles).29  
 
Graph 1.4 Estimated number of vehicles in circulation in selected countries in 1930, 
1952 and 1970 (in thousands of vehicles) 
 
average in 1961. Moreover, the road network in the north of the country was poorly connected, as 
Santiago del Estero and San Miguel de Tucumán were not connected by any continuous paved roads with 
the rest of the country by 1961. Considerable paving took place in the 1960s, but Santiago del Estero and 
San Miguel de Tucumán were still only connected by unpaved roads with Corrientes, and although the 
road between Neuquén and Mendoza was mostly paved, there was still a significant stretch whose surface 
was just ‘natural’ earth. Herman Felstehausen, Conceptos de Planeamiento Para Mejorar Carreteras y 
Caminos Colombianos (Bogotá, 1969), 17; Annexes I, J, K.  
24 See also Annexe C. 
25 ICC, A Statistical Survey, 12-13; IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 17. 
26 ICC, A Statistical Survey, 12-13; IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 18. 
27 IRF, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971, 18.  
28 Ifor Wyn Pugh and Jan Kanty Wardzala, ‘Mechanization of Road Construction in Ghana, 1952-57’, in 
Conference on Civil Engineering Problems Overseas, 1958 (London, 1958), 85-108. 





Sources: For Brazil, in 1970 the exact date is not specified. This figure is an estimate done by the Grupo 
Executivo de Integração da Política de Transportes (GEIPOT) in 1970 quoted in IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of 
a Third Construction Project, Brazil’ (Washington D.C., 29 February 1972), Table 9. See also: ICC, A 
Statistical Survey, 18-23; IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 11-14; IRF, World Road 
Statistics, 1967-1971, 10-26. 
 
After the Second World War, in most places outside the developed world traffic density 
oscillated between 300 and 2,000 vehicles per 1,000 km of road (while most developed 
countries had a density between 1,000 to 3,000 vehicles per 1,000 km of road).30 However, 
in some cases, traffic density could surpass the densities commonly found in Western Europe 
and the US. In 1952, for instance, while France and Britain had a traffic density of 2,700 and 
11,600 vehicles per 1,000 km of road respectively, in the Federation of Malaya there were 
about 7,600 vehicles per 1,000 km of road.31 In the same year, in Panama (four years after 
the creation of the Colón Free Trade Zone) there were about 16,000 vehicles per 1,000 km of 
road.32 These were not negligible densities, especially because an important proportion of this 
traffic was related to goods transport.  
In fact, lorries were central to motor traffic outside the developed world in general. Already 
in the 1930s there was a significant number of lorries in countries such as Argentina and 
Brazil. For example, in January 1930, at the beginning of Getúlio Vargas’ interventionist 
 
30 IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 119-120. 
31 IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 118-120. 
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regime, it was estimated that there were about 64,560 lorries in use in Brazil, which 
represented about 33 per cent of the total of motor vehicles.33 This number had more than 
tripled by 1952, and Argentina experienced a similar growth passing from about 80,200 
lorries in 1930 to 128,300 in 1952 – period in which lorries passed from representing 19 to 
35 per cent of the total of motor vehicles in use.34 This traffic growth was related to the 
industrialisation policies that both countries undertook in this period, starting with imports 
substitution during the Great Depression (although agricultural production was also 
significant, especially during the Second World War).  
In the developing world, the proportion of automobiles was typically low by US and 
European standards. In the US, for instance, there were around 42,570,500 private cars and 
8,721,100 commercial vehicles in 1952.35 In contrast, in Mexico, for example, there were in 
1952 about 193,100 private cars and 127,000 commercial vehicles.36 In some cases the 
number of commercial vehicles surpassed the number of private cars. This was the case for 
the Gold Coast, Nigeria, French West Africa, Madagascar, Tanganyika, Angola, the Belgian 
Congo, and Latin American countries like Bolivia and Ecuador (see Graph 1.5). In French 
West Africa, for instance, there were in 1952 approximately 12,900 private cars and 26,700 
commercial vehicles.37 By the late 1960s, the proportions of heavy vehicles as compared to 
private cars were less stark but were still significant since there were about twice as many 
private cars than goods vehicles in most cases.38 This is a point which bears expansion. 
Lorries and pickups were considerably larger and heavier than automobiles. For example, the 
1960 Ford Falcon, 4-door sedan, 109.5-inch wheelbase, weighed about one ton, and generally 
carried less than 500 kg.39 In contrast, a 1957 Ford F-600 dump truck had a maximum gross 
vehicle weight of about 8,500 kg, and some versions of the 1958 Ford T-850 had a maximum 
 
33 ICC, A Statistical Survey, 12-13. 
34 ICC, A Statistical Survey, 12-13. 
35 In its 1953 edition, the IRF’s World Road Statistics distinguished between private cars, passenger 
vehicles (i.e. buses and coaches), and commercial vehicles, defined as: ‘all mechanically-propelled 
vehicles of a load-carrying type – trucks, lorries, ambulances, fire engines and all such vehicles employed 
in Government or Municipal services (excluding buses and coaches)’. IRF, World Road Statistics, 
Revised Second Edition, 15, 17. 
36 IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 17. 
37 IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 16. 
38 See Annexe C. 





gross vehicle weight of about 20,400 kg.40 High proportions of lorries and other goods 
vehicles were therefore particularly damaging for roads (see Chapter 2). 
 
Graph 1.5 Estimated number of private cars and commercial vehicles in circulation in 
selected colonies and countries, January 1952 
 
(a) Commercial vehicles were defined by the IRF in 1953 as: ‘all mechanically-propelled vehicles of a load-
carrying type – trucks, lorries, ambulances, fire engines and all such vehicles employed in Government or 
Municipal services (excluding buses and coaches)’. Figures for Angola, Gold Coast, Nigeria and 
Tanganyika include buses and coaches.  
Source: IRF, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition, 15-18. 
  
Finally, roads in some parts of Asia and the Americas also had to accommodate the rising 
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles.41 The case of India is perhaps unique due to the high number 
 
40 The unit of gross vehicle weight includes the vehicle's chassis, body, engine, engine fluids, fuel, 
accessories, driver, passengers and cargo but excludes that of any trailers. James K. Wagner, Ford Trucks 
Since 1905 (Sarasota, 1978), 278, 289. 
41 This seems to have been less common in the Americas. However, the high number of animal-drawn 
vehicles was considered a safety hazard in some British territories in the Caribbean in the early 1950s. 
That was the case of Barbados in 1953, where it was estimated that there were approximatively as many 
private cars as animal-drawn vehicles in circulation. National Archives United Kingdom (NA), 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) 27/331, RN/2553/PHPW, PHP Williams, Roads 












of bullock carts circulating throughout the twentieth century. In 1961, the International 
Development Association (IDA) stated that animal-drawn carts and other slow moving 
vehicles were a main feature of road traffic in India.42 According to the IDA, these vehicles 
tended to outnumber motor vehicles on traffic surveys, even on the National Highways.43 
That same year it was estimated there were more than 10 million bullock carts, while there 
were about 160,000 lorries, 50,000 buses, and 285,000 cars, jeeps and taxis.44 About 500,000 
of the bullock carts were commercial, which means they were hired to carry goods for a 
reward.45 The number of these vehicles was expected to continue to grow as it had been doing 
in the 1950s, following an increase of the farmers’ income.46 Indeed, in 1971, slow moving 
traffic (including bullock and hand carts) was still a decisive factor for road construction and 
maintenance, although its presence on trunk roads was decreasing.47 Studies had been carried 
out to examine the effects these carts had on traffic operations, concluding that in terms of 
road capacity one bullock cart was the equivalent of 11.2 passenger cars.48  
 
Roads over railways 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, roads acquired increasingly important roles within 
transport systems in many countries and colonies – a process that had often started in the 
1930s. In most Latin American countries, with the exception of Bolivia, roads replaced 
railways as main carriers of goods, even in long distances, and even in countries with 
extensive rail systems like Argentina and Colombia (Chapter 4 and 5).49 In Brazil, for 
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example, the proportion of ton-km carried by rail decreased from 28 per cent in 1950, to 18.3 
per cent in 1961, and to 14.4 per cent in 1968.50 In contrast, the proportion of ton-km carried 
by road went from 41.6 per cent in 1950, to 62.9 per cent in 1961, and to 72.6 per cent in 
1968.51 Despite the nationalisation of the Brazilian railways, which started in the 1930s and 
was accelerated after the Second World War, and despite the impulse that the war gave to the 
railways due to the difficulty of importing motor fuel, railways became less important.52 
According to the historian Ángel Rodríguez Carrasco, the Brazilian state turned to roads as 
prime movers of goods in great part because the railway network had been built to export 
mineral and agricultural products and was therefore outward-looking and lacked many 
connections between lines.53 In fact, in 1968, roads carried 107.5 billion of net ton-km, while 
railways carried 21.4 billion of net ton-km.54 A degree of specialisation did take place, and 
from 1960 onwards railways tended to mostly carry minerals, fuel, and construction 
materials, amongst other similar products.55  
The increasing importance of roads within national transport and economic policies in Latin 
America in the second half of the century was also evident in the way public investment was 
divided. In the case of Brazil for instance, federal investment in railways in relation to the 
other transport methods went from representing 32.37 per cent in 1965 to 13.7 per cent in 
1969, whereas investment in roads grew from 38.67 per cent to 46.52 per cent during the 
same period.56 Peru provides an extreme example, with railways being attributed only 1.8 per 
cent of the budget in the transport investment plan for 1961-1971.57 This low figure is in great 
part explained by the fact that, unlike most Latin American countries, Peru did not nationalise 
its railway network until after 1970, which, combined with the rising identification of 
railways as a symbol of European imperialism after the Second World War, resulted in a 
limited governmental effort to support railway transport.58 In fact, according to the historian 
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Carmen Aycart Luengo, the state introduced a tax on the railways specifically to fund road 
development in the middle of the century.59  
A preliminary overview of road and rail transport in Asia and Africa in the post-1945 period 
suggests that the shift from rail to road was not as marked as it was in Latin America.60 Roads 
did carry larger freight volumes than railways in many cases. For instance, in Ivory Coast, 
already in 1951, about 60 per cent of the two most important export products of the territory 
(coffee and cacao) were transported by lorry and not by rail (see also Chapter 3).61 This trend 
continued after independence and, by 1973, 70 per cent of inter-urban freight traffic (ton-km) 
was carried by road, while only 25 per cent was carried by train.62 Another example is Nigeria, 
where the share of tonnage carried by road to and from the port of Lagos increased from 16 
per cent in 1955 to 60 per cent in 1967-68.63 The rise of road traffic around this port in the 
late 1960s was related to the damages the railway suffered in the context of the civil war that 
had started in 1967.64 Large quantities of general cargo and petroleum products were shifted 
to the roads – which started deteriorating due to an unprecedented high volume of heavy 
traffic and a general lack of maintenance.65 In Indonesia, railways were carrying mostly 
passengers by the late 1960s. The World Bank estimated in 1969 that the railway’s share of 
the transport of goods by land was below one tenth of the total.66 Over the previous six years, 
only 15 per cent of the traffic on the railway corresponded to freight.67 According to the Bank, 
railway track and bridge maintenance had been neglected since 1939, and by 1969 the vast 
majority of the rolling stock was over 40 years old, 75 per cent of the locomotives were steam-
powered and the service to shippers was slow and unreliable.68 The maintenance condition of 
the railway seems to have played a role in the decline of rail traffic, and the volume of ton-
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km carried by train decreased from about 1 billion to 0.6 billion from 1962 to 1967.69 
Although roads were in equally poor conditions in the late 1960s, and unpaved roads formed 
the majority of the length of each category of road still in 1969, the circulation of motor 
vehicles was nonetheless possible, if only at speeds below 15 km/h.70  
However, the railway maintained its place as the main transporter of freight in many colonies 
and countries during the period – which seems to have been related to state measures to 
protect railway networks. For instance, the East African Railways (serving Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanganyika) more than doubled the volume of freight they carried from 1938 to 1953.71 
By 1969, in Kenya, the railway route between the port of Mombasa and the western border 
with Uganda, along with the subsidiary lines feeding into it (about 1,600 km combined), 
carried the majority of the country’s imports, exports and long-distance bulk traffic.72 In 1969, 
the World Bank considered that the state, in its attempt to protect the railways, had 
excessively regulated and restricted commercial road transport, and that these measures 
should be relaxed to allow for free competition.73 In Ghana, in 1969 the railway was the main 
carrier of the principal export commodities (cocoa, timber, bauxite and manganese ore), 
which constituted over 90 per cent of its freight.74 Yet, for other commodities (and for 
passengers) roads were of ‘prime importance’, according to the World Bank, and they were 
the basic transport method serving the area beyond the three main urban areas in the south, 
which were connected by the railway system.75  
India’s development plans (and in particular industrialisation initiatives) were closely linked 
to railways and not roads during the 1950s and 1960s. Railway traffic in India grew 
considerably during the period, as well as public investment in the maintenance, 
modernisation, and to some extent extension of the railway network. Between 1951-52 and 
1955-56, the total volume of freight originated increased by 18 per cent (from 96.6 million 
tons to 114 million tons) and the number of freight ton miles from 28,966 million to 36,458 
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million.76 In the following decade, the volume carried by the railway increased from about 
87,700 million net ton-km in 1960-61 to 125,000 million net ton-km in 1968-69.77 Transport 
investment reflected the prioritisation of railways during the period. Total railway investment 
was of Rs. 11.2 billion in the Second Five-Year Plan and the Third Five-Year Plan proposed 
a total investment of Rs. 12.2 billion.78 In contrast, investment in roads during the Second 
Plan was expected to be about Rs. 2.7 billion, and the Third Plan allocation was about Rs. 2.5 
billion – a sum the World Bank qualified as ‘totally inadequate’ in 1960.79 Nevertheless, the 
Bank provided ten times more funding for railway than for road projects in India during the 
period. From 1949 to 1969, India received over 600 million USD from the Bank for 13 
railway projects, while it only received about 60 million USD for one road project during the 
same period.80 Nonetheless, as previously noted, India’s road transport and network also 
experienced significant growth during the period.81  
In general, the World Bank lent more money for roads than for railways during the period. 
From 1949 to 1970 inclusive, the World Bank lent over 2,600 million USD for 157 road 
projects around the world, and about 1,960 million USD for 78 railway projects.82 In addition, 
the majority of railway loans were destined for the maintenance and improvement of existing 
lines – and in great part for the purchase of machinery and other equipment to renovate, 
maintain, and facilitate the future maintenance of the networks.83  
The argument for roads over railways was clearly made in the early 1950s by, for instance, 
the British engineer Sir Kenneth Mitchell. He argued that despite the fact that railways could 
be more economical for certain traffic over long distances, ‘the transport to be provided in at 
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present under-developed countries will be solely or mainly by road’.84 Roads offered, in 
contrast to railways, the ‘transport necessary to build up the economy of the backward country 
or area at the lowest possible cost in the early critical years’.85 Mitchell had been appointed 
consulting engineer to the Government of India for Roads in 1930, was wartime Chief 
Controller of Civil Road Transport in India, and Chairman of a Departmental Committee 
advising on post-war road development and transport coordination in India from 1945-46), 
and was considered an authority in the field of road development by the 1940s. Along similar 
lines, the engineer and British conservative politician F.J. Erroll (who served as Technical 
Adviser to the South East Asia Command on armoured fighting vehicles during the Second 
World War, was elected Member of Parliament for Altrincham and Sale in 1945, and later 
became Minister of Trade and of Power) stated in 1951 that roads were ‘the appropriate way 
to develop virgin territory’, writing about transport in African colonies.86 The reasons he gave 
were first, that new techniques made road construction quick and cheap (unlike rail 
construction), second, that roads could be improved and expanded as traffic increased without 
great increase of capital investment, and third, they could also be easily linked to other roads 
without the problems posed by the variation in gauges.87 Erroll also noted that roads required 
less capital cost because the maintenance and repair of vehicles was in the hands of road 
hauliers and workshops.88 Roads were therefore also more suited to respond to strategic 
needs. As Erroll claimed in 1951: 
for strategic communications, roads are better than railways, because they can be built 
very quickly and one need not spend much on them. Most modern armies move on 
lorries rather than by train, and bring their own road transport with them, so that they 
can always make use of roadways whereas it is not so easy to use railways. The 
country supplying the troops may have its own gauge: bomb damage on railways 
takes a long time to repair, whereas a lorry can always drive around the site of the 
bomb crater and proceed on its way.89 
Indeed, the Second World War had prompted the construction and use of roads at a large 
scale, often through virgin and difficult territory, under considerable time pressure for 
construction (see below).  
 
84 Sir Kenneth Mitchell, ‘The Logical Stage Development of Roads in Under-Developed Countries’, in 
Road International, 3 (1951), 40.  
85 Mitchell, ‘The Logical Stage Development’, 40. 
86 F. J. Erroll, ‘Transport in Africa, A Comprehensive Study of Means of Communication Throughout the 
Continent’, in Road International, 3 (1951), 48. 
87 Erroll, ‘Transport in Africa’, 49. 
88 Erroll, ‘Transport in Africa’, 50. 




These arguments related to the construction of roads in British colonies, but similar opinions 
about the advantages of roads were common at the annual meetings of PIARC, in Latin 
American engineering debates, and amongst World Bank staff in the post-war period. For 
instance, in 1951, a PIARC Indonesian report stated that ‘opening-up’ new districts with the 
construction of standard or narrow gauge railways had been an error in the past, and that roads 
were a better option for this purpose due to the requirement of low initial investment in 
comparison with railways: 
Experience has proved that railways require from the outset heavy investment of 
capital which for the time being is not profitable and which is in danger of getting 
totally lost if the development of the district does not run as smoothly as anticipated. 
Construction of highways, on the contrary, can be done on the principle that as many 
roads as possible are made in the most economical manner. This will be achieved by 
practicing the utmost restraint in the projection of roads, which are gradually 
expanded, and in the first place by also making use of the navigable parts of the 
rivers.90 
Almost a decade later, one of the technical committee’s report at PIARC linked road 
construction of low trafficked roads and of main roads in ‘underdeveloped countries’ to a 
high capitalisation rate policy. According to the delegates (from France, Belgium, Great 
Britain, Italy, Portugal, and Turkey), in contexts in which insufficient funding was available 
to build the necessary road infrastructure to respond to the transport demand, ‘communities’ 
were ‘obliged’ to meet only the most urgent needs in order to avoid a ‘future catastrophe’, 
even if this meant sacrificing the quality of the works, an increase in maintenance costs, and 
high operating costs for road users.91 Therefore, for road engineers at PIARC, roads presented 
the advantage of being motorable without requiring high quality standards, which means they 
could demand relatively low initial expenditure, unlike railways.  
Latin American road engineers put forward similar arguments. For example, the Colombian 
engineer Sebastián Ospina B., a fierce promoter of road development (and US-educated), 
argued in the 1940s and early 1950s that roads were better suited to the country’s topography 
and financial situation, as the mountains that traversed the country made railway construction 
and operation particularly expensive.92 Therefore, he concluded, a poor country with a rugged 
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topography like Colombia should build roads, which could be built with lower initial 
investments and which could be more easily upgraded over time.93 However, Colombian road 
engineers were generally not in favour of abandoning existing railways, and most civil 
engineers agreed on the fact that, in ideal conditions, railways were better suited to carry large 
volumes over long distances than lorries.94  
Some of the World Bank staff seems to have shared these opinions about the advantages of 
roads. In the case of Colombia, the Bank’s 1949 mission, directed by Lauchlin Currie, stated 
that roads: 
can be used efficiently by many types of vehicles for both local and long-haul traffic; 
they can traverse terrain too difficult for railway construction; and the investment in 
their construction can be adjusted in considerable measure to the economic utility of 
the route involved, (whereas) a very high minimum investment is always required for 
a railroad.95  
Despite vouching for the extension and modernisation of the road network, this mission also 
recommended significant investment in railway development, including the construction of a 
new line, a project the Colombian government decided to undertake (see Chapter 4). Over a 
decade later, by the mid-1960s, Hendrick J. Van Helden (Chief of the Transportation Division 
of the Technical Operations department at the World Bank in the 1960s) also identified the 
requirement of comparatively low capital investments as an advantage of roads. However, he 
added an important nuance to this premise: road transport usually required less public funds 
than railway transport, for both its construction and operation.96 In countries with limited 
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The ‘low-cost’ road: between temporary and permanent 
 
The term ‘low-cost road’ did not have an explicit definition until the 1950s, but its use was 
common as early as 1930.98 By the mid-1950s, the PIARC had created a committee dedicated 
entirely to the discussion of issues related to economic principles and low-cost methods in 
‘underdeveloped’ areas.99 In the 1959 meeting, the committee confirmed that the concept of 
low-cost roads was expected to be fruitful in the future, especially in the face of the new 
challenges brought about by the rapid changes in road transport trends.100  
Broadly speaking, a low-cost road was characterised by the use of particular materials and 
methods to build a motorable road that would remain passable all seasons (if possible), at the 
lowest possible cost, even if the road was not built up to the best technical standards.101 Low-
cost roads were not necessarily cheap, they prioritised keeping costs to a minimum. There 
was one main element that differentiated low-cost roads from other types of road 
construction. Although low-cost roads did not prioritise technical standards, they were 
designed to allow for future improvements. This was called ‘stage construction’ or 
‘upgradeability’.102 The basic implication of upgradeability was that all the non-urgent 
elements of the road were initially deferred, but the expectation was that these elements were 
going to be added to the road structure at some point in the future. In general, engineers 
considered that while surfaces could always be improved, the alignment or the gradients of 
the roads were very expensive to correct, and should thus be prioritised.103 However, 
determining which elements should be provided from the initial stages and which could wait, 
as well as anticipating the future timeline of upgrades for any road, were complicated 
processes, and there was no consensus about how they should be carried out. There was no 
formula applicable to every situation for the negotiation between lowest possible cost and 
maximum technical standards. It was considered that ‘the highway engineer must select the 
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solution which each case demands, having regard to the materials available and the conditions 
of climate, soil and traffic, on which he should be accurately informed’.104  
Even if engineers managed to find a solution taking into account all those variables, they 
could not predict how conditions would change over time with precision (and indeed traffic 
growth in the developing world exceeded most predictions during the period), which meant 
engineers could not define the design life of the road in advance, i.e. they did not know how 
long roads were going to last before reconstruction or significant improvement was needed. 
In general, the low-cost roads of the developing world were expected to last half the time as 
the main roads of developed countries, in great part due to the rapid rates of traffic growth. 
For the British Road Research Laboratory (RRL), for example, in 1962, roads in ‘the 
developing countries in the tropics’ were built to last for about ten years without major 
reconstruction, in contrast to roads in developed countries, which were designed to respond 
to demands for the following 20 years.105 This was related to the rapid growth of traffic in the 
‘less developed countries’.106 As the RRL explained, while increases of 15 to 20 per cent per 
year were common in developing countries, in Great Britain annual increase was of the order 
of seven per cent.107 This meant that, twenty years after built, roads in developing countries 
would have to carry about 15 times more traffic, against only four times in Britain.108 Another 
problem, according to the World Bank, was the scarcity of data, which made traffic 
projections particularly difficult to calculate.109 By 1969, according to the RRL, the situation 
had not changed: in developed countries it was considered normal to design roads for the 
estimated traffic over a period of twenty years, while in most developing countries it was 
usual to adopt a design life of ten years in the first instance, and assess what the traffic would 
be over that period for the purposes of initial construction.110 This was still related to the high 
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rates of traffic growth, which made it ‘uneconomic’ to design roads to serve the traffic of the 
following twenty years, in terms of both layout and strength.111 Low-cost roads were a quick 
and relatively inexpensive palliative solution designed to respond to urgent demands usually 
by running the risk of increased future expenditure.  
Although low-cost roads were not exclusive to the developing world, they acquired a 
particular significance there. While low-cost roads in developed countries usually 
corresponded to parts of the network of secondary or tertiary importance, in developing 
countries or colonies they generally played important roles within trunk networks.112 
The temporary roads of the US Army Corps of Engineers in the Second World War  
One very important reference point for the low-cost road were the roads built by the US 
military during the Second World War. These were rapidly built roads, often using heavy 
machinery, designed for a short life. The temporary roads of the US Army Corps of Engineers 
influenced the way low-cost roads were built from then on. Although ‘road expedients’ (such 
as the corduroy road) were not common after the war, construction of unpaved, substandard, 
seasonal roads, using the same machines and low-quality local materials was widespread in 
the developing world from the late 1940s through the 1960s.113  
Road construction was one of the essential tasks undertaken by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers during the Second World War on a huge scale. As the narrator of an official training 
film of the US Army Service Forces put it: ‘While most of our equipment travels first on the 
high seas, or even by air freight, eventually it must be transported on roads. Roads that feed 
the combat zone, roads that carry the guns and machines from their factory in Detroit to the 
men that need it, when they need it’.114 The mechanisation of works was one of the main 
strategies adopted by the US Army Corps of Engineers to accelerate construction processes, 
although this did not entail the disappearance of manual labour (see Chapter 2). 
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Although these roads had to bear very heavy traffic and endure constraining environmental 
conditions, they were mostly unpaved and they were not designed to last long. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the unpaved surface and heavy traffic that characterised the Ledo road (alternative 
route to the Burma road connecting India and China). The finished Ledo road was weather-
dependent and regular maintenance works were necessary even during construction, as ‘the 
jungle would start taking over again’.115 Heavy traffic and raids also significantly increased 
the need for maintenance works, which often continued during the night.116 However, the 
road was not meant to last beyond wartime, and therefore a more sturdy structure or surface 
was considered superfluous.  
 
Figure 1.1 American lorries on the Ledo Road during World War II 
 
Source: ‘US-built Army trucks wind along the side of the mountain over the Ledo supply road now open 
from India into Burma...’, n.d. 208-AA-45L-1. Taken from ‘Pictures of African Americans During World 
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The fact that wartime roads were not made to last long was made explicit in the official history 
of the US Corps of Engineers for the case of Australia. In 1942, as the American engineers 
started guiding ‘the Australians in the unfamiliar task of building for the American Army’, 
they noted that the Australians were building ‘over-elaborate’ roads with structures ‘better 
suited for a permanent peacetime highway than for a temporary military supply route’.117 The 
Americans insisted construction should ‘be held to “bare essentials”’ and suggested the 
deferral of long-term projects.118 Many Advisory War Council officials agreed and through 
their control of manpower, materials, and equipment focused the efforts on the projects that 
would contribute to the war effort (even if supplies and materials had been allocated to other 
projects before Japan entered the war) and saw that what they called “spit and polish” 
construction was avoided.119  
Between cumulative improvements and reconstruction: the evolution of upgradeability  
Low-cost roads were not meant to be temporary, only some of their elements were. However, 
how long should a low-cost road last before significant improvement (as opposed to routine 
maintenance) and/or reconstruction was needed? And how could road engineers make sure 
that their roads were built to the (minimum) sufficient standard that allowed them to last that 
particular amount of time? The decision about which elements were deferred and which were 
to be built to a permanent status from an early stage was the result of a negotiation between 
engineers and road authorities and varied greatly between cases. However, some general 
trends seem to emerge from the PIARC and United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) meetings and publications, as well as from World Bank’s 
staff appraisal reports. 
Low-cost roads were meant to be upgradeable: they were designed to facilitate improvements 
over time that would progressively transform earth tracks into all-weather paved roads – 
provided the level of traffic justified the necessary upgrades. This logic, also known as stage 
construction, was already moulding road construction in the interwar period.120  
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From at least the 1930s until approximately the mid-1950s, the concept of upgradeability was 
connected to an ideal of cumulative improvements. This model implied that each 
improvement corresponded to an addition to the previous one and was supposed to become 
an integral part of the final stage of the road. Therefore, road engineers aimed to build 
permanent structures (such as drainage) along the roads’ definitive alignment (profile and 
route) from the early stages of construction, leaving the improvement of characteristics such 
as width and type of surface to later stages.121 Discussing the topic of the construction of 
roads in colonies and ‘undeveloped regions’ at the 1930 PIARC meeting in Washington D.C., 
the French, British and American reports presented the methods used to determine road 
alignments and make them permanent as soon as possible. French engineers advised 
undertaking a comprehensive survey of the route location before beginning any partial 
improvements, and their British counterparts highlighted the importance of ensuring the 
alignment accommodated all mechanically propelled vehicles, as well as draught animals.122 
American engineers explained how their general tendency was to look for direct routes ‘on 
the most permanent and economic location obtainable’, but that sometimes low standards 
were justified if the needs were urgent and funds limited.123 However, even in these cases, 
surfaces that were considered expensive were not used on temporary alignments because they 
anticipated that these would be discarded over time.124 
In the mid-1950s, the PIARC reports continued to indicate similar approaches to road 
upgradeability. The General Report on Low Cost Roads at the 1955 congress concluded that 
one of the primary objectives of new construction was to make roads permanent and eliminate 
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all temporary engineering structures.125 The French engineers working in French West Africa 
followed this practice as they included permanent alignment and engineering structures in the 
first stage of road construction, leaving surface improvements for the second and third 
stages.126 In the same year, the British report on low-cost roads noted that final alignment and 
drainage were a necessary condition to pass from the lower to the higher stages of road 
construction standards, which for them commonly involved either providing a seal coat of 
bitumen or grout, or stabilising soil with cement, bitumen or a chemical additive.127  
However, by the late 1950s road engineers started to move away from the model of 
cumulative improvements. One important reason was that some low-coast roads were found 
not to be upgradeable. For instance, the World Bank reported how, despite Iran’s high 
investment on road construction after the Second World War, by 1959 many of the roads built 
since then required considerable reconstruction or even relocation due to lack of maintenance 
and low construction standards.128 The Trans-Iranian Highway (the longest road included in 
this project) provides an example of the amount of reconstruction that was required. This road 
ran for more than 1,200 km from the port of Khorroamshahr on the Persian Gulf to the port 
of Pahlavi on the Caspian Sea (almost parallel to the Trans-Iranian railway built in 1938).129 
The reconstruction of the road cost 87.7 million USD, almost as much as the construction and 
reconstruction of another 1,200 km of main roads and about 440 km of secondary roads which 
were included in the same project.130  
The need for considerable reconstruction of many roads (and, therefore, the limitations of the 
model of cumulative upgrades) was also noted in countries that had actively participated in 
the PIARC congresses. In the 1964 meeting, for instance, one of the French reports pointed 
out that this model was satisfactory only if the roads were built under careful supervision and 
were continuously maintained.131 However, the French engineers noted that this was often 
not the case in ‘African developing countries’, and they related the bad conditions of the roads 
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(and even their destruction) to the shortage of funds and skilled labour.132 Discussing the same 
subject at the congress, their British counterparts stated that poor road conditions in 
developing countries also resulted from the limited use of cost-benefit studies in the process 
of determining when, or if, to build permanent alignments.133 According to them, this 
frequently led to the construction of roads with standards that they considered either higher 
or lower than necessary.134  
This generated a change in the way road engineers thought about road upgradeability. The 
new definition did not necessarily consider improvements as cumulative; instead, when 
building a new road, it became acceptable (and even desirable in some cases) to build 
temporary structures and alignments, even if these had to be abandoned a few years later.135 
In practice, provisional structures and alignments had been common, and now they were the 
norm.  
This definition of upgradeability was ratified by the first manual on road construction and 
maintenance in developing countries prepared by UNESCO in the mid-1960s. Although the 
organisation recognised the possibility of building permanent structures, embankments and 
alignments from the first stage of construction (and leaving surface improvements for the 
following stages), this option was presented as often unfeasible, unnecessary, and even 
counterproductive – given that high standard construction could be considered premature for 
some roads, and therefore an unwelcome diversion of already scarce funds.136 Instead, all 
road characteristics (including alignment and structures) were expected to evolve over time, 
and were therefore provisional.137 The UNESCO text identified three main stages for road 
construction: 1) motorable tracks, which allowed seasonal motor traffic with the help of some 
temporary bridges or structures; 2) earth roads, with drainage, embankments and often an 
improved surface, and which could, over time, reach an all-weather stage with definitive 
profile and alignment; and 3) a definitive paved road with bitumen or concrete, ensuring 
continuous circulation.138 However, unlike the previously accepted practice, the manual noted 
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that the paved stage of the road had, in principle, but not necessarily, permanent alignment 
and structures.139  
Similarly, in 1964, French engineers at PIARC reported that stage construction had been 
useful in the former colonies during, and especially after the Second World War, but that 
current conditions were generating a move away from the idea that each improvement had to 
be an integral part of the final stage.140 First, permanent structures required an investment that 
was not always justified for the level of traffic on every road. Second, the lack of maintenance 
often destroyed road structures and embankments, even if they had been initially built with 
high standards. Indeed, these French engineers stated that it was sometimes ‘accepted to 
bituminise a highway on a temporary line, whilst knowing that the alignment will be amended 
later on’.141 For them, the benefits of this approach were that investment on earthworks was 
deferred while maintenance works were made easier and cheaper by paving the surface.142 
This option was therefore particularly attractive in countries in which funds and staff for 
maintenance works were scarce.143 
It is difficult to measure the adoption of this new definition. Initially prepared in French, the 
UNESCO manual was published in both French and English in the late 1960s.144 These texts 
were written and edited by important members of the PIARC Committee on Low Cost Roads: 
the French engineer Lionel Odier (Chief Engineer from Ponts et Chausées, working at the 
Bureau Central d’Études pour les Équipements d’Outre-Mer), the British engineer Dr R.S. 
Millard (head of the Tropical Section at the RRL, England, later to become the Deputy-
Director of the RRL), the Indian engineer S.R. Mehra (Director of the Central Road Research 
Institute in New Delhi, India), and the Portuguese engineer Pimentel dos Santos (Director 
General de Obras Publicas e Communicaçôes, Ministerio de Ultramar).145 These engineers 
had been active members of PIARC discussions for decades, and especially in relation to low-
cost road building in developing countries and colonies. It is therefore possible to say that 
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this definition was well known (if not adopted) by the members and correspondent members 
of the PIARC Committee on Low Cost Roads, which in 1967 included delegates from 
countries such as Turkey, Poland, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and Japan.146 
It is possible that both types of construction of upgradeable roads (cumulative and by 
reconstruction) were kept as options, and that in practice one or the other was adopted 
according to each specific case. However, as the networks of the developing countries grew, 
by the late 1960s and early 1970s most main roads had already been built and therefore new 
roads were increasingly those that occupied secondary and tertiary roles.147 Thus, the 
relatively low level of traffic on these new roads was probably making increasingly attractive 
the option of building provisional structures and alignments for the upgradeable roads.148 
Upgradable roads as policies   
The move away from the model of the cumulative improvements was accompanied by the 
realisation that upgradeable roads not only responded to, but also demanded, in and of 
themselves, a particular road policy. First, stage construction and maintenance were 
considered inseparable.149 Indeed, upgradeable roads were considered more vulnerable to 
wear and tear than roads built up to high standards.150 Moreover, maintenance itself was also 
a way of gradually upgrading roads. According to the UNESCO manual, many roads in Africa 
had been transformed from tracks in that way by the mid-1960s.151 In fact, around those years 
in Ivory Coast, for instance, maintenance works and road improvements carried out by the 
Public Works Department were closely related activities (as they were before independence, 
Chapter 3). The same teams carried out both types of work, specialising only according to the 
type of task: reshaping, resurfacing and basic maintenance (such as clearing verges).152 
Second, these roads were designed to be upgraded, and future works had to be more or less 
substantial depending on the growth of traffic, the quality of maintenance works, and the 
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initial standards of the road. Consequently, upgradeable roads were also tied to a plan of 
future expenditure.153  
Although these facts had been well known for decades, road engineers only started referring 
to them as a policy in the 1960s. At the 1964 PIARC meeting and on the UNESCO manual, 
engineers stated that the regimes of maintenance and improvements that low-cost roads 
required were actually road policies that governments needed to understand and follow 
closely, given that the engineers themselves had little control over future upgrades.154  The 
manual pointed out that governments and administrators were, however, often unwilling or 
unable to respect these policies, resulting in the rapid destruction of roads.155 For the 
Portuguese engineer F. Alvares Dos Santos, this meant that low-cost roads were a risk for the 
engineers’ reputation, as they would be the ones held responsible when roads failed.156 
Although insistent on the need to respect the policy that upgradeable roads demanded, road 
engineers struggled to explain with precision what this policy consisted of. For instance, 
British engineers identified three steps for road upgrades in developing countries (un-
improved tracks, improved gravel or earth roads and bituminised roads), while engineers in 
Ivory Coast recognised five of them.157 Although alignments, surfaces, and whether the road 
was seasonal or all-weather were generally part of the elements that characterised each stage, 
there were many others such as the width, the type of drainage and other structures provided, 
as well as the type of preliminary studies required for the works.158 Moreover, although the 
order of road upgrades would usually involve a gradual transformation from an earth track to 
a bituminised road, engineers did not expect every road to go through all the intermediate 
stages. Some phases could be avoided if traffic growth, road conditions and funds availability 
allowed for it (see Chapter 3). In addition, at any one time, a road could have stretches with 
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characteristics that were different from the rest of the road (and that corresponded to a 
different stage) if this ensured the homogeneity of circulation conditions.159  
The timing of improvements was also not clear from the start, as it depended on traffic growth 
and the quality of maintenance works. The challenges of predicting future traffic demands 
not only resulted from the lack of data and the rapid and unprecedented traffic growth (as 
previously mentioned), but also from the inadequacy of measuring traffic with the unit of 
number of vehicles per day (see Chapter 2).160 The difficulty of foreseeing traffic 
development was especially problematic because the evolution of traffic was closely linked 
to the justification of paving. For example, in the mid-1960s, roads in South Africa bearing 
above 200 vehicles per day were paved, while in Ivory Coast only roads carrying more than 
400 vehicles per day were provided with a bituminous surface.161 Vehicle operation costs 
were also an important factor to make this decision (as governments were interested in 
diminishing transport costs), but research exploring the effects of different road conditions 
on these charges was only emerging in the 1960s.162 In addition, maintenance and 
improvement works were frequently not carried out effectively or opportunely, and it was 
therefore impossible to predict what the future conditions of any road were going to be at any 
point in time.  
Given how important it was that upgrades were carried out in a timely manner, it is not 
surprising that the lack of a clear improvement schedule was a significant obstacle for the 
optimal behaviour of low-cost roads over time.163 Although not the only factor, the undefined 
character of low-cost roads’ upgrades needs to be taken into account in order to understand 
why some roads failed only a few years after construction or suffered from constant poor 
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Between 1930 and 1970, the world’s road networks expanded, a phenomenon linked to rising 
motor traffic. The growing road networks of the developing world had to accommodate high 
proportions of heavy vehicles, and in some cases animal-drawn carts. These road networks 
were increasingly competing with railways for the movement of goods, even in long 
distances, especially after the Second World War. Roads also started being preferred for the 
construction of new routes, mostly because they required lower initial capital investment than 
railways, but also because they were able to function with low quality standards and were 
relatively easy to upgrade over time. 
The roads of the developing world were built according to a particular logic that prioritised 
keeping costs to a minimum. These low-cost roads sacrificed quality and increased the risk 
of high future expenditure on maintenance and reconstruction costs, but offered a quick and 
relatively inexpensive solution. However, these roads demanded judicious maintenance and 
timely upgrades, and these were difficult to plan for in advance, especially given the 
challenges of predicting the evolution of traffic. Therefore, while these roads were meant to 
last about a decade before needing reconstruction of considerable improvement (half as long 
as the high-quality roads of the developed world), they often did not last more than a few 
years. Yet, the provisional character of low-cost roads was not a surprise: it was an essential 




Chapter 2 Defying the imagination: the techniques and tools that built the 
roads of the developing world, 1930-1970 
 
This chapter explores the means used to build, maintain and upgrade low-cost roads. These 
were based on American methods from the first decades of the century which gained 
increasing international prestige during and after the Second World War. European colonial 
powers sought to adapt elements of the American model to suit their own needs and 
conditions, both in the metropoles and in their overseas territories, for which they also drew 
upon research they carried out themselves. The main features of this model were the growing 
mechanisation of road works and the introduction (or increased used in some cases) of the 
options offered by the emerging fields of soil mechanics and materials laboratory testing.  
These changes went along with a growing international road engineering community that 
adapted and hybridised US approaches with others. The peculiarities of some environmental, 
traffic, administrative and institutional conditions in the developing world encouraged the 
creation of innovative practices and artefacts that, despite often being based on foreign tools, 
equipment and techniques, took new and unique shapes. This chapter suggests that although 
the transnational exchanges of engineering knowledge were mostly pragmatic in nature, they 
reflected large-scale economic and political inequalities (such as imperial and informal 
economic imbalances), as engineers from developed countries had the most resources at their 
disposal and dominated the spaces of discussion.  
How world road construction and maintenance changed has received limited attention from 
historians.1 Bruce Seely has examined how elements of US methods were disseminated to 
and eagerly adopted by Western European countries after the Second World War, mentioning 
the construction of durable pavements but focusing on the diffusion of traffic engineering 
(which revolved around automobile use, speed and flow) and aspects related to safety 
concerns (such as signs and markings).2 Although Seely noted the importance of the US Army 
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Corps of Engineers and the Navy’s Seabees in the widespread adoption of American 
earthmoving machinery, the full significance of the war in helping to promote new tools and 
techniques in Europe and beyond has been largely missed.3  
The Latin American case has also attracted limited attention.4 Although the influence of the 
US has been noted, the material perspective of this phenomenon has remained marginal, thus 
missing the story of the dynamic adaptation of knowledge and practices that reveals the 
importance that war and prestige occupied in the choices road engineers made.5 In other 
geographical areas, accounts of technical road development are rare. An exception is Katie 
Valliere Streit’s thesis on mobility in Southern Tanzania, in which she recognises the 
importance of unpaved roads and maintenance, as well as the influential role of the British 
Road Research Laboratory (RRL) and its research on colonial engineering.6 However, she 
did not examine what this research work consisted of, nor did she look into the way research 
on road materials and construction was conducted in or propagated throughout the British 
Empire. In addition, although she highlighted the influential role of Asian (and in particular 
Indian) private enterprises, she did not identify any technical influences apart from British 
engineering and, crucially, her case study remains an isolated example.  
The present chapter is divided into three parts. The first part briefly presents the most 
important elements of the American road-building model: highly mechanised works, the use 
of certain road design methods and standards (especially those defined by the American 
Association of State Highway Officials, AASHO), and materials laboratory testing.7 This 
section also explores the way this model circulated, as part of both initiatives to promote it 
and as a result of phenomena that were not explicitly part of the US public or private agendas. 
The second part concentrates on the conditions that made road construction in the developing 
world different from that in developed countries, and especially on the way engineers and 
 
the Establishment of a Swedish Car Society, 1945-1965’, in Comparative Technology Transfer and 
Society, 2 (Dec. 2004), 273-300. 
3 Seely, ‘Inventing the American Road’. 
4 See e.g. Melina Piglia, Autos, Rutas y Turismo: El Automóvil Club Argentino y el Estado (Buenos Aires, 
2014); Michael Bess, ‘Routes of Conflict: Building Roads and Shaping the Nation in Mexico, 1941-
1952’, in The Journal of Transport History, 35 (June 1, 2014), 78-96;  Simón Uribe, Frontier Road: 
Power, History, and the Everyday State in the Colombian Amazon (Hoboken, NJ, 2017); Álvaro Pachón 
and Maria Teresa Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En Colombia Durante El Siglo XX: Una 
Descripción Desde El Punto de Vista Económico (Bogotá, 2006), 277-486. 
5 See e.g. Valeria Gruschetsky, ‘Saberes Sin Fronteras. La Vialidad Norteamericana como Modelo de la 
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad, 1920-1940’, in Mariano Ben Plotkin, and Eduardo A. Zimmermann 
(eds.), Los Saberes del Estado (Buenos Aires, 2012), 185-212. 
6 Katie Valliere Streit, ‘Beyond Borders: a History of Mobility, Labor, and Imperialism in Southern 
Tanzania’ (Univ. of Houston D.Phil. thesis, 2016). 
7 Created in 1914, the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) changed its name to 




World Bank staff perceived road building in these areas as a distinctive endeavour. The third 
part examines some examples of ways in which the American model was modified and 
hybridised to respond to the road-building efforts in diverse contexts. Without attempting to 
be comprehensive, this section emphasises first the hybridisation that took place in the 
growing field of laboratory testing, second, the various ways in which mechanisation was 
adopted (not only for construction but also for the maintenance of unpaved roads) and, finally, 
the particular ways in which design and construction methods were modified to accommodate 
high proportions of lorries and animal-drawn vehicles.  
This chapter is mostly based on reports and proceedings of the Permanent International 
Association of Road Congresses (PIARC) during the period, and on the work the RRL 
undertook for road construction purposes in the British (ex)colonies from the 1930s to the 
late 1960s. The library of the Highway Research Board (HRB) also supplied significant 
material, and in particular a publication series product of a project aiming to disseminate 
amongst developing countries the most useful and relevant information available on road 
construction in those contexts.8 Equally valuable were the proceedings of the seminar series 
entitled ‘L’aventure des Laboratoires Régionaux des Ponts et Chaussées’, organised by the 
historian André Guillerme in 2002. This oral history project provided first-hand accounts of 
French engineers working in materials laboratories during and especially after the Second 
World War, which, added to the analyses presented by the historians Guillerme, Denis 
Glasson, and Gerard Brunschwig, amongst others, constituted an important window into the 
particularities of the French case. Some archival material from the World Bank available 
online was also useful, and in particular the Staff Appraisal Reports of various road projects 
and some of the speeches and papers given by World Bank staff in the 1960s.  
 
The American model and its circulation 
 
 
8 Although this project took place in the late 1970s, some of the contributions it referenced first appeared 
in the 1950s and 1960s – offering an idea of the value American road engineering experts attributed to 




The model: mechanisation 
The US was the primary model for the mechanisation of road construction.9 The 
mechanisation of road works was identified by road engineers around the world as a central 
element of the American road-building model. In fact, for the most part, this equipment was 
invented in the US.10 The mechanisation of road works had started in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, as steam rollers and horse-drawn scrapers were slowly being replaced by 
the new self-propelled agricultural tractors, and other new machines, such as the motor-
grader.11 These earth-moving machines were soon found around the world.12 One of the most 
important developments was the motor-grader (along with bulldozers and tractors). Early 
models of graders (a machine with a long blade used to create a flat surface) were towed 
behind horses or other equipment, such as steam tractors. The first self-propelled graders 
appeared in the 1920s, and consisted of a grader fitted to a tractor, and in 1931, the recently 
founded Caterpillar introduced the first dedicated ‘motor-grader’ designed as a single unit: 
the ‘Auto-Patrol’ (Figure 2.1).13 Unlike bulldozers, motor-graders were not suited to move 
large amounts of material or heavy loads; they were designed for projects that required 
precision and are still used today for finish grading, shaping, ditching, levelling, and creating 
inclined surfaces, amongst others. From its first appearance in the 1930s, the motor-grader 
became one of the central components of the plant employed in road construction and 
maintenance works around the world. The introduction in the 1930s of diesel engines and 
large air tyres gave the machines more independence, flexibility and power.14 
 
Figure 2.1 Caterpillar ‘Auto Patrol’ motor-grader, ca 1930s 
 
9 Very little manufacture of road-building machinery was carried out in the developing world. However, 
some efforts did exist, especially because agricultural tractors could also be employed for road 
construction and maintenance, see below note 28.  
10 The exception seems to have been the European hydraulic excavator, introduced and refined in the late 
1950s and 1960s. The Japanese brand Hitachi also introduced an hydraulic excavator in 1965. William 
Haycraft, Yellow Steel: The Story of the Earthmoving Equipment Industry (Illinois, 1999), xiv-xv. 
11 This chapter focuses on earth-moving machinery but the US also employed machines in other processes 
from the first decades of the century. As Seely points out, asphalt and concrete spreading machines, 
rollers, levellers, and lorries, amongst many others, made paving faster and more precise; while aerial 
photography allowed the preparation of drawings and plans for road programmes faster than ever before. 
Seely, ‘Inventing the American Road’, 244. 
12 Earth-moving machinery usually refers to heavy equipment used for shaping, loosening, loading and 
hauling earth and rock materials for construction. Haycraft, Yellow Steel, xv. 
13 http://webuildgeorgia.com/foundations/the-auto-patrol/ (28/02/2019); Seely, ‘Inventing the American 
Road’, 244. 





Source: http://webuildgeorgia.com/foundations/the-auto-patrol/ (28/02/2019) 
 
Over a dozen earthmoving machine manufacturers were created in the US in the 1920s, 
amongst which Caterpillar is probably the most famous.15 Other companies manufactured 
attachments for tractors such as blades, scrapers, and front buckets, amongst others (both 
mounted and towed).16 Caterpillar, knowing of the importance of this type of product for its 
own success, started a programme to support these firms by providing them with technical 
support and engineering drawings, as well as promoting the expansion of their market. 
The Second World War was essential for the growth of American heavy machinery 
manufacturers. According to the first volume of the history of the US Army Corps of 
Engineers during the Second World War, while the pick and shovel had been the symbol of 
the engineer soldier in the First World War, the bulldozer replaced them in the Second, as 
behind it ‘stood the full power of construction machinery to move mountains and cut through 
jungle’.17 The use of air compressors, bulldozers, tractors, dumper trucks and other machines 
 
15 Caterpillar was founded in 1925 with the merger of Best and Holt, two American manufacturers of 
agricultural and logging crawler tractors. This paragraph is based on: Cohrs, 500 Years of Earthmoving, 
66-67, 97. 
16 Letourneau was one of these companies.  
17 Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, United States Army in World War II. The 
Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment (Washington D.C., 1988), 62-63 
(hereinafter: Coll et. al., The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment). 




rose significantly from the early 1940s onwards.18 In 1942, crawler tractors and other 
construction plant and equipment represented almost 40 per cent of the value of the engineer 
supplies.19 In 1944, at its peak, it represented 53 per cent.20 Tractors were the most numerous 
machines: in 1942 almost 10,000 tractors were delivered to the Corps, in 1944 the number 
rose to 28,785.21 As an example, the machines used to build airfields around Myitkyina, to 
serve the Ledo Road in Burma, included: 149 lorries (2.5 tons), 66 tractors, 32 scrapers, 30 
motor-graders, 27 rollers, 9 power shovels, and 4 cranes, amongst others.22 In general, even 
though standardisation was considered the key to ensuring that enough spare parts of the right 
kind were available, demand was so high that various models from different manufacturers 
were purchased. Therefore, for example, different tractors were bought from Allis-Chambers, 
Caterpillar, Cleveland, and International Harvester as well.23 
Figure 2.2 Image from the construction of the Ledo Road, 1944 
 
18 Coll et. al., The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, 34. 
19 Coll et. al., The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, Chart 3, 181. 
20 Coll et. al., The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, Chart 3, 181. 
21 The types of tractors used were usually crawler type, with diesel engines of different sizes going from 
91 to 140 drawbar horsepower (Class I), to 36 to 45 drawbar horsepower (Class IV). In contrast, in 1944, 
only 1,398 bulldozers were delivered. Coll et. al., The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, Table 
7 and Table 13, 200, 548. 
22 The plant was most likely used for the construction of the road as well. Karl C. Dod, United States 
Army in World War II. The Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan 
(Washington D.C., 1987), 472 (hereinafter: Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan). 
23 Nevertheless, manual labour was employed in great numbers: machines needed skilled operators, 
supervisors, and contractors, while problems to access spare parts and fuel, as well as the damages caused 
by raids to the machines complicated the use of machines. The urgency of the works was also a major 
factor. For instance, works on the Burma Road in 1944 were led by 500 engineers and executed by nearly 
12,000 Chinese labourers. The construction of the Ledo road also employed considerable labour. In the 
Autumn of 1944, for instance, the stretch from Mogaung to Myitkyina (about 65 km long) was built by 
the 330th General Service Regiment with the help of the 1304th Construction Battalion, and the Chinese 
12th Engineer Regiment. Coll et. al., The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, 180; Dod, The 





Note: Figures 2.2 and 2.3 were taken from US Department of the Army, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 
The Battle of China, Reel 7, 4:09 and 4:14 (1944), National Archives Identifier 36072 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/36072 (14/09/2018). 
 
Figure 2.3 Image from the construction of the Ledo Road, 1944 
 
 
The American earthmoving machinery industry experienced another boom after the war. 
Already strengthened by wartime activities and the demand generated by the construction of 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 




the Interstate Highway System at home, some companies managed to expand their markets 
in Europe and beyond during the post-war period.24 For instance, in the 1950s, Caterpillar 
established two overseas trading companies and two manufacturing bases in Europe (and its 
largest European base in Belgium in 1960).25 From 1956 to 1965, Caterpillar’s business 
outside the US usually corresponded to 42 to 46 per cent of its total business.26 Caterpillar 
became so iconic that it was often the only brand explicitly mentioned in the lists of 
machinery needed for road construction projects in the developing world, and most machine 
manufacturers adopted a shade of yellow for their products.27  
Although American machine manufacturers dominated the global market for the majority of 
the twentieth century, some European firms started becoming more competitive in the 1950s 
and 1960s (even though in general they remained oriented to their national markets).28 Japan 
was, however, the country that produced the first companies able to compete with the 
American giants at an international scale. By the early 1960s, Japanese earthmoving machines 
were competitive in terms of price and sometimes even quality, especially in developing 
countries.29 The Japanese earthmoving industry had emerged by borrowing from western 
designs, a practice legitimised by the formalisation of license agreements with American and 
European manufacturers from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s.30 
The model: design standards, soil mechanics and materials laboratories 
Another element of the American road-building model were road design standards. 
Geometric design standards defined the road’s horizontal alignment (route, in terms of 
tangents and curves), vertical alignment (profile, such as gradients, camber, etc.), cross 
section elements (drainage, lane and shoulder widths, etc.), and other features related to the 
visible features of the road (such as signing, marking and lighting). Geometric design was 
considered different from structural design, which dealt with materials, carrying capacity, 
 
24 Haycraft, Yellow Steel, 147. 
25 Haycraft, Yellow Steel, 160. 
26 Haycraft, Yellow Steel, 161. 
27 Caterpillar machines became officially yellow in 1931. Haycraft, Yellow Steel, 64; Caterpillar Website, 
Company History, 1930s https://www.caterpillar.com/en/company/history.html (24/09/2019); Ifor Pugh 
Wyn and Jan Kanty Wardzala, ‘Mechanization of Road Construction in Ghana, 1952-57’, in Conference 
on Civil Engineering Problems Overseas, 1958 (London, 1958), 85-108; R.W. Taylor, ‘Sections 1 and 2 
Joint Meeting, Question VI, Construction and Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-
Developed Countries, Nigeria’, in PIARC (Lisbon, 1951), 1-30 (hereinafter: Taylor, ‘Construction and 
Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, Nigeria’). 
28 Due to the capital needed, the production of heavy machinery was rare in the developing world, 
although the manufacture of smaller pieces of equipment was more widespread (see Chapter 4). Haycraft, 
Yellow Steel, xiv. 
29 Haycraft, Yellow Steel, xv. 




pavement thickness, etc.31 In general, road design standards were fixed by public road 
authorities (national and subnational) and were continuously revised to reflect the expanding 
data base of observations and research and to make general design standards fit specific 
problems.32 The American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) played a major 
role in this process in the US. Gathering from the varied research and experience of highway 
departments in different States, the AASHO defined accepted criteria and standards that, once 
reviewed by the federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), became official.33 Thus, the AASHO 
defined the design standards of the Interstate Highway System and of primary, secondary and 
feeder roads – although at the State level each highway department still had the authority of 
modifying road standards to suit their conditions, needs and demands (except for roads 
belonging to the Interstate System).34 In fact, the 1965 edition of the AASHO’s Policy on 
Geometric Design of Rural Highways claimed that the association’s objective was not to 
innovate or provide instructions ‘to design highways for the future’, but rather to report on 
the common practices and relevant experiences of road engineers over the previous decade, 
in order to update the previous edition.35  
In the 1950s and 1960s, American geometric road design attributed a particular importance 
to speed, capacity and safety.36 In the mid-1950s, unlike some of their European and in 
particular British counterparts, American engineers thought of the benefits of roads in terms 
 
31 AASHO, A Policy on Geometric Design of Rural Highways (Washington D.C., 1954), v-x (hereinafter: 
AASHO, A Policy on Geometric Design 1954); AASHO, A Policy on Design Standards (Washington 
D.C., 1956), 6.  
32 Sometimes specific road projects could be assigned different standards than the general national ones, 
even for the same type of road. Transportation Research Board, Transportation Technology Support for 
Developing Countries, Compendium 1, Geometric Design Standards for Low-Volume Roads 
(Washington, 1978), xvi (hereinafter: TRB, Compendium 1). 
33 The American Roadbuilders Association, which represented the highway construction industry, as well 
as several other organisations, also contributed to and influenced AASHO standards (such as the BPR 
itself). In particular, the BPR provided assistance for the establishment of a policy for the design of rural 
roads by making investigations, compiling materials and preparing drafts for the AASHO Committee on 
Planning and Design Policies to consider. The AASHO had one committee for every topic, and each was 
composed of representatives of different State Highway Administrations, and often a representative from 
the BPR. AASHO, A Policy on Geometric Design 1954, iii-iv; Daniel J. Minahan, ‘The Highway Spot 
Improvement Program: A Critical Review’ (Highway Safety Research Institute, University of Michigan, 
1968), 7.  
34 Minahan, ‘The Highway Spot Improvement Program’, 7-8; AASHO, A Policy on Design Standards. 
35 AASHO, A Policy on Geometric Design of Rural Highways (Washington D.C., 1965), v-vi 
(hereinafter: AASHO, A Policy on Geometric Design of Rural Highways 1965). 
36 The term road capacity refers to flow, rather than load-bearing (or ‘carrying’) capacity. AASHO, A 
Policy on Geometric Design 1954, 4; AASHO, A Policy on Geometric Design of Rural Highways 1965, 
5; National Archives United Kingdom (NA), Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), 
27-329, RN/2516/WHG, RLM, W.H. Glanville and R.L. Moore, ‘America’s Approach to the Road 
Problem, Impressions Gained from a Visit to the USA in late 1954’, (June 1955), 4-5 (hereinafter: 




of savings in time, wear and tear, petrol and accidents.37 Prioritising speed had several 
consequences for road design: curves, gradients, intersections, etc. were thought of in terms 
of using a design speed ‘as high (…) as practicable’, which could often increase costs.38 
Geometric design was linked to traffic engineering, a specialty that focused on traffic flow 
logistics that was born in the US in the early 1930s and which gained academic status at Yale 
in 1943.39 In the post-war period, although European engineers also took into account traffic 
flow, the American approach was different in that it put special emphasis on speed and on 
guaranteeing the uninterrupted circulation of traffic.40 As motorisation grew in Europe and 
cars were reaching increasingly higher speeds, American traffic engineering started being 
adopted in European countries with important implications on planning and land use at the 
national and municipal levels.41  
The American approach to structural design was very influential. Certain American methods 
of building road surfaces and foundations structures were, for instance, widely adopted 
around the world (such as ‘Marshall Asphalt’ and soil stabilisation, see below). However, 
behind these methods lay a more fundamental and more pervading distinctiveness of the 
American road engineering model: the development of materials laboratory tests and 
materials specification standards. In other words, not only how to use materials but first and 
foremost how to choose them. As part of an effort to determine the cause of the failure of 
many roads under heavy traffic during the First World War, and given that the characteristics 
of every material had an impact on the result of construction procedures, during the interwar 
period American road research organisations started developing techniques to test materials, 
as well as specification standards to classify them according to their main properties.42 With 
the assistance of the BPR, the AASHO published syntheses, which were frequently updated, 
of the different tests and materials specifications employed in every State, thus creating 
standards that would serve as guides for road engineers around the country.43 Although the 
 
37 Glanville and Moore, ‘America’s Approach to the Road Problem’, I. 
38 Design speed was defined as the maximum safe speed that could be maintained over a section of road 
when conditions are so favourable that the design features of the road govern. It was determined out of 
the physical features of the road influencing vehicle operation. Although related, it was slightly lower 
than the running speed, i.e. the speed over a section of road (distance divided by running time). AASHO, 
A Policy on Geometric Design, 4, 635. 
39 Blomkvist, ‘Transferring Technology’, 283. 
40 Blomkvist, ‘Transferring Technology’, 284-285. 
41 Blomkvist, ‘Transferring Technology’, 284-285; Seely, ‘ “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology 
Transfer’. 
42 Bruce Seely, ‘The Scientific Mystique in Engineering: Highway Research at the Bureau of Public 
Roads, 1918-1940’, in Technology and Culture, 25 (Oct. 1984), 821. 
43 In the 1950s and 1960s, for the case of materials testing and specifications, as well as for road design 
standards, all the States were represented. It is important to note that the AASHO was not the only 




standards were intended for an American audience (and made no consideration of materials 
or environmental conditions that were not found in the US), they were still meant to be 
modified according to the conditions in different States. In particular, while preparing the 
specifications of naturally occurring materials (such as rock, soil, gravel, etc.) the AASHO 
indicated test limits generally considered ‘the most liberal that may be safely allowed’, 
expecting that if engineers found ‘higher grade’ materials they would apply more rigid 
requirements.44 What made these testing methods and standard specifications fundamentally 
different from those used in other countries at the beginning of the twentieth century was their 
reliance on laboratories. Although some European countries adopted laboratory testing 
quickly, such as Great Britain, others, like France, remained sceptical of their utility until the 
Second World War (see below). 
The significance of the use of these materials tests and classifications was twofold. First, a 
more precise knowledge about certain materials properties facilitated the prediction of their 
behaviour under different conditions and therefore contributed to the control of certain 
characteristics of the road, such as, for example, its ability to resist heavy rain. Second, the 
possibility of testing materials along the road sites opened the possibility of using locally 
available materials (which often helped reduce construction costs considerably).  
The study of soils was one of the most revolutionary and influential elements of the American 
road engineering model. Soil mechanics – the study of soils properties, behaviour and use in 
civil engineering works – was born in the US in the interwar period with the work of Karl 
Terzaghi.45 The understanding of soils properties opened an important possibility: their 
 
procedures already in place in some States (or in use by the BPR), they could be known by a different 
name, and could also correspond to existing standards from the American Society for Testing Materials 
(ASTM). However, as we will see below, AASHO publications were widely distributed over the world 
and were often the way in which many standards were known abroad. In relation to the constant revision 
of the standards, the introduction of the AASHO standards explicitly welcomed criticisms and provided 
the name and address of the Committee Secretary to whom suggestions were to be sent. More research is 
needed to determine the way in which these standards were updated and the extent to which new editions 
incorporated suggestions. AASHO, Standard Specifications for Highway Materials and Methods of 
Sampling and Testing (Washington D.C., 1955), III (hereinafter: AASHO, Standard Specifications). 
44 Unlike the specifications of naturally occurring materials, the characteristics of manufactured materials, 
such as asphalt or Portland cement, were not considered subject to modification according to local 
conditions. AASHO, Standard Specifications, III. 
45 Terzaghi combined previously existing theories of earth pressure with soil physics, thus founding the 
field of soil mechanics. He spent an important part of his career in the US (at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology from 1925 to 1929 and Harvard after the war), and his ideas had already started to spread 
in the US and Germany in the 1930s, although their wide adoption took place after the Second World War 
(see below). Karl-Eugen Kurrer, The History of the Theory of Structures: Searching for Equilibrium 
(Berlin, 2018), 344; Eduardo Kausel, ‘Early History of Soil-Structure Interaction’, in Soil Dynamics and 
Earthquake Engineering, Special Issue in honour of Prof. Anestis Veletsos, 30 (September 1, 2010), 824; 




modification.46 The use of chemical or mechanical treatments to change soil characteristics, 
a technique called soil stabilisation, allowed the manipulation of certain soil characteristics 
under particular conditions and, in some cases, it even offered the chance of creating ‘new’ 
soils altogether. This technique also emerged in the US in the 1920s and 1930s.47  
Finally, the US built experimental roads that could be closed to normal traffic for years. The 
‘AASHO Road Test’ is perhaps the most famous full-scale experiment led by the AASHO in 
the twentieth century. Administered by the HRB and funded by the State Highway agencies, 
the BPR, the Department of Defense (DoD), and associations such as the Automobile 
Manufacturers Association and the American Petroleum Institute, the AASHO Road Test 
consisted of seven miles of two-lane roads (in the form of six loops and a tangent), divided 
into over 800 sections, each paved with a different combination of surface, base and sub-base 
thickness (half concrete and half asphalt). After two years of construction, the roads were 
open to the traffic of heavy vehicles provided by the DoD in 1958, and the behaviour of the 
roads was monitored for another two years.48 Some of the conclusions of this experiment 
became highly influential for the structural design of road pavements around the world, and 
are still used today.49 The relative comprehensiveness of American road engineering research 
and standards facilitated their circulation, especially because of their relative early 
appearance. That was also the case, for example, of the AASHO’s Policy on Geometric 
Design of Rural Highways (1954), known as ‘The Blue Book’ after the colour of its cover, 
which was widely distributed in both developed and developing countries and colonies.50  
 
1955)’, in L’Aventure des Laboratoires Régionaux des Ponts et Chaussées, Colloque du Cinquantenaire 
(28 Nov. 2002), 4. 
46 The studied soil characteristics were: permeability, stiffness and strength. They depend on different 
factors such as water content and the nature of the soil grains.  
47 Although some forms of soil stabilisation were used in ancient China, India, and the Roman Empire, 
the modern soil stabilisation of the twentieth century, with the help of materials laboratories and soil 
mechanics, allowed higher control of the quality of the materials used, guaranteed higher uniformity of 
materials and thus of the behaviour of the road structure. For a general description of the main types of 
road pavement see M.G. Lay, Ways of the World: A History of the World’s Roads and the Vehicles That 
Used Them (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1992), 207-251. 
48 Highway Research Board, The AASHO Road Test, Report 7, Summary Report (Washington D.C., 
1962).  
49 Transport Research Board, Transportation Research Circular E-C118, ‘Pavement Lessons Learned 
from the AASHO Road Test and Performance of the Interstate Highway System’ (New York, July 1007), 
iii; US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, ‘Highway History: AASHO 
Road Test’. www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50aasho.cfm (17/04/2019). 




The circulation of the American road engineering model 
As Seely has noted, the International Road Federation (IRF) had the explicit objective of 
promoting (American-style) road development worldwide.51 Founded in 1948 by officials 
from firms such as Shell Union Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and the Automobile 
Manufacturers’ Association, amongst others, the IRF encouraged the creation of national road 
associations abroad, instead of directly lobbying for specific policies.52 The number of 
national groups associated to the IRF passed from eight in 1948, to more than seventy in 
1963.53 The IRF presented itself as an apolitical organisation and was listed as a technical 
adviser to the UN.54 The IRF was also engaged in moulding the new generations of road 
engineers through the creation in 1949 of a fellowship programme that funded road 
engineering students to take post-graduate courses in British and especially American 
universities.55 After their academic studies these fellows were invited on a tour which 
included road projects, administrative offices, research laboratories and manufacturers of 
road-building equipment, with the objective of providing not only theoretical knowledge but 
also first-hand observation and, most importantly, contacts: a ‘roster of experts’ that the 
fellows could ‘consult at some later date’.56 In its first twenty years, the programme funded 
498 engineers from 83 countries, creating, according to Hugh Gillespie (former 
communications director, and main author of the IRF’s institutional history), an ‘elite corps 
of highly-trained road administrators, ministers and directors throughout the world’.57 In 
addition, the IRF published extensively; in particular, Road International, its bi-annual and 
then quarterly magazine, played an important role in the circulation of practices related to 
road transport and construction and, significantly, in the advertisement of American and 
British road-related industries.  
The congresses and trips that took place in the framework of the Pan-American Highway 
project (which started in the 1920s and continued throughout the century) were also major 
opportunities for the US to promote its motor-vehicle and road-related industries in Latin 
America. Although more research is needed to determine the specific role this project played 
 
51 Seely, ‘ “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology Transfer’, 240. 
52 Seely, ‘ “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology Transfer’, 240. 
53 Seely, ‘ “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology Transfer’, 240. 
54 Editorial Board, ‘Better Living Through Better Roads’, Road International, 1 (Autumn 1950); Bruce 
Seely, ‘ “Push” and “Pull” Factors in Technology Transfer’, 240. 
55 In particular Yale, an institution that was considered a centre for road and traffic engineering by the 
middle of the century. Gijs Mom, ‘Roads without Rails: European Highway-Network Building and the 
Desire for Long-Range Motorized Mobility’, in Technology and Culture, 46 (2005), 766. 
56 E. A. Hugill Jr., ‘International Road Federation Fellowship Program’, in Highway Research Record, 
Highway Transportation Research, Education and Technology Abroad, 125 (1966), 52-53. 




in the expansion of the American road engineering model, the Pan-American Highway 
Congresses provided a space for the international exchange of technical road engineering 
approaches – a subject for which the US was acquiring growing international recognition, in 
a context in which the US was gaining increasing economic, political and military power at 
an international scale.58  
While in Europe post-war reconstruction contributed to the adoption of American approaches, 
international funding agencies based in the US, and in particular the World Bank Group, 
played an important role in the development of road construction and maintenance projects 
around the world. In the 1950s and 1960s, part of the criteria to obtain a loan from the Bank 
was its approval of the project’s roads’ routes, type of surface and geometric design standards 
(which were meant to be linked to traffic estimations, although data was often considered 
insufficient for this). The Bank’s staff appraisal reports therefore provide elements to 
compare road projects around the world. In 1967 and 1975, the World Bank carried out two 
reviews of the staff appraisal reports on the basis of which each road project had been 
approved from 1960 to 1970, and gave particular attention to the design standards that were 
adopted. These publications reported that in that decade AASHO road geometric standards 
had been applied in many countries with few modifications, such as Iraq and Costa Rica, 
while they seemed to have had no influence on some countries, such as Ecuador.59 For the 
IBRD, despite the many differences between national standards, some similarities were 
visible (e.g. similar median design speeds according to whether the terrain was flat, rolling or 
 
58 Several historians have established how the Pan-American Highway project was for the US a way to 
promote its commercial, economic and political interests in Latin America. Although authors such as 
Valeria Gruschetksy have suggested that the project also exerted a technical influence over road 
development in the region, the material implications of the project have remained largely marginal issues. 
The historian Rosa Ficek argued that an effort was made to unify certain planning, design, construction 
and maintenance aspects of the roads included in the project, as well as to standardise transit regulations, 
signs and administration. Nevertheless, Ficek did not explain how this process took place, or how these 
aspects materialised, and more research is needed to understand the specific influence of the Pan-
American Highway Congresses in the technical development of Latin American road networks. See Rosa 
Ficek, ‘Imperial Routes, National Networks and Regional Projects in the Pan-American Highway, 1884-
1977’, in The Journal of Transport History 37 (December 1, 2016), 129-154; Rosa Ficek, ‘The Pan 
American Highway: An Ethnography of Latin American Integration’ (Univ. of California Santa Cruz D. 
Phil. thesis, 2014), 46; Rodrigo Booth, ‘Automóviles y Carreteras. Movilidad, Modernización y 
Transformación Territorial en Chile, 1913-1931’ (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile D. Phil. thesis, 
2009); Valeria Gruschetsky, ‘La Avenida General Paz, Infraestructuras de Movilidad Urbana, Expertos y 
Política en Buenos Aires, 1887-1941’ (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella D. Phil. thesis, 2017); Eric 
Rutkow, The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway, and the Quest to 
Link the Americas (New York, 2019). 
59 J. De Weille et. al., ‘A Review of Sixty Two Road Project Appraisal Reports: 1960-1966’, World Bank 
Staff Working Paper No. SWP 5 (Washington D.C., 1967), 25-29. The influence of the AASHO was 
especially evident for the case of bridges, see Frederick W. Cron, ‘A Review of Highway Design 





mountainous), which were seen as the expression of a ‘healthy cross-fertilization of 
engineering thought and practice’ that resulted from the activities of international lending and 
aid organisations and international engineering consultants (as well as from those of the IRF, 
PIARC and the Pan-American Highway Congresses).60 In fact, the IBRD prepared material 
to provide guidance in the definition of road standards and made it available to every country 
receiving funding from the Bank.61  
The action of the US Army Corps of Engineers as part of the war effort was a catalyser of the 
diffusion of the American model of road building. The performance of their sturdy and 
powerful machines had impressed engineers everywhere they went, even the French 
acknowledged that American machines ‘defied the imagination’.62 However, the impact of 
the war was even more direct. The fact that Americans left machinery behind and sold it for 
very low prices had two major consequences. First, those particular machines continued to 
be used after the war. Second, and more importantly, the acquisition of spare parts to maintain 
those machines meant that it was convenient to keep buying the same brand in order to use 
the same stocks of pieces.63 American manufacturers made sure to take advantage of this 
opportunity after the war.  
North Africa, for example, became according to the historian André Guillerme a vast 
landscape for the transfer of civil and military engineering knowledge from the US to France 
during the war.64 It was there that French engineers were first exposed to the American 
materials laboratories in the early 1940s, and this example shaped the way road works were 
carried out in both the French colonies and the metropole in the second half of the century.65 
In 1944, the French founded a soils and foundations laboratory in Algiers which quickly 
adopted American standards, techniques, and practices. It was therefore equipped to conduct 
 
60 For Frederick Cron, the author of the 1975 review on road standards in the World Bank roads’ projects 
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maintenance facilities, and available funds. Cron, ‘A Review of Highway Design Practices’, 26, 39.  
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62 Guillerme, ‘Laboratoires Régionaux’, 8. 
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the latest soil and surface analyses, as well as other type of measurements (with mostly 
American instruments), and was located close to the field.66 This laboratory was an important 
tool for the construction and maintenance of Saharan tracks and air runways, such as the 
construction of the Rabat track in 1944 and, according to Guillerme, it also served as the 
prototype for the new regional laboratories created in metropolitan France in the early 
1950s.67 In fact, they were equipped to test road-building materials and all had, for instance, 
an apparatus to measure soil bearing capacity that was modelled on the American one.68 In 
their first ten years of existence, these laboratories were crucial factors for the transformation 
of French road techniques from labour intensive and based on ‘traditional’ techniques (such 
as macadam), to relying on scientific measurements, experimentation, and mechanisation.69 
An Algerian division of the Laboratoire Central des Ponts et Chaussées was founded in 1955 
tasked with the adaptation of techniques (including American methods and instruments) to 
the local climate and available materials.70 French engineers also helped spread American 
approaches to road engineering to its other African colonies. Laboratories were created in 
Abidjan and Dakar (although this process was a lot slower than in the metropole), and the 
mechanisation of works became widespread in some territories (see Chapter 3). 
While French engineers seem to have started this process after the war, their British 
counterparts were already adopting and adapting American road engineering approaches to 
use in the colonies since at least the 1930s. For instance, British engineers had been 
experimenting with the principles of soil mechanics and laboratory soil testing in some 
colonies since the interwar years (and in particular with soil stabilisation in Malaya), and in 
the 1940s the RRL started receiving and collecting samples of materials from different 
colonies.71 The samples included not only naturally occurring soils and aggregates, but also 
binders and cement, amongst others. They were kept in glass preserve jars (containing about 
300 or 400 grams of material) and displayed in a museum available for consultation by 
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engineers and contractors working overseas.72 By 1963, there were about 1,900 samples from 
52 countries, mostly from Africa, and from Nigeria in particular.73 The RRL continued to 
study tropical soils and other materials throughout the 1960s, allowing the laboratory to 
survey and classify a number of soils and, for example, find similarities between tropical clay 
soils found in Kenya and in North Borneo.74 The RRL received an increasing number of 
requests for advice related to road construction from various colonial Public Works 
Departments and it invested significant effort in attempting to respond to these demands. This 
work was possible due to the impulse to scientific research that the British empire undertook 
from the 1940s in an attempt to reinforce its control over the people and resources of its 
African and Caribbean colonies.75 The continuation of the RRL research on soils and other 
road-related issues overseas in the 1960s, after the political independence of many colonies, 
suggests that the work of the RRL contributed to the continuity of certain imperial 
dynamics.76 The fact that the RRL prioritised the provision of services (such as the study of 
materials for a particular project) instead of strengthening and expanding its training 
programmes so that overseas public works departments (often severely under-staffed) could 
benefit from the RRL’s expertise in the long- and not only the short-term seems to support 
this argument.77  
 
72 The amount of material kept in the museum was only a small sample of the material received (usually 
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British and French engineers visited the US research laboratories, attended conferences, and 
studied American road engineering techniques and administration. In 1951, a French mission 
of thirteen engineers travelled to the US and reported there were many aspects of American 
road development they thought could be useful to apply in France and its overseas territories 
such as, for example, the creation of materials laboratories in order to be able to use local 
materials, soil stabilisation, and the mechanisation of road works.78 Similarly, after a visit to 
the US in 1954, the then director of the RRL, William H. Glanville, suggested taking up the 
way of assessing the state of the road network by comparing capital investment in roads with 
the gross national product, advocated the replacement of grade intersections by under- or 
over-passes on new roads, and recommended the RRL conducted its own research into crash 
injuries so as not to wait for the results of American enquiries.79  
Ray Millard (named Deputy Director of the RRL in 1965 and highway advisory consultant 
for the World Bank) claimed in the late 1970s that the adoption of some of these norms and 
practices had not been based on technical criteria, but on prestige. An example of this was 
the widespread adoption of Marshall Asphalt. This technique was first created by the 
Mississippi Highway Department in the late 1930s and refined by the US Corps of Engineers 
for the construction of airfields during the war.80 As with other methods of designing asphalt 
surfaces, the aim was to determine the optimum mixture of component materials (aggregates, 
asphalt and Portland cement) for a given application. Although not without its shortcomings, 
this method was adopted in several countries, partly because it could provide a durable, hard-
wearing surface that could withstand the stresses induced by heavy wheel loads, and partly 
because it was simple and relatively inexpensive.81 Nevertheless, according to Millard, other 
methods were more appropriate for certain roads in developing countries. For example, 
Rolled Asphalt (a method developed in Britain based on an American method) produced 
roads with lower stability and which were more prone to deform under heavy loads, but could 
generate, nonetheless, roads that were more able to tolerate repeated flexure, a factor that 
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gave this method an advantage over Marshall Asphalt for building lightly trafficked roads.82 
Millard lamented that engineers in developing countries did not use this method more often, 
or other effective alternatives, such as seal coats or surface dressings, which were highly 
adaptable to different environmental conditions and work regimes (both of the mechanised 
and labour intensive varieties).83 He acknowledged that the lack of skilled workers and 
operators was a significant factor limiting the adoption of these particular alternatives, but he 
argued that ‘the real reason’ lay in the acceptance of a ‘technological myth’ – the assumption 
that some methods were the most ‘advanced’, ‘civilized’ and ‘effective’.84 Until the 1970s, 
this method was used in western Europe mostly for the construction of airfields because of 
its ability to withstand increasing weight and pressure, but was usually considered 
unnecessary for the construction of roads.85  
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the international network through each engineering 
knowledge and experience circulated reflected and reproduced several large-scale political 
and economic inequalities. Not only were certain imperial dynamics reinforced, the very 
spaces of exchange were dominated by developed countries, as the delegates of the PIARC 
meetings illustrate it. The developing world was mostly the object of study, rather than a 
subject participating in the debates, which was in great part a consequence of colonialism.86 
In fact, only from the mid-1960s was there a conscious effort to invite extra-European 
developing countries to participate in the discussions of the Committee on Low-Cost Roads, 
which had started convening since 1957.87 Moreover, since developed countries had the most 
resources at their disposal in order to undertake road-related research, the developing world 
depended in many instances on their experiments and conclusions. In addition, as Chapter 5 
illustrates it, engineers in developing countries often depended on developed countries’ 
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publications or events to learn about what their counterparts in other developing countries 
were doing. 
 
The distinctive challenges of road building in the developing world 
 
The World Bank’s perspective 
The World Bank offers a good standpoint to examine the particularities of road building in 
developing countries given that it had access to information from several countries and played 
an important role in the approval and financing of road projects during the period. The point 
of view of Hendrick J. Van Helden, Chief of the Transportation Division of the Technical 
Operations Department at the World Bank in the 1960s, is particularly helpful. In his official 
papers and speeches of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Van Helden appears at first glance 
reluctant to draw a stark division between civil engineering in developed and developing 
countries. Many of the problems that transport infrastructure posed were the same everywhere 
in the world, he argued, and differed only in degree. In particular, design and construction 
issues were all similar.88 For instance, drainage was a common concern in road construction, 
but it was more so in particularly humid areas. However, Van Helden did recognise that some 
conditions made construction work in developing countries distinguishable. One of these was 
the need to work with particularly scarce funds, which influenced works from the planning 
stage, to the detailed engineering phase. An example of the impact of this limitation was the 
use of local materials.89  
Nevertheless, for Van Helden the main distinctiveness of transport projects in developing 
countries was related to planning. Unlike most developed countries where congestion was 
generally the main problem, many ‘opening-up’ roads in the developing world were meant to 
‘tap hitherto unused resources’.90 The justification of this kind of project was completely 
different than that of roads that were meant to alleviate bottlenecks, as the latter was 
considered obvious, while the former required careful economic analysis and ‘a considerable 
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amount of judgement and crystal ball gazing’, in his words. In fact, according to him, road 
planning in developing countries would benefit from additional training from the civil 
engineers so that they were able to consider the economic and financial implications of their 
products, as well as have a better understanding of the feasibility of the projects. Moreover, 
an added complication in transport planning in developing countries was the scarcity of 
certain type of data (such as labour and equipment outputs). This made it difficult to make 
estimations about traffic growth and the speed and cost of construction works, which, added 
to the few opportunities engineers had of comparing unit prices with similar projects in the 
same country, could easily result in what he considered poorly designed projects.  
Another major problem was the lack of management and organisational experience. 
According to Van Helden, developing countries often drowned in reports but lacked the 
knowledge of how to put their recommendations into place, which led him to claim that what 
these countries needed were ‘doers’ rather than new studies.91 This did not necessarily mean 
there was a shortage of engineers. In fact, an element that differentiated roads from other 
infrastructure projects in developing countries was the availability of specialised local 
expertise.92 During the 1960s the number of road engineers rose (and in particular those who 
had been educated in developed countries), and with few exceptions most countries had some 
form of roads department, as road construction and maintenance were continuous activities 
everywhere. Nevertheless, despite being competent and knowledgeable, many of these new 
professionals often lacked vital experience in their fields. 
Apart from these general trends, Van Helden also identified two broad geographical areas 
with characteristic problems related to population density and type of traffic. First, in Latin 
America and Africa population densities were generally low (especially away from the 
coasts), and there were long distances between population centres. According to him, in these 
regions the major problem encountered in road construction was to find a compromise 
between cost and design standards.93 Second, in Asia, with high population densities and large 
volumes of animal and human traffic, especially in urban areas, the problems usually 
encountered corresponded to the quality and capacity of the existing roads, railways, and 
water transport facilities – in rural areas the problems were likely to be similar to those of the 
other regions but he was not specific in his description. Interestingly, Van Helden appears to 
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give limited importance to the impact that traffic and environmental conditions had on the 
design and construction processes of civil engineering projects.  
The engineers’ perspective: the case of the RRL  
From the early 1930s, the RRL (then known as the ‘Road Experimental Station’) was 
providing advice to colonial public works departments about road construction.94 In relation 
to the African colonies in particular, the engineer Harry W.W. Pollitt warned in 1952, as the 
Liaison Officer of the RRL, that the undergoing spurt in colonial road development was being 
carried out without essential information related to transport costs, traffic growth, local 
materials specifications and location, and the most appropriate road structure techniques for 
the local conditions (including bituminous carpets and soil stabilisation).95 It was in fact 
considered that although established road construction techniques and methods to test and 
classify materials were (more or less) applicable in the colonies, adaptation was necessary to 
respond to local traffic demands, and reflect the differences in climate, topography and 
materials characteristics – and for this adaptation to happen, it was first necessary to find out 
what these characteristics were.  
With these objectives in mind, visits from the RRL staff to colonial Public Works 
Departments started as early as 1946 and, nine years later, a Colonial Section was formed 
within the RRL, fully dedicated to the study of road-making materials and problems in the 
colonies.96 In 1959, the Section was renamed ‘Tropical’, deigned more appropriate given the 
‘changing world situation’, and also thought to be in accordance with the climate in these 
territories as they were located in tropical or subtropical areas.97 Despite this change in name, 
the research priorities of the RRL for overseas research remained largely the same throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, as did the geographical scope of its work.98  
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Ray Millard (who we noted above as a critic of the Marshall Asphalt), was a prolific writer 
and several of the articles and books he published in the 1960s and 1970s were more or less 
explicitly about road building in ‘the tropics’.99 Millard identified various factors that made 
of road building in the tropical and subtropical areas a distinctive endeavour. These 
differences were mostly related to climate and materials characteristics (especially soils). 
Variation in temperature, local materials, and rain all had a major effect on the design of 
roads, on the feasibility of different road construction and maintenance processes, and on the 
performance and durability of road pavements under traffic.100  
American methods were sometimes more easily applicable than British ones in the colonies 
and former colonies. For instance, although British engineers had significant experience with 
the use of crushed stone by the middle of the twentieth century, quarries were difficult to find 
in most African colonies, and since the transport of rock was extremely expensive, engineers 
preferred to use other methods (such as soil stabilisation).101 The RRL considered that in the 
field of low-cost roads, Americans were ‘pre-eminent in publishing information’, much of 
which was ‘of interest to colonial engineers’, and in particular the materials tests necessary 
for soil stabilisation.102  
However, some of the factors that Millard identified as distinctive of the tropics were not 
related to the natural environment. One of these factors was the inability to enforce traffic 
regulations, which resulted in an amount of overloading that was highly damaging for the 
road surfaces.103 Millard presented the example of some parts of the Nairobi-Mombasa road 
in Kenya that were rebuilt in the 1960s according to the country’s regulations on vehicle 
weight and axle loading, and following traffic growth estimations for the following fifteen 
years, which should have given the new stretches a design life of at least fifteen years. 
However, only four years after completion the pavements were showing signs of distress, 
after which deterioration was rapid, and complete reconstruction of the upper layers of the 
 
country was Hong-Kong. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, although the RRL was starting to expand its 
scope to countries such as Turkey, Nepal and Colombia, overseas research continued to focus on 
countries such as Kenya, Malaysia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Sierra Leone. NA, DSIR, MT 45/750, 
STAFFING, HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONS. Activities of the Tropical Section of the Road Research 
Laboratory, April 1964, Appendix C, Tropical Section Staff Overseas; Institution of Civil Engineers 
London, ‘The Report of the Road Research Board with the Report of the Director of Road Research, 
1965-66’ (London, 1967), 124; RRL, Annual Report (London, 1970), 116-118. 
99 See e.g. R. Millard, ‘Road Building in the Tropics’, in Journal of Applied Chemistry, 12 (August 1962); 
Millard, Road Building in the Tropics. 
100 Millard, Road Building in the Tropics, 1. 
101 NA, DSIR 27/343, RN/2811/FHP Williams, F.H.P. Williams, ‘Notes on a Visit to Gambia, Gold Coast 
and Sierra Leone’ (Oct. 1956), 10-11. 
102 Pollitt, ‘The Need for Colonial Road Research’, 22. 




pavements became necessary. A census of vehicle loading revealed that several lorries had a 
weight 60 per cent higher than that permitted in the regulations, and for Millard this was proof 
that overloading was the main cause of the ‘early demise of the pavements’, a story he 
qualified as ‘familiar’.104 Another factor was the presence of certain vehicles, such as animal-
drawn carts and ‘mammy wagons’ (i.e. light lorries equipped with wooden benches and 
carrying up to 40 passengers and their baggage which were found in West Africa since at 
least the early 1960s).105  
In 1993, discussing longstanding issues of road development in the tropics, Millard not only 
identified the lack of management experience as a distinctive characteristic (as Van Helden 
did), he also emphasised the link between management problems and lack of maintenance. 
Millard criticised the focus of financial assistance on capital investment works, as for him the 
assumption that countries would be able to fund and undertake the necessary maintenance of 
the new roads on their own had been proven wrong. Governments continued to struggle to 
raise the necessary funds and administer maintenance in a timely and efficient manner, partly 
because of a certain bias in favour of construction, but also in great part because the lack of 
regular maintenance often meant that roads started needing major reconstruction faster than 
they would have had otherwise.106 
 
The solutions: adaptation, hybridisation, innovation 
 
Materials laboratories and use of local materials 
According to the RRL, by the early 1960s testing laboratories existed in the government 
departments concerned with road building in almost every country.107 In addition, by 1970 (if 
not before), the creation of small testing laboratories on road work sites (known as mobile 
laboratories) had become standard practice.108 The spread of materials laboratories was 
accompanied by the expansion of the use, adaptation and hybridisation of several materials 
tests and classifications that were originally created in the US. The case of materials 
 
104 Millard, Road Building in the Tropics, 6. 
105 Millard, ‘Road Building in the Tropics’, 342. 
106 Millard, Road Building in the Tropics, 4. 
107 NA, DSIR 28-309, Road Research Board, Committee on Overseas Road Research, Report of the 
Tropical Section of the Road Research Laboratory for the Period 1st of July, 1961 – 30th June, 1962, 3. 
108 NA, CM 6-325, Road Research Laboratory, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Overseas 
Development, Tropical Section, Tropical Visit Memorandum No. 52, Visit to Nepal (1970), Report to a 




classifications illustrates this process. In particular, the soil classification system created by 
Arthur Casagrande in the US in the late 1940s was used by British engineers, who extended 
it, creating a considerable number of sub-groups. This new classification system provided 
valuable information at the survey stage of road projects as it indicated possible design 
structures for a particular route.109 A simplified version of the Casagrande classification was 
created in the US by the AASHO, which did not classify soils by type (e.g. sands, clays), but 
only divided them into seven major groups, with the aim of simplifying the way to determine 
if a soil was suitable for a sub-grade or not.110 Different countries used and modified these 
classification systems. For instance, in 1959, Portugal used and modified both the AASHO 
and the British Standard (BS) classification systems to identify and classify its soils and those 
of its colonies. The changes carried out on the systems were minor, but they were significant 
because they illustrate how the gradual emergence of national standards took place all over 
the world.111 By the late twentieth century, national standards had been created in many 
countries, often as the result of the adaptation to local conditions of American and sometimes 
British standards (which could be, themselves, based on American standards as we have 
seen).112  
Test methods created in the US were also widely adopted and modified. A good example of 
this is the California Bearing Ratio (CBR) test, created by the then called California Division 
of Highways in 1929, and which became the most widely known method to test the load-
bearing capacity of soils.113 The test measured the force generated between a cylindrical metal 
plunger and a sample of soil or other material at particular intervals of penetration (up to a 
penetration of 7.5 millimetres). The CBR value was an indicator of the support a soil 
foundation would give to a pavement structure, as well as of the strength of gravel sub-bases 
and bases. In an attempt to recreate the worst possible moisture conditions that could occur 
in the field, the samples were soaked in water for four days before being tested.114 This 
information was used in two main ways: first, to determine if a soil stabilisation treatment 
was necessary and possible (and to establish what type), and second, to help design resistant 
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road structures, especially flexible pavements. Countries as varied as Colombia, India, 
Mexico, Morocco and Australia had adopted this test by the 1950s and 1960s.115 The method 
had also been used in British and Portuguese colonies since the early 1950s.116 British 
engineers had chosen the CBR test because a similar British method measured the resistance 
of soils to frost damage, a measure that was unnecessary in most colonies.117 By the early 
1970s, the RRL still recommended the CBR technique to design the thickness of lightly 
trafficked pavements in the tropics and sub-tropics.118 However, British engineers also 
created a modified version of the CBR method that gave less emphasis to the soaking of 
samples (although the four-day soaking procedure was also included as an option).119  
Some methods were used differently in the developing world, such as soil stabilisation. For 
instance, whereas in Britain this technique was used to maintain the dry strength of the soils 
in the presence of water and frost, in Africa stabilisation was ‘a way of producing a new and 
different material of higher strength’.120 Many experiments were carried out under the 
direction of RRL staff for this purpose. For example, in 1958, with funds from the Kenya 
Road Authority and the Materials Branch of the Ministry of Public Works, experimental 
stretches were built with commonly found clayey soils, which were considered to ‘lie outside 
the range of soils normally accepted elsewhere’ as suitable for soil stabilisation.121 After being 
mixed in place with hydrated lime, Portland cement or aniline-furfural dye, these soils 
became usable, and the resulting surface was able to successfully carry about 250 vehicles 
per day in its first two years of service.122 The RRL conducted similar research in other 
colonies and former colonies. 
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The application of American methods was sometimes wasteful and counterproductive. For 
instance, in 1959, Indian engineers found that the employment of the CBR test, the most 
widely used method in the country to calculate the bearing capacity of soils, was resulting in 
‘oversafe’ pavements.123 Outside areas which were either water-logged or were prone to 
continuous flooding for long durations, the sub-grade did not saturate completely, such that 
CBR values pointed to pavements thicknesses that were higher than what was actually 
needed.124 In response, a large-scale research project was launched to determine the moisture 
content of sub-grades after construction around the country and to study the way it affected 
the structural stability of pavements.125 In 1952, the RRL engineer Pollitt noted that the CBR 
could also produce incomplete results because no account was taken of traffic volume or 
intensity.126 Millard argued that in some arid areas the CBR was unhelpful, but according to 
him, even in the late 1970s, engineers in Africa ‘solemnly’ soaked compacted samples of 
soils for four days, yielding misleading results for much of the continent.127 
Engineers often experimented and compared different methods. For instance, in India, the 
engineer S. Sinha reported at PIARC that by the mid-1960s there was no consensus about 
which method of soil compaction was better suited for the local conditions.128 The BS, the 
AASHO or the ‘Modified AASHO’ were at the time the most commonly used laboratory tests 
to determine the degree of compaction and moisture content needed for the soil to achieve its 
highest dry density. They consisted of compacting soil of a particular moisture content into a 
cylindrical mould using a compactive effort of a certain magnitude.129 The process was then 
repeated with different moisture contents. These three tests employed the same type of mould 
(called ‘Proctor’, after the American engineer who first invented the method), and varied 
mostly in the compactive effort exerted.130 Sinha explained that ‘none of the methods could 
be deemed to be perfect by themselves alone either in their approach or application’ and 
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therefore recommended to choose between methods according to specific needs.131 In 
addition, even when a particular method was chosen, it was open to modifications. For 
example, when Portuguese engineers carried out the AASHO Proctor test in the early 1950s 
(both in the colonies and in the metropole), they made an important change: samples were to 
be divided into several portions so that each soil was tested only once, as they had found that 
successive compactions of a sample could interfere with the results.132 
Mechanisation of construction and maintenance 
In 1955, the British report on low-cost roads at PIARC stated that the most important 
developments in ‘under-developed’ areas of the Commonwealth since 1950 had been the 
increased use and improved efficiency of machines.133 It became possible, for instance, to 
have no manual labour involved in earthworks, other than machine operators, their assistants, 
surveyors and the supervisory staff.134 Mechanisation offered significant benefits. First, 
generally speaking, machines were considered to improve the quality of the works.135 In 
particular, mechanised paving was portrayed as producing smoother and stronger surfaces 
than manual methods.136 Second, machines required a shorter time than workers to generate 
good results. Indeed, sometimes machines did not necessarily make works less expensive, or 
improve their quality, but just accelerated their speed.137 For instance, in Nigeria in 1951, the 
main advantage of mechanical excavation the saving of time, not money.138 However, 
engineers foresaw that, over time, experience gained with bulldozers and scrapers would 
increase the output of the mechanised works.139  
Taking full advantage of machines depended on how well these were adapted to the various 
work and environmental conditions. Sometimes machines did not work well in certain 
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contexts. In the Himalayas in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example, roads over 400 
km-long could run for 90 per cent of their lengths over heights exceeding 3,000 metres above 
mean sea level (mamsl) and reaching 5,300 mamsl.140 Combined with temperature, wind 
velocity, and snowfall and rainfall, these altitudes diminished the efficiency of both labourers 
and machines. While workers suffered from dizziness, sleeplessness, pulmonary oedema, and 
frost bites, amongst other conditions, the power loss of the machines was estimated at 3 to 4 
per cent for every 300 m of rise in altitude, becoming acute beyond 3,000 mamsl. Different 
measures were taken to overcome these obstacles such as using winter grade and sub-zero 
diesel oils, resetting of fuel injection pumps, and introducing turbo-chargers, amongst many 
others. The high altitude and its corresponding reduction of machine efficiency even 
precluded the employment of imported snow clearing machinery. This machinery was not 
considered suitable to deal with the requirements of clearing snow mixed with earth and 
boulders at considerable depths with reduced power. Bulldozers were used instead, with 
satisfactory results. 
In another example, in Nigeria in the early 1950s, D6 Caterpillar tractors were used for earth 
moving, even though D8 tractors were accessible and more efficient, because the weight of 
the latter kept them from reaching certain construction sites.141 In fact, the transport of 
machinery to isolated sites, and the need to build structures, such as bridges, to guarantee 
their safe and timely delivery, was a frequent challenge in the developing world.142 
Dismantling equipment into smaller components easier to transport was not unheard of, even 
in the early 1970s.143 Modifying the plant was also a frequent solution employed to ensure 
the continued used of machines. At the 1964 Conference on Civil Engineering Problems 
Overseas (Institution of Civil Engineers, London), William Joyce, who was at the time Senior 
Plant Engineer at the London-based construction firm George Wimpey and Co. Limited, 
briefly mentioned that he had seen modifications done in South American countries to crawler 
tractors, excavators, and dumper trucks in order to improve their efficiency (by, for example, 
installing particular air filters to avoid damages from dust), or in order to enable them to carry 
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larger loads than they were designed to transport.144 However, experience had also taught him 
that attempting to manufacture spare parts locally caused considerable difficulties and 
generated a great deal of downtime.145  
In fact, the most significant obstacle for mechanisation was not environmental. The lack of 
spare parts was a constant concern, and the need to import them could present an additional 
obstacle in countries with imports restrictions, or where a government department was the 
employing authority and had fiscal control over the purchase of spares and materials.146 In 
1964, Joyce recommended getting experienced, trained personnel from the contractor’s own 
organisation to vet the lists of all the spares needed for each type of machine – lists which 
were preferably obtained initially from the distributors or manufacturers of the machines.147 
He also suggested standardising the plant as much as possible to facilitate supplying the 
workshops, continuing the work while one machine was being repaired, and the training of 
mechanics and operators.148 If standardisation was not possible on a large scale, he advised 
to at least try a degree of it with smaller units such as engines, compressors and electrical 
equipment.149 Planning the supply, location and organisation of the repair workshops was 
also an important issue for road engineers, as well as the coordination of the plant.150 For 
instance, in the mid-1960s, K. Nambiar from the Concrete Association of India attributed the 
failure to employ concrete-building machinery not only to the inability of small-sized crusher 
units to cope with the demand for aggregates, and to the lack of central mixing plants able to 
provide the necessary output of concrete to keep works running continuously, but also to poor 
coordination.151 Concrete construction was mostly done by hand in India (with the help of 
mixers and hand-operated vibrating screeds).152 Indeed, Nambiar insisted on the fact that 
unless jobs were planned and phased keeping in view the type of equipment to be employed, 
there was little chance for the mechanisation of construction.153  
 
144 William Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant on Overseas Contracts’, in Conference of Civil Engineering 
Problems Overseas, Institution of Civil Engineers (London, 1964), 322. 
145 Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant’, 322. 
146 Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant’, 318; Bawa et. al., ‘Planning of Project – Earthworks, India’, 8; K.K. 
Nambiar, ‘Section 1 Construction and Maintenance of Roads and Runways, Question III, Design and 
Construction of Concrete Roads, India, in PIARC (Rome, 1964), 10 (hereinafter: Nambiar, ‘Design and 
Construction of Concrete Roads, India’); PIARC, ‘Proceedings of the XIVth International Road Congress 
– Question VII, Committee on Low Cost Roads’, in PIARC (Prague, 1971), 279. 
147 Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant’, 318. 
148 Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant’, 319. 
149 Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant’, 319. 
150 Joyce, ‘Civil Engineering Plant’, 320. 
151 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 9-10.  
152 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 9-10. 




Manual labour was sometimes preferred for certain tasks, as in some cases it was cheap.154 
For instance, in India in 1961, the mechanisation of earthmoving was not considered 
necessary given the low cost of manual labour and due to the fact that the borrow pits along 
the roads required only short haulage.155 According to the International Development 
Association (belonging to the Word Bank Group), the prevalence of unemployment made the 
use of manual labour in India not only possible, but also desirable ‘to the greatest possible 
extent’.156 In addition, in some instances manual labour was preferred because it was better 
suited to the task, the abilities of the workers, and the conditions of the site. For example, in 
Indonesia in 1951, in areas of heavy forest, clearing the route did not involve machine-sawing 
of trees because the machines were not designed for the hard tropical wood, their maintenance 
was difficult in the middle of the forest, and supplying their fuel was equally problematic.157 
It was found that experienced woodcutters could obtain the same results, and for a much 
lower cost.158  
Road maintenance also underwent a process of mechanisation during this period, and the need 
to respond to local conditions prompted the emergence of innovative practices and artefacts 
for maintenance just as it did for construction. An instance of this is the variety of methods 
created to deal with corrugations (i.e. small transverse ridges that appear on the surface of 
unpaved roads in dry conditions). Corrugations were problematic because they became hard 
and thus rendered driving slow, unpleasant, damaging for the vehicles, and potentially 
dangerous.159 Corrugations were very common in dry tropical climates, but were also 
encountered in areas of temperate climate during the dry season.160 During the 1950s and 
1960s there was no consensus about the exact causes of corrugations, or about how to prevent 
 
154 Although forced labour was abolished in many colonies by the middle of the century, in some places 
this process took longer (such as the Belgian Congo and Portuguese African colonies), and even where it 
was formally abolished some of its dynamics persisted – especially in relation to public works. See 
Introduction note 77. 
155 IDA, ‘Appraisal of a Road Project for India’, 8. 
156 IDA, ‘Appraisal of a Road Project for India’, 8. 
157 J.J.  Jonker et. al., ‘Sections 1 and 2 Joint Meeting, Question VI, Construction and Maintenance of 
Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, With Special Reference to Available 
Resources And to The Traffic to be Carried, Indonesia’, in PIARC (Lisbon, 1951), 19 (hereinafter: 
Jonker, ‘Construction and Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, 
Indonesia’). 
158 However, after cutting and drying and burning of the copped wood, the clearing process was finished 
with the help of bulldozers. Jonker, ‘Construction and Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or 
Under-Developed Countries, Indonesia’, 19. 
159 After heavy rains corrugations could also render circulation impossible. J. Chauchoy and R. Lantenois, 
‘Low Cost Roads, French West Africa’, in PIARC (Istanbul, 1955), 15, 26; Taylor, ‘Construction and 
Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries. Nigeria’, 20; NA, DSIR 
27/353, RN/3017/JST, J.S. Tanner, ‘Corrugations on Earth and Gravel Roads: their Formation, Treatment 
and Prevention’ (April 1957), Summary (hereinafter: Tanner, ‘Corrugations on Earth and Gravel Roads’).  




their appearance. In the 1950s, road research in different countries pointed to the fact that 
corrugations were linked to traffic: the heavier the vehicles, and the higher the number of 
vehicles per day, the faster the corrugations would appear.161 However, factors such as the 
cohesiveness of the surfaces and the pressure of the vehicles’ tyres also seemed to play a role, 
but the relationship between these factors was not understood.162 Unless the road was paved, 
constant maintenance of the surface was necessary.163  
In British African colonies, one of the simplest methods used to prevent corrugations was the 
employment of a branch cut from a bush (Figure 2.4). Brushes were effective on lightly 
trafficked roads when only spreading of loose material was required. The simplest form of 
manufactured brush was drawn by one or a few people, while more elaborate ones were towed 
by tractors (Figures 2.5 and 2.6). Another solution was the towed drag unit. Various types of 
drags were invented, particularly in West Africa where locally designed implements had been 
made. In the north of the Gold Coast, for example, a rolled steel joist was used (or a 
combination of short lengths of railway rail), loaded with concrete blocks according to the 
type and the state of the surface (Figure 2.7).164 Graders were also employed to remove 
corrugations, and when manipulated skilfully they could remove even the worst ones.165 
Graders could spread loose material evenly, maintain an accurate camber, leave a good riding 
surface, and allowed a few workers to maintain several miles of road. However, they were 
expensive to buy, required skilled maintenance, and when operated by unskilled workers they 
could cause serious damage to a road.166 An alternative was the method known as ‘scuffling’. 
This consisted of first cutting out the corrugations with spaces, picks and hoes, to afterwards 
spread the loosened material over the road by hand. This was a slow and laborious method 
that required a relatively large force of unskilled labour.167  
Figure 2.4 Hand-drawn brush made from thorn bush, ca 1957 
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Note: Figures 2.4 to 2.7 were all taken from: Tanner, ‘Corrugations on Earth and Gravel Roads’, Plate 1 
(B), Plate 2 (A), Plate 2 (B), Plate 4 (A) – respectively.  
 
Figure 2.5 Tractor-drawn brush made from thorn bush, ca 1957 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Tractor-drawn brush, ca 1957 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 






Figure 2.7 Drag unit as used in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast for removing 
corrugations, ca 1957 
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Roads for lorries and animal-drawn vehicles 
In the developing world, in the 1950s and 1960s, the need to accommodate heavy vehicles 
was usually prioritised over other considerations, such as speed.168 In fact, according to the 
IBRD, the findings of the AASHO Road Test of 1960 suggested that only heavy vehicles 
needed to be taken into account for the design of pavement thickness, as the effect of lighter 
vehicles was negligible in comparison.169  
This made a significant difference for road design. The case of the Humming Bird Highway 
in British Honduras of the mid-1950s is illustrative. Until 1950 there were no motorable roads 
in Honduras: there was one rail line, and the country relied mainly on water transport.170 The 
Humming Bird Highway was built to serve timber logging and to connect the area of citrus 
exploitation to the capital, Belize, and, at the same time, to expand the exploitation of raw 
materials to new areas. Despite a low traffic density, the surface needed to be thick and be 
made of a strong material like bitumen because timber trailers were common, and they could 
carry up to 20 tons (excluding their own weight and that of the tractor pulling it).171 In 
addition, the carriageway was also wider than usual for one single lane (11 feet and 3 inches, 
instead of just 10 feet), because the road needed to offer easy passage for the large timber 
vehicles.172 However, the precise effect that heavy vehicles had on different types of 
pavements, and its relationship with local conditions, was not a fully understood phenomenon 
in this period. The Humming Bird Highway was suffering from considerable deformation 
only 18 months after being in use.173 By the early and mid-1960s, the international 
engineering community had established that the frequency of some heavy loads had a much 
more pronounced destructive effect than a large number of low or medium loads.174 
Therefore, the total of heavy loads carried annually was a decisive factor.175 However, it 
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seems knowledge about this phenomenon was scarce, as even by the mid-1960s few engineers 
used load repetition to determine road design.176 An important obstacle was the lack of data 
about traffic. Surveys providing information such as the variations of the most frequently 
encountered axle-loads, details on whether vehicles were empty, half-loaded or fully loaded, 
and the percentage of overloaded vehicles and their axle-load weight, were rare in these 
countries/colonies during the period.177  
The circulation of animal-drawn vehicles in some parts of the Americas and Asia represented 
an additional problem. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the number of these vehicles was 
increasing in some countries and colonies in the post-1945 period. Different measures were 
adopted to accommodate such traffic. In Indonesia in the early 1950s, for example, to 
determine the necessary width of the road pavement, the engineers elaborated the following 
graph and concluded that ‘a number of slow-moving vehicles (had) more influence on the 
pavement width than the same number of fast-moving vehicles’.178  
 
Figure 2.8 Required pavement width with various traffic intensities of drawn carriages 
and motor vehicles, Indonesia, 1951 
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of Roads and Runways, Question VI, Particular Problems of Lightly Trafficked Roads, Great Britain’, in 
PIARC (Rome, 1964), 26-27; PIARC, ‘Comité des Routes Économiques, Rapport, 1967’, 63. 
177 In the late 1960s, the RRL had started experimenting with ways of making surveys providing data 
about the normal wheel-loads expected in Jamaica, Malaysia, Rhodesia and Malawi. The report suggests 
the RRL was also conducting these surveys in other countries, but no information was provided about 
them. R. Millard, ‘Question VII Lightly Trafficked Roads, Great Britain’, in PIARC (Prague, 1971), 15. 






Source: J.J. Jonker et. al., ‘Sections 1 and 2 Joint Meeting, Question VI, Construction and Maintenance of 
Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, With Special Reference to Available Resources 
And to The Traffic to be Carried, Indonesia’, in PIARC (Lisbon, 1951), 7.  
 
Wide roads made the mixed traffic flow, but of course increased costs.179 Indeed, the 
engineers noted that building two parallel roads, one for fast and another for slow traffic, 
could be envisaged in order to reduce the maintenance cost that a traffic of more than 100 
iron-tyred carts could generate on bitumen roads.180 An example of the application of this 
solution is the road built in 1950 between Jakarta and Kebajoran (a small satellite town that 
was supposed to draw off population from the capital). This road, meant to be a ‘great modern 
traffic-way’ included the construction of separate lanes for bullock carts, bicycles and 
pedestrians.181 However, since Indonesia did not send reports to any other PIARC congress 
during the period, more research is needed to determine the extent to which traffic segregation 
was realised. It seems likely that parallel roads for slow-moving traffic were only provided 
along some main roads, given the increase in the initial cost of construction that segregation 
would require. 
 
179 Jonker, ‘Construction and Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, 
Indonesia’, 6. 
180 Jonker, ‘Construction and Maintenance of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, 
Indonesia’, 7. 
181 However, in rural areas it was usually impossible to ensure that the animal-drawn vehicles were using 
the lanes or paths provided for them – as was the case in Argentina in the 1930s. Anon., ‘An Indonesian 
Traffic-way, modern link between capital and satellite town’, in Road International, 1 (Autumn, 1950), 
34-35; Pascal Palazzo, and Charles L. Coqueugniot, ‘The Segregation of the Various Classes of Traffic 
on the Highway, Argentina’, in PIARC (The Hague, 1938), 17-18. 




The rising bullock-cart traffic in India (see Chapter 1) meant that the use of surface dressings 
was ‘markedly different from that in most other countries’ because of the need of finding a 
method that would produce roads capable of withstanding bullock carts.182 Whereas usual 
surface dressings did not require the aggregate to be completely covered by the binder, in 
India engineers made sure this practice was followed, as they found it was the only way of 
making these surfaces resistant to the iron wheels of the bullock carts.183 Another example of 
the influence of bullock carts in Indian road-building methods is concrete construction. At 
the 1964 PIARC congress, the Indian report on the construction of concrete roads started by 
stating that this technique had developed in India over the previous 40 years following a 
somewhat unique path.184 This resulted partly from the fact that concrete roads arose from 
laying a cement concrete layer on top of existing water-bound macadam roads whenever the 
intensity and volume of traffic required an upgrade of the surface.185 However, the road 
sections that had been chosen for a concrete surface were ‘invariably those which carried high 
volumes of traffic or which had a preponderance of steel-tyred bullock carts’.186 In fact, since 
the 1930s, despite its high initial cost, concrete had been used in India because it was found 
to be the only surface that could withstand heavy bullock-cart traffic, and not just motor 
traffic, as most paved surfaces could.187 The high initial cost of the concrete was justified 
because the surface would considerably diminish maintenance expenditure in the long 
term.188 By 1940, most Indian engineers deemed acceptable a 4” thick plain concrete 
pavement of premix construction over a macadam road.189 Since this particular surface met 
the requirements of the bullock carts, a considerable length of rural roads was built according 
to that standard.190 In the United Provinces, which was considered the province with the 
largest concrete mileage in the late 1930s (along with the princely state of Hyderabad), the 
majority of roads were made of kankar bound with tar or bitumen while only a small 
proportion of metalled roads was made of concrete.191 However, the length of concrete roads 
 
182 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 2. 
183 Millard, ‘Road Building in the Tropics’, 354. 
184 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 2. 
185 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 2. 
186 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 4. 
187 British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR), IOR/V/27/710/3 Posts and Air Department, Post-
War Road Development in India, Proceedings of the Conference of Chief Engineers of Provinces and 
States, Nagpur 15-18 December 1943 (Delhi, 1944), 7. 
188 Kynnerseley, T.R.S., ‘Concrete Roads and the Bullock Cart’, in Journal of the Institution of Engineers 
(India), 9 (Sept. 1939), 141. 
189 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 4. 
190 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 4. 
191 The term metalled referred to roads built using a binding agent (such as water, tar or bitumen), as 
opposed to ‘unmetalled’ roads, i.e. earth roads which might or might not be drained, or bridged. D.P. 
Nayar, ‘Construction of a concrete track in miles 306-310 of the Great Trunk Road (near Lahore), in 




in the UP was multiplied by ten from 1929-30 to 1939-40, and the proportion of concrete 
roads compared to the total of metalled roads increased from under 1 per cent in 1929-30, to 
about 4 per cent in 1939-40, and to over 8 per cent in 1945-46.192 In the mid-1960s, many of 
the concrete roads built in the 1940s were still in good condition and were found to have a 
compressive strength of concrete over 8,000 lb./sq. in.193 Moreover, until the early 1960s, the 
way in which pre-moulded fillers were jointed prioritised the protection of the concrete from 
the tyres of the carts over the comfort demands of motor vehicle drivers: 
It was customary till about five years ago for the premoulded fillers to be kept slightly 
proud of the concrete surface and then caulked into the rounded joint groove, thereby 
making a high-riding joint. This was due to the fear that steel-tyred wheels of the 
bullock cart would otherwise strike the edges of the concrete slabs and cause 
spalling.194 
Although this practice seemed to have yielded good results, as no special problems of the 
fillers were found even in the oldest pavements, it was modified in the mid-1960s due to the 
increased use of motor vehicles on heavily trafficked roads and the drivers’ demand for a 
smooth riding surface.195 Nonetheless, the effect of the carts’ tyres continued to influence the 
construction of concrete surfaces until at least the early 1970s. For example, at the 1971 
PIARC Congress, Indian engineers presented the construction of a 366 metres-long concrete 
street in Old Delhi that served heavy mixed traffic.196 The top layer of the surface was made 
particularly strong so that the surface could bear the ‘abrasive nature’ of the high proportion 
of iron-tyred carts.197 Although more research is needed to determine the proportion of 
concrete construction in relation to other paving methods, it is likely that concrete remained 
a small fraction of total paving due to its high initial cost (as it was until at least 1946).198  
 
 
Report of the Indian Road Development Committee, 1927-28 (Calcutta, 1928), 9 
https://archive.org/details/reportoftheindia032320mbp  (24/09/2019); Sukla Bhaduri, Transport and 
Regional Development, a Case Study of Road Transport of West Bengal (New Delhi, 1992), 34.  
192 BL, IOR, IOR/V/24/3299-IOR/V/24/3309, United Provinces, Public Works Department, 
Administration and Progress Report of the Chief Engineer, United Provinces Public Works Department, 
Buildings and Roads Branch, 1929-30 to 1945-46 (hereinafter: UP, PWD, Report Buildings and Roads 
Branch). 
193 Some of the roads had, however, failed under axle loads of 12,000 lb. and over. Nambiar, ‘Design and 
Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 4. 
194 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 11. 
195 Nambiar, ‘Design and Construction of Concrete Roads, India’, 11. 
196 Concrete was more common in urban areas. J. Datt, ‘Question III Concrete Pavements, India’, in 
PIARC (Prague, 1971), 14. 
197 J. Datt, ‘Question III Concrete Pavements, India’, in PIARC (Prague, 1971), 14. 
198 Concrete roads represented 8 per cent of total paved roads in 1945-46. UP, PWD, Report Buildings 






A modernisation process based on the American model of road engineering took place and 
made possible the growth of heavy traffic over low-cost and often unpaved roads that 
characterised the developing world during the period. The particular environmental, traffic, 
administrative and institutional characteristics in these areas necessitated the emergence of 
new knowledge, and was therefore perceived by road engineers (particularly by engineers 
from developed countries) and by the World Bank staff as distinctive endeavours. These 
peculiar challenges also prompted the emergence of solutions that although often based on 
equipment and techniques from developed countries, took new and unique shapes. Methods 
and standards were modified and hybridised; mechanisation spread as long as machines and 
work regimes were adapted to local conditions (and as long as the task demanded it and the 
environmental and economic contexts allowed it), and sometimes completely new artefacts 
emerged to confront particular problems, like corrugations. Finally, the design of road 
structures also differed to that of developed countries, especially where roads needed to 
accommodate high proportions of heavy lorries and, sometimes, animal-drawn vehicles. 
Scarcity of funds and organisational and managerial limitations often restricted the extent to 
which the solutions considered ideal were applied. In fact, it seems that while tools and 
techniques were imitated and modified, management and administration practices were not, 
or to a lesser extent, considerably limiting the efficacy of the modernisation of road 
construction tools and techniques.
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Chapter 3 Building and maintaining roads in French West Africa and the 
Algerian Sahara, 1950-1962 
 
After the Second World War, roads in French African colonies were mainly intended to carry 
goods over long distances at the lowest possible cost. The priority of the white, French 
engineers (mostly graduates from the École des Ponts et Chaussées) was to accommodate 
increasingly heavier lorries while keeping construction and maintenance costs to a minimum. 
This task was particularly challenging because they had to confront extremely varied and 
constraining environmental conditions that differed considerably from the ones they were 
familiar with in the metropole.  
This chapter explores how they were able to do so through the examples of French West 
Africa (FWA) and the Algerian Sahara, from 1950 until independence. Although both 
territories were very important in economic, political and military terms, the resources 
available in the Sahara were much greater. In fact, while FWA’s roads transported mostly 
exports of coffee, cacao, timber and bananas, road construction in the Sahara was motivated 
by hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. These differences generated two different types 
of efforts in this period. In the Sahara, massive investment from both the colonial 
administration and private firms resulted in the building of new paved roads with modern and 
novel methods adapted to the extreme conditions and demands. In FWA, this period was 
mostly characterised by the establishment of a highly successful mechanised maintenance 
regime that made existing low-cost roads able to carry rising volumes of goods.  
These two cases illustrate the post-war modernisation of road engineering presented in 
Chapter 2, and in particular the important influence of the US model. In addition, this chapter, 
as well as the two following ones, show that maintenance played a key part in the push 
towards the technical, technological and scientific development related to road and road 
transport development. The importance of maintenance was evident in that it was present in 
all stages of road development: from materials research, to creation and use of construction 
and maintenance plant, passing through drainage and profile design. Furthermore, this chapter 
goes beyond the recent initiatives to analyse the role of maintenance (see Introduction), by 
presenting it not as the neglected routine upkeep of roads, but as a central activity in road 
development that occupied everyone from labourers to elite engineers and that involved the 




Moreover, through the case of the Sahara this chapter reflects on the meaning of 
environmental constraints (see also Chapter 5). I argue that the biggest challenge posed by 
the natural environment was the lack of knowledge about the way in which both local and 
imported materials would behave if they were employed for road construction in this context. 
There was no precedent for the use of certain familiar materials in these extreme conditions 
(like bitumen), and the properties of the local materials (mostly sands) were unknown. Given 
that the kind of new knowledge the engineers needed about local materials could only be 
produced in materials laboratories, these facilities acquired major importance in road 
construction projects. Yet, the roads built in the Sahara during this period remained 
experimental to a certain extent, as it was considered that only time would be able to confirm 
laboratory findings. Unlike the other case studies in this thesis, the case of the Algerian Sahara 
features the construction of paved roads and the swift upgrade of tracks into paved roads. The 
hydrocarbon roads do not seem to have been considered low-cost. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first section focuses on the Algerian Sahara 
and highlights the role of private firms and materials laboratories in the development of paved 
roads. The second section studies the case of FWA and gives special emphasis to the territory 
of Ivory Coast given its commercial importance within the federation. The chapter is based 
on two main sources. First, the colonial Public Works fund at the Archives Nationales 
d’Outre-Mer (ANOM, Aix-En-Provence, France). This archive contains published and 
unpublished documents related to transport projects that took place in the French colonial 
Empire during the twentieth century. The documents include annual technical and 
administrative reports and proposals and assessments of the transport development plans. The 
second important source is the monthly journal Revue Générale des Routes et des 
Aérodromes, a private publication that features contributions from engineers working either 
for the colonial administration or for private firms, being all these engineers for the most part 
graduates of the École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées. The Revue can be found in Paris at 
the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (François-Miterrand site).  
 
Urgent roads for the ‘unknown’: the roads of the Algerian Sahara, 1956-1962 
 
In 1947, France launched a vast exploration programme to find hydrocarbons in the Algerian 
Sahara. In 1956, after four years of exploratory drillings, large oil reserves were found in 




world’s largest gas fields was discovered at Hassi R’ Mel.1 These discoveries, and the efforts 
that led to them, transformed road transport in the Algerian Sahara. This section presents the 
steps taken by the public administration (i.e. the newly created Organisation Commune des 
Régions Sahariennes, OCRS) and mostly private construction and petroleum firms in order 
to build the roads that served oil and gas fields and make them accessible. Long distances, 
extreme climate and the rising circulation of the new large vehicles especially designed for 
the Sahara made this endeavour extremely challenging and expensive. However, the greatest 
obstacle for the road engineers was the limited knowledge they had about the properties of 
the local materials, and especially about how these would behave if used for road construction 
in those particular conditions. Similarly, the way familiar materials would react in this context 
was unknown. The adoption of materials laboratory testing and other modern American 
techniques was a key part of the process of road construction in the Sahara. New ways of 
managing and organising labour and road works also had to be created in response to the 
conditions. However, it is noted that although many innovations were required, existing ‘old’ 
techniques were also employed in this endeavour. The term ‘low-cost’ was not employed in 
this context, although engineers were always looking for ways to keep costs to a minimum.2  
This section is divided into four parts. The first part gives a broad picture of the transport 
system in the Algerian Sahara before 1950 and presents the main challenges to road 
construction in the region. The second part focuses on the upgrade of the Ghardaïa-El Goléa 
route from a track into a paved road, emphasising the modern equipment and techniques used, 
as well as the role of large private companies. The third part presents the example of the 
construction of the Gassi-Touil road, a paved road crossing the Great Eastern Erg, 
highlighting the major role that laboratory testing played. The final part briefly introduces 
certain particularities of the construction of roads within oil fields.  
 
1 Marta Musso, ‘Oil Will Set Us Free: The Hydrocarbon Industry and the Algerian Decolonization 
Process’, in Andrew Smith and Chris Jeppesen (eds.), Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa: 
Future Imperfect (London, 2017), 67-68. 
2 I only found one reference to the construction of ‘economical’ roads built quickly and with the 
expectation that future improvements would be needed. This comment was made by André Ponton in a 
recent volume gathering testimonies from engineers of the École des Ponts working in African colonies; 
Ponton arrived to Algeria in 1950 to work for the administration, who was put in charge of the technical 
services of the OCRS in 1960 and continued to direct the organism that replaced the OCRS after 
independence until 1964. He characterised as economical the roads the engineers built in the 1950s and 
1960s around Touggourt, El Oued, Ouargla, Ghardaïa, amongst others. In general, however, although 
engineers in the Sahara were always trying to minimise costs, they commented on the availability of 
abundant funds. In addition, due to environmental and traffic conditions roads were paved and made 
highly resistant. Jacques Bourdillon (ed.), Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, Témoignages 




Setting the scene: desert, hydrocarbons, lorries 
In the first decades of the century there was little transport development in southern Algeria. 
Rail connections between the main coastal cities and the south followed three main axes: the 
western axe went from Oran to Colomb-Béchar, the central one from Algiers to Djelfa, and 
the eastern axe from Philippeville to Touggourt. These railways served military and political 
purposes as part of the French effort to control the Southern regions of their Northern African 
colonies.3 South of these termini, caravans were the main methods used to supply the oases 
and provide administrative connections.4 Caravans of dromedaries followed ancient routes 
towards Sudan, Niger or Chad, and south of the Eastern Erg transport was limited to the 
traditional itineraries of semi-nomad tribes on the border between Algeria and Tunisia.5 A 
network of motorable roads and tracks also existed, following the same three axes as the 
railways and reaching further south across the desert. Even though motor traffic was light, by 
the middle of the century the northern stretches of the roads linking the coast to the Sahara 
were covered by a light bituminous treatment. These roads connected Oran to Bouktoub (in 
the route towards Colomb-Béchar, stretching for 280 km), Algiers to Laghouat and the oasis 
of Ghardaïa (635 km-long road, known as the RN1), and Philippeville to Biskra (320 km-
long, in the route towards Touggourt).6  
 
Figure 3.1 Map of Saharan roads and tracks, 1957 
 
3 Saigot, J., ‘Préambule: Les Travaux d’Infrastructure au Sahara de 1945 à 1957’, in Revue Générale des 
Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 65. 
4 Saigot, ‘Préambule’, 65. 
5 Saigot, ‘Préambule’, 65; Réné Durand, Marcel Tessier and Charles Jaillard, ‘La Circulation dans les 
Ergs du Sahara’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 156. 





Source: Taken from J. Declerck, ‘Roads for the Sahara’, in Road International, 27 (1957), 31. 
 
The quest for and discovery of hydrocarbons revolutionised transport in the Algerian Sahara.7 
This revolution did not include railways. Although there were plans to build rails across the 
desert by the late 1950s, these were never built, and all transport south of the railway termini 
was done by road or track throughout the period.8 Roads were indeed the preferred method 
for petroleum exploration because it was a highly uncertain activity.9 There were two types 
 
7 During the Second World War, the railway that connected Oran to Colomb-Béchar was extended south 
as part of an initiative to build a Trans-Saharan Railway, an ambitious project that was never built. The 
railway only made it to Abadla, less than 100 km away from Colomb-Béchar. Some road paving took 
place during the war as well, in the area linking Touggourt to Ouargla and some stretches in the route 
Ouargla-Fort-Lallemand, but these were only 250 km in total. Saigot, ‘Préambule’, 65-67. 
8 See map, Annexe D. 
9 G. Kyvellos, ‘Infrastructure Saharienne de la Compagnie Française des Pétroles (Algérie)’, in Revue 
Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 221. 




of roads and tracks linked to hydrocarbons: the long-distance access routes (that connected 
coastal cities to the exploration/exploitation fields), and the roads within exploitation 
camps.10 While the latter were built and managed by hydrocarbon firms, the former were 
provided by both this type of firm and large groups of French construction firms hired by the 
public administration.  
The construction and upgrade of roads to serve the new hydrocarbon needs confronted the 
French engineers with obstacles that had not been surmounted before in road building. 
Climate conditions were certainly one of the biggest problems to overcome, but the real issue 
was that there were no previous studies about the behaviour of materials under such extreme 
temperatures (that could oscillate in some places from 0 to 80º C under the sun), and the 
effects of humidity variations on the roads were difficult to predict in the long term.11 There 
was a lot of uncertainty around road construction and maintenance in the Sahara, but two 
threats were quickly identified as absolutely certain: sand and water. Sand storms could bury 
the roads, and while rain was very scarce, it could be torrential. Flooding frequently destroyed 
roads, and road foundations could remain humid at 5 per cent for many weeks after heavy 
rain, causing great instability.12  
In addition, access to water for road works was difficult, traditional road-building materials 
were rare, and there were no detailed maps of the region. In fact, in the 1950s the maps offered 
by the administration were of poor quality and although the nomad populations knew the 
territory well, their knowledge was not directly translatable into conventional figures and 
information that would allow the engineers to exploit it.13 One of the possible reasons for the 
difficulty of employing their knowledge in road construction is the fact camel routes were not 
designed to accommodate motor vehicles, and the latter often found it impossible to circulate 
on these routes.14 Another important reason was that the properties of local materials played 
 
10 For a map of Saharan roads and tracks in 1957 see Figure 3.1. 
11 Barbet, G. and Masson, P., ‘Le Rôle de la Route au Sahara. Ses Conditions d’Établissement et 
d’Exécution’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 86. 
12 Saigot, J., ‘Section 1 Construction and Maintenance, Question 3 Low-Cost Roads, Algeria’, in 
Permanent International Association of Road Congresses (Istanbul, 1955), 5 (hereinafter: Saigot, ‘Low-
Cost Roads, Algeria’); J. Fonkenell and G. Guérin, ‘La Route Gassi-Touil, Construction d’une Route en 
Matériaux Exclusivement Sableux’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 
(June 1959), 190. 
13 Barbet and Masson, ‘Le Rôle de la Route au Sahara’, 84. 
14 To overcome the lack of maps, aerial photography was employed. Used in the US since the 1920s, 
aerial photography had become popular in British African colonies to compensate for the lack of maps or, 
more accurately, the lack of detailed maps to work with. In the Sahara this was a particularly useful 
technique because the lack of dense vegetation made the determination of the topography and the 
materials of the terrain relatively easy. Moreover, aerial photography was seen as a suitable alternative to 
the traditional manual terrain reconnaissance because it required a lot less time, effort, and money. Barbet 




a major role in the process of deciding which route to take – but these characteristics could 
only be determined with laboratory tests.  
Moreover, population density was low, services for drivers were scarce, and distances were 
very long.15 This made the transport of materials expensive and the management of labour 
and plant complicated. For example, the transport of bitumen was so expensive that only 
traffic of over 70,000 or 100,000 tons per year justified its use.16 In fact, bitumen was 
imported from the refineries of the Étang de Berre (South-East France) and stored in different 
coastal cities; the largest stocks were located in Oran (storage capacity of 7,700 tons) and 
Algiers (with the capacity to store 7,500 tons).17 From there, most of the bitumen would be 
transported by railway on tank cars until the terminus (Touggourt in particular), from where 
it would be transferred to lorries which, in turn, would deliver the binder to the work sites.18 
Sometimes the distances the lorries had to cover were of more than 1,000 km return.19  
Finally, the Saharan vehicles that had started being developed since the beginning of the 
century also represented novel challenges. These vehicles were not only becoming 
increasingly adapted to the heat, dust, and long distances, they were also growing in size and 
loading capacity to serve the hydrocarbon sector.20 By the late 1950s, loaded lorries could 
weigh about 40 to 70 tons, and axle loads could reach 15 tons (which exceeded the maximum 
allowed in France, i.e. 13 tons).21 Despite low traffic densities (sometimes no more than 50 
vehicles per day), these heavy vehicles were a threat to the road structures and surfaces, 
especially because the effects of their circulation were only being researched at the time.22  
 
15 For instance, the distance between Touggourt and the oil field of Edjeleh is over 900 km-long. 
16 In 1959, construction with bitumen was estimated at 10 million francs per km in the Northern Sahara 
and at 15 million francs in the Central Sahara. Saigot, ‘Préambule’, 70. 
17 Chambre Syndicale des Importateurs et Distributeurs de Bitumen de Pétrole en Algérie (CSIDBPA), 
‘Approvisionnement et Distribution des Liants Bitumineux sur les Chantiers Sahariens, Départements des 
Oasis et de la Saoura’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 
219. 
18 CSIDBPA, ‘Approvisionnement et Distribution’, 218. 
19 There were companies specialised in the transport of materials. They crafted diverse solutions for these 
long journeys. Amongst these was the use of articulated lorries towed by a tractor of 300 hp. with adapted 
tanks designed to keep the bitumen hot – the total weighing about 60 tons when loaded. CSIDBPA, 
‘Approvisionnement et Distribution’, 218. 
20 See R. Le Grain-Eiffel, ‘La Construction Automobile Française de Véhicules Sahariens’, in Revue 
Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 141-154. 
21 P. Fumet, ‘Étude de l’Action des Véhicules Gros Porteurs Sahariens sur l’Infrastructure Routière’, in 
Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 129; P. Fumet, 
‘Chaussées en Sables Gypseux et en Sables Stabilisés Chimiquement’, in Revue Générale des Routes et 
des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 169-178. 
22 Le Grain-Eiffel, ‘La Construction Automobile Française’. In 1959, on the 110 km-long stretch open to 
traffic on the Gassi-Touil road (which was still under construction), traffic density was on average 50 
vehicles per day, but lorries could weigh up to 70 tons; the average weight bore by the road was 150,000 




Upgrading tracks into roads: the Ghardaïa-El Goléa road and the role of construction firms  
From 1951 to 1954, hydrocarbon exploration generated a significant traffic increase on the 
320 km-long track connecting Ghardaïa to El Goléa. In only three years traffic volume was 
multiplied by seven, reaching 51,000 tons per year.23 Since this traffic was only expected to 
increase, the administration decided to upgrade this route into a road that could withstand 
vehicles of 13 tons per axle circulating at 100 km/h – as this was the only way to keep the 
road open and keep maintenance costs manageable.24 Reconnaissance studies started in 1956, 
and construction in October 1957.  
The construction of this road is an example of the rapid modernisation that road construction 
experienced in the Sahara in the mid- to late-1950s. The scale of works and the conditions of 
the site meant that a group of construction companies (and not just one) was in charge of the 
project. In this case, the bid was won by the Groupement des Entreprises pour 
l’Aménagement des Routes du Sahara (GEDARS), which consisted of the large firms: 
Société Colas d’Algérie, Société Générale d’Entreprises (SGE, today’s Vinci), Razel Frères, 
and Truchetet et Tansini.25 GEDARS spent over 3,100 million francs in the construction of 
this road.26 
In addition, the selection of materials was done with the help of modern laboratory tests – a 
reconnaissance process that took about six months.27 The structure and type of surface were 
determined according to these findings and following the construction of experimental 
stretches. From early- to mid-1957, GEDARS built a few stretches of the road with different 
surfaces to see how they would react to traffic. After two months, it became clear that a thick 
bitumen surface was needed, especially if the effects of the high temperatures on the bitumen 
were to be delayed, as the American experience had previously shown. The consideration of 
 
23 Saigot, ‘Low-Cost Roads, Algeria’, 2. 
24 C. Regis and J.P. Fourès, ‘La Construction de la Route de Ghardaïa à El Goléa’, in Revue Générale des 
Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 209-13. 
25 Regis and Fourès, ‘La Construction de la Route de Ghardaïa à El Goléa’, 210. 
26 By June 1959, with still 50 km left to build, the cost of the works had been 3,100 million francs. 
However, these companies did not work exclusively within GEDARS. In fact, construction companies 
formed different groups for every project (or for a certain number of projects). For example, Société 
Colas d’Algérie, SGE, Razel Frères and Truchetet et Tansini joined forces with Viasphalte and the 
Société Algérienne de Travaux Publics de l’Afrique du Nord (SATPAN) to build about 450 km of roads 
from 1954 to 1959, costing over 4,000 million francs (their projects included the roads from Biskra to 
Touggourt and Ouargla to Hassi-Messaoud). Robert Warren and Jacques Fourès, ‘Organisation, Rôle, 
Effort de l’Entreprise Routière au Sahara’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, Spécial 
Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 94. 
27 For more details about the use of laboratories in the Sahara see next section. This paragraph is based 




the response of the road to future traffic and the local natural environment was indeed 
essential to facilitate future maintenance and delay reconstruction as much as possible. 
The American influence was not only present in the use of materials laboratory tests and the 
choice of surface, but also in the mechanisation of works and the plant employed. For 
example, although some of the equipment used to build the surfaces was indeed French (a 
Richier cylinder, a Berliet lorry, and an Albaret roller), the majority seems to have been 
American, including two ‘Heavy Duty’ Barber-Greene bituminous mixing plants, one 
bulldozer D7 (Caterpillar), one bulldozer TD14 (International Harvester), one motor-grader 
(Caterpillar), and one Barber-Greene finisher.28  
Conditions in the Sahara also required the creation of new management practices. The 
maintenance of the machinery had to be pushed to an extreme, as expensive and sophisticated 
machines would be useless unless they were adequately maintained, lubricated and promptly 
repaired. For instance, the availability of spare parts had to be planned well in advance due 
to the long distances and also because, as the engineers Robert Warren and Jacques Fourès 
stated in 1959, ‘in the Sahara… you only find what you take with you’.29 Moreover, despite 
the high mechanisation of the work, large numbers of workers were required, partly because 
the isolation of the work sites made necessary a great variety of workers that went from 
mechanics, to cooks and nurses.30 Although mobile accommodation for workers on road 
construction sites was very common in large projects in this period, the peculiarity of the 
Saharan caravans was that they had to provide air conditioning for temperatures up to 55ºC.31 
In addition, the construction companies were aware of the strain on the workers’ mental health 
that working for prolonged hours under the sun hundreds of kilometres away from the nearest 
town could cause. Different solutions were implemented such as offering periods of leave 
every 5 to 6 weeks, bringing by lorry or by plane diverse commodities for the workers to buy, 
and even offering entertainment, such as open-air cinemas in the middle of the desert.32 The 
idea was to give the workers the impression that ‘they never left’.33 
 
28 The brand of smaller equipment and tools was not specified, but it is likely that it was produced in 
France. Regis and Fourès, ‘La Construction de la Route de Ghardaïa à El Goléa’, 213. 
29 Warren and Fourès, ‘Organisation, Rôle, Effort’, 92. 
30 In 1959, for a road programme of 1,400 km taking place over four years (and costing about 17 billion 
francs), the number of workers was about 1,500. Warren and Fourès, ‘Organisation, Rôle, Effort’, 95. 
31 This accommodation also differed from the one provided for oil fields because it needed to be mobile. 
Warren and Fourès, ‘Organisation, Rôle, Effort’, 95 ; Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de 
l’Afrique, 259. 
32 Warren and Fourès, ‘Organisation, Rôle, Effort’, 95. 




Building a new road across the Eastern Erg: the Gassi-Touil road and the role of materials 
laboratories 
The Gassi-Touil road was built from 1957 to 1960; it connects to this day the region around 
Hassi-Messaoud (and therefore, northern Algeria) with Fort-Flatters (and from there the oil 
field of Edjeleh).34 Although traffic was already in circulation along this corridor before 1957, 
only about a third of the route corresponded to a built road at the time.35 The hydrocarbon 
findings around the Edjeleh area justified the construction of this paved road, as the 
maintenance of any other surface would prove too expensive with the rising traffic. 
Conditions in Gassi-Touil were considered to be extreme, even by the standards of other 
Saharan road works.36 Crossing the Great Eastern Erg from north to south, the route extended 
for about 300 km along a corridor surrounded by dunes. The temperatures reached 50oC in 
the shade from May to September, period during which water consumption could reach 500 
m3 per day, due to evaporation. The isolation of the site presented challenges for both the 
workforce and the plant. As previously mentioned, long stays in these conditions were 
considered dangerous for the mental health of the workers. The closest oasis, Ouargla, was 
situated 400 km away from the starting work site. Communications were also an important 
issue: radio connection with Algiers was considered indispensable to order and receive plant 
and materials as promptly as possible.  
However, the major obstacle was the lack of materials that were traditionally used for road 
construction. In order to determine whether it was possible to use any of the materials 
alongside the route, laboratory tests were employed. From April to December 1957, materials 
were analysed and classified at the mobile laboratories at the work site, and smaller 
representative samples were sent to the Laboratoire Central des Ponts et Chaussées (Algeria 
Division) for more detailed studies.37 The tests performed included granulometry, plasticity, 
CBR, and other standard tests (see Chapter 2), and produced essential new knowledge to build 
the road.  
The role of the laboratory went beyond the testing of local materials. It was considered 
necessary to stabilise the superior layer of the base given the expected traffic of lorries 
 
34 I have not been able to find an exact date of completion, but in 1959 the completion date was December 
1960. Warren and Fourès, ‘Organisation, Rôle, Effort’, 94. 
35 Fonkenell and Guérin, ‘La Route Gassi-Touil’, 179. 
36 This and the next paragraph are based on : Fonkenell and Guérin, ‘La Route Gassi-Touil’, 179-80. 




weighing over 60 tons.38 However, known stabilisation methods were considered too 
expensive (in particular sand-cement) and it was the collaboration with the laboratory in 
Algiers which allowed the construction to move forward, with the discovery of the possibility 
of using a ‘miracle’ material: lignosulfonates.39 This material is a by-product of the 
production of paper, at the time produced in Landes, and it was useful as a binder for road 
construction only if it was not exposed to humidity, which was the case in this area.40 The 
construction of this road absorbed almost all French production for three years.41 It was 
transported by train until Port Vendres, by ship to Philippeville, by train until Touggourt, and 
from there by lorry until the road site.42 Furthermore, materials laboratories were also 
essential during construction to monitor the characteristics of the materials being used. In 
addition to the laboratory situated at the semi-permanent camp (moved every 100 km), staff 
from the Algiers laboratory were sent to perform measurements on site during construction.43 
It is worth noting that, despite the increasing use of laboratories, by 1959 experience was still 
considered necessary to determine the efficacy of construction and maintenance techniques. 
Indeed, although private companies (such as the Société des Transports Pétroliers par 
Pipeline, TRAPIL, and the Union Technique de l’Automobile, du motocycle et du Cycle, 
UTAC) and the Central Laboratory of the École des Ponts contributed enormously to the 
knowledge of local materials, it was still considered that the results from the experiments 
could only be confirmed by commercial use.44  
In fact, not everything about transport in the Sahara was new in the 1950s. Most of the routes 
across the Sahara were either ancient itineraries or were at least used since the First World 
War. Routes across the ergs (or sand seas) were still being marked by guemiras (rock 
pyramids used by the méhariste militaries) or their updated version made of metal or plastic.45 
The gypsum sand, never before used for roads, was used before in artisanal construction, and 
 
38 Fonkenell and Guérin, ‘La Route Gassi-Touil’, 181. 
39 Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 263. 
40 Rain was considered negligible. Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 263. 
41 Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 263. 
42 After this road was finished, the experience acquired was only partially transferable to build the stretch 
that reached In Amenas (and thus Edjeleh). Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 
263. 
43 Fonkenell and Guérin, ‘La Route Gassi-Touil’, 182-88. 
44 Charles Deutsch, ‘Pipelines et Transports Automobiles Sahariens’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des 
Aérodromes, Spécial Sahara, 29 (June 1959), 112. 




water, needed in large quantities for the construction process and for the workers, was often 
obtained with the ancient method of the artesian well.46  
Roads in oil fields 
Although traffic on oil exploitation fields could be extremely heavy, road planning was 
relatively easy given that the circulation of vehicles was highly controlled, unlike the traffic 
on public roads. In the camp of Hassi-Messaoud, for example, the Compagnie Française des 
Pétroles - Algérie (CFP) calculated traffic on roads according to ‘units of traffic’. One unit of 
traffic corresponded to 2,000 passages of heavy lorries (10 to 55 tons), and 4,000 passages of 
light vehicles, i.e. a total of 50,000 tons in the period of 5 to 6 months.47 The characteristics 
of each road within the network were determined according to the number of units of traffic 
that particular road was expected to bear: although most roads were paved, some roads only 
received a soil stabilisation treatment.48  
To illustrate the scale of the works, in one block of the camp (of about 40 sq. km), 620 km of 
roads were needed, and traffic was expected to oscillate between one and four units of 
traffic.49 In a period of six months the total volume of traffic in the Hassi-Messaoud network 
was expected to be approximately 10 units, i.e. 500,000 tons (unevenly distributed). Although 
the cost of the works was not made explicit, one of the engineers of the CFP estimated in 
1959 that they would cost a few billion francs. Apart from road networks, the CFP also 
provided exploration drills with aerodromes whose size depended on the importance of the 
camp. In Hassi-Messaoud, for example, an aerodrome equipped to receive heavy planes of 
55 tons was built. 
The construction of pipelines also required building tracks. Indeed, the first step in pipeline 
construction was to build a track of 15 to 20 m-wide.50 These tracks were mainly used by 
transport vehicles and work machinery (which included tractors and other machines, such as 
welding equipment). The material transported included pipes, water, lubricants, and surfacing 
materials, amongst others, the transport of which necessitated a large fleet of about 100 
mobile units (lorries or tractors), representing about 25,000 hp (i.e. more than work 
 
46 Fumet, ‘Chaussées en Sable Gypseux’, 169; Anon., ‘Construction de La Route Ghardaïa-Ouargla’, in 
Revue Générale Des Routes et des Aérodromes, 317 (1958), 91. 
47 Kyvellos, ‘Infrastructure Saharienne’, 221. 
48 Kyvellos, ‘Infrastructure Saharienne’, 222. 
49 There were roads that were expected to carry more than four units of traffic but these were a minority. 
This paragraphs is based on: Kyvellos, ‘Infrastructure Saharienne’, 221-23. 
50 These pipeline tracks differed from tracks built for motor vehicles in that they followed the sharp 




machinery, which usually had a power of 15,000 hp), as well as about 150 units of towed 
equipment, such as trailers and tanks. 
 
Maintaining low-cost roads in French West Africa, 1950-1959 
 
After the Second World War, FWA, the largest of the federations in ‘Afrique Noire’, 
comprised the territories of Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, 
French Sudan, Upper Volta, Niger and French Togoland – in the late 1950s it was estimated 
that the Federation extended over an area of 4,634,000 sq. km, comprising a population of 
about 19 million.51 This area corresponded to about double the one of the second largest 
federation, French Equatorial Africa, and to about seven times the area of France.  
Roads occupied a central role in the development agenda of FWA in the post-war period. By 
1957, lorries were carrying a larger freight volume than railways on mostly unpaved roads.52 
These were low-cost roads, and only the establishment of a large-scale and strict regime of 
constant routine and ‘progressive’ maintenance (also called stage construction, see Chapter 
2) allowed for the circulation of the rapidly growing traffic. This new way of organising 
maintenance made use of new modern machinery and obtained very satisfactory results. By 
1959, the engineers working in FWA, and especially in Ivory Coast, considered they had 
found a way of maintaining unpaved roads that could and should be widely applied. This 
method was mainly based on highly frequent interventions, the employment of trained 
engineers for the supervision of teams and, above all, on the modification of road design to 
make maintenance easier and cheaper.  
In the early 1950s, FWA had a railway network of about 3,700 km, which consisted of 
unconnected lines, each serving a separate territory linking the inland productive areas with 
the maritime ports – the largest ones being Dakar, Conakry, Cotonou and Abidjan (opened 
respectively in 1866, 1909, 1892, and 1951).53 The road network consisted of about 47,000 
 
51 French Togoland had a particular status; in 1955 it became an autonomous republic within the French 
Union while retaining the status as a UN trust territory that it acquired after the Second World War. 
However, for public works planning, Togoland was effectively managed as part of French West Africa 
until its formal independence in 1960. M. Giraud and J. Millier, ‘1ère Section: Caractéristiques, 
Construction et Entretien des Routes et Pistes d’Aviation, 4ème Question: Routes à Faible Prix de 
Revient, Rapport Afrique Occidentale Française’ in Permanent International Association of Road 
Congresses (PIARC) (Rio de Janeiro, 1959), 2 (hereinafter: Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de 
Revient’). 
52 It seems most of these roads were built before 1950. See note 54.  





km of road and 34,000 km of tracks, i.e. about 0,01 km of road per sq. km (excluding tracks).54 
Roads and tracks followed a similar pattern to the railways (and therefore ran parallel to 
them), with the difference that roads also provided inter-colonial connections with northern 
Africa, as well as reached much extensive territory by feeding the railways and main road 
routes.55  
Before the Second World War, roads and tracks were built by the army and France d’Outre-
Mer (FOM) administrators with little resources, and it was only after 1946 that engineers 
from the École des Ponts were sent to sub-Saharan Africa to work on infrastructure projects.56 
By the early 1950s, most of the network was seasonal and unpaved, and road conditions were 
poor: drainage works were considered insufficient, tracks could not keep up with the traffic 
demands and were rutted by traffic and surface water, and tracks with light treatments were 
constantly deteriorating.57 This situation was changed by the end of the decade, when dust 
seemed to be the only remaining problem.  
This section is divided into two parts. The first one presents the objectives and challenges of 
FWA’s road development from 1950 to 1959. The second examines the way in which 
mechanised maintenance regimes were established during the period in FWA, and in Ivory 
Coast in particular. The example of Ivory Coast is used prominently in this section, not only 
because of its successful maintenance regime, but also because of its important economic role 
within FWA. In fact, in 1955, the value of Ivory Coast’s imports and exports corresponded 
to almost 40 per cent of the external commerce of FWA, and in particular, to more than 70 
per cent of the total exports of FWA.58 
 
54 These figures are from 1956 but length increase seems to have been negligible in the previous five 
years. See Annexe F and: R. Lantenois, ‘Section 1, Road Construction and Maintenance, Question II, 
Progress Made Since the Congress at The Hague in 1938 in the Study of Road Subgrades, French West 
Africa’, in PIARC (Lisbon, 1951), 2. 
55 See map in Annexe E. 
56 Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 378.  
57 R. Lantenois, ‘Section 1 and 2 Joint Meeting, Question VIb, Construction and Maintenance of Roads in 
Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries, With Special Reference to Available Resources and to 
the Traffic to be Carried – Allocation of Funds to the Construction and Maintenance of these Roads, 
French West Africa’, in PIARC (Lisbon, 1951), 2, 3 (hereinafter: Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in 
Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’); R. Lantenois, ‘Section 1, Road Construction and 
Maintenance, Question II, Progress Made Since the Congress at The Hague in 1938 in the Study of Road 
Subgrades, French West Africa’, in PIARC (Lisbon, 1951), 2. 
58 The value of Ivory Coast’s imports was of 19 billion CFA francs and the value of its exports was of 
25.6 billion CFA francs. The most important export products were: coffee and cacao, timber, and 
bananas. The volumes of these products exported in 1955 were respectively: 160,000 tons, 200,000 tons, 
and 30,000 tons. Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM), BIBECOL//10917, Giraud, ‘La Politique 
Routière et ses Conséquences Économiques’, in Giraud et. al., Routes en Afrique Occidentale Française: 
Conférences Prononcées à Dakar le 28 Novembre 1956 (April 1957), 21 (hereinafter: Giraud, ‘La 




A road network to move goods 
After the Second World War, as part of a large programme of infrastructure development in 
the colonies, the metropole committed to invest in transport systems in general, and road 
development in particular. Funds for transport development came from the Caisse Centrale 
de la France d’Outre-Mer (CCFOM) and mostly from the Fonds d’Investissement pour le 
Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d’Outre-Mer (FIDES), both of which 
were created in the post-war period.59 The FIDES financed the two development plans that 
covered the periods from 1948 to 1953 and 1953 to 1959, which had the objective of 
modernising ‘Afrique noire’ and Madagascar by offering the loans necessary to fund large 
projects that included support for agricultural production, mining, research, and transport 
development.60 Transport was attributed a significant portion of the funding since it was 
considered the key element to ensure the exports of raw materials and the imports of 
manufactures. From April 1946 to June 1951, of the 240 billion CFA francs spent by the 
FIDES and the CCFOM on development projects in all the overseas territories, 170 billion 
were destined to support transport programmes and social facilities (such as hospitals, 
schools, etc.); this corresponded to 70 per cent of total investment, of which 85 billion (i.e. 
50 per cent) were spent exclusively on transport development.61 Funds for transport 
development also came from general and local budgets, as well as from road funds (Fonds 
Routiers), which were created in several territories during this period with taxes to fuel 
consumption.62 In FWA, in particular, from 1948 to 1959, about 11.6 billion CFA francs were 
spent on road development only, which corresponded to more than a third of the total money 
spent on development in the territory during the period.63  
 
59 The CCFOM was in charge of issuing money and of financing social and economic development. After 
the independence of several colonies the Caisse was renamed the Caisse Centrale de Coopération 
Économique (CCCE) in 1958 and continued to provide funding, although lost its monetary role. After 
1959 funds were also received from the Fonds Européen de Développement. For details on the FIDES see 
the ANOM website:  
http://anom.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/ark:/61561/wu706hcy.num=20.q=routes+en+afrique+occid
entale+ (04/06/2017)  
60 ANOM, 3TP/141, Plans d’Équipement, 1938-1951 (Afrique Occidentale Française: Routes), ‘Texte 
Conférence Prononcée le 17-10-51 à la Société d’Encouragement pour l’Industrie Nationale par Monsieur 
Postel-Vinay, Directeur Général de la Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre-Mer’ (1951), 2 (hereinafter: 
ANOM 3TP/141, Plans d’Équipement, 1938-1951 (AOF: routes), ‘Texte Conférence par Postel-Vinay’).  
61 From October 1948 to December 1959, 1 CFA franc was the equivalent of 2 French francs. ANOM, 
3TP/141, Plans d’Équipement, 1938-1951 (AOF: routes), ‘Texte Conférence par Postel-Vinay’, 2; Giraud 
and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 9, 26. 
62 FWA created a Road Fund in 1952-53. Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 
402. 
63 In FWA, the total investment on social and economic development from 1948 to 1959 was of about 30 
billion CFA. Most of this money came from the two FIDES plans, which consisted of 22.9 billion CFA 
francs, 20 per cent of which was spent on road development (i.e. 4.6 billion CFA francs). To this sum 




With these funds FWA developed a policy of building and maintaining low-cost roads (or 
‘routes économiques’). Broadly speaking, low-cost construction in FWA acquired the same 
meaning noted in Chapter 1.64 However, in FWA, the term ‘low-cost’ was also used as a tool 
to seek funding. Since the costs for building roads in FWA were high, road programmes 
attracted a lot of criticism, and it was only reluctantly that loans were attributed. Therefore, 
in the presentation of road projects, expenses were brought down to the minimum to fit the 
definition of the low-cost road, term that seems to have been used to designate all road 
projects in the overseas territories.65  
In the 1950s, roads carried more freight than railways in FWA.66 For instance, in Ivory Coast 
in 1951, an average of 63 per cent of the two most important products of the territory (coffee 
and cacao) were transported by lorry and not by rail.67 In 1957, it was estimated that 
approximately 2,200 million ton-km of goods were transported in FWA (including exports 
and imports), and most of this volume was moved by road (i.e. 1,400 million ton-km), while 
only about a fourth of the tonnage was carried by railway (see Graph 3.1).68 Although this 
could suggest that roads were competing with railways, it seems that roads were (at least part 
of them) feeding the railways.69 The Gouverneur Général of FWA had to approve of the 
creation of any transport company for either passengers or goods and it appears that this 
measure avoided the competition between both kinds of methods, especially in the case where 
roads were parallel to the railways.70   
 
‘La Politique Routière et ses Conséquences’, 6-7 ; Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 
7.  
64 In particular, allowing for high speeds was not a concern: ‘in under-developed countries in overseas 
territories… there is no need… for an alignment suitable for high average speeds which would entail 
expensive earthworks’, instead roads had to be ‘adapted to the nature of the terrain’ and the ‘alignment 
must be modified to eliminate any difficulties in plan or in longitudinal profile which might interfere with 
the use of the roads by heavy lorries, since the employment of these lorries is essential to bring about a 
reduction in transport costs’. J. Chauchoy and R. Lantenois, ‘Section 1: Construction and Maintenance, 
Question 3, Low Cost Roads, French West Africa’, in PIARC (Istanbul, 1955), 27 (hereainfter: Chauchoy 
and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’). 
65 With, it seems, the exception of Northern Africa. ‘Aussi, afin de poursuivre notre programme, a-t-il 
fallu toujours rogner sur la dépense et essayer de justifier le terme de “routes économiques”, vocable par 
lequel on désignait toutes les réalisations routières dans les Territoires d’Outre-Mer’, Giraud, ‘La 
Politique Routière et ses Conséquences’, 12.  
66 From 1951 to 1957, the volume of exports in FWA almost doubled, going from about 856,000 tons to 
1,512,611 tons; while imports remained rather stable in comparison (going from 1,471,000 tons to 
1,721,149 tons). The figures available exclude iron and bauxite exports. Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à 
Faible Prix de Revient’, 4.  
67 67 per cent of coffee exports and 58 per cent of cacao exports were transported by road. ANOM, 
3TP/78, Afrique Occidentale Française, 1953-1957, République Française, Afrique Occidentale 
Française, ‘Plan 1953-1957 d’Équipement Routier de l’Afrique Occidentale Française’, 2. 
68 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 4. 
69 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 4. 
70 ANOM 3TP/141, Plans d’Équipement, 1938-1951 (Afrique Occidentale Française: Routes), Sécrétariat 




Graph 3.1 Distribution of volume carried by transportation method in French West 
Africa in 1957 (in millions of ton-km) 
 
Source: Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 4. 
 
Road construction costs were usually high, and although they varied enormously, some 
averages can be presented. In the early 1950s, the construction of an earth road (nine metres 
road bed, improved with local materials and including earthworks and small engineering 
structures) would usually cost about 2 to 3 million CFA francs per km, while the construction 
of a bitumen new road could cost from 4 to 8 million depending on the amount of earthworks 
needed.71 Due to the high costs of bitumen surfaces, only urban streets and heavily trafficked 
roads (more than 100 vehicles per day) were paved.72 The high cost of paving directed 
attention towards the development of methods for laying light surfaces in order to make earth 
roads more resistant to heavy traffic. These surfaces included light bitumen surfacings 
containing varied quantities of bitumen (also called ‘carpets’, see Chapter 2), and other 
methods that used mixtures of sand, cement or other materials. These methods were 
considered low-cost only because their price was lower than that of any other type of 
 
Françaises, Afrique Occidentale Française – Les Routes, (s.d.), 12; Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible 
Prix de Revient’, 12. 
71 In 1954, 1 million CFA francs was the equivalent of 5,714 USD. IBRD, ‘Technical Report on the 
French West African Railways’; Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 27; M. Giraud, ‘Prix 
de Revient des Travaux Routiers Entrepris au Sénégal’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, 
23 (April 1953), 36. 
72 Urban traffic could be very heavy, as was the case on the road Abidjan-Port Boët (Ivory Coast) in 1956, 
which had traffic of 3,000 to 7,000 vehicles per day. Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 
15; Anon. ‘Problèmes Routiers et Circulation en Côte d’Ivoire’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des 








pavement, but their actual cost was high.73 In fact, by the mid-1950s most roads were not 
protected by a bituminous carpet and were thus extremely vulnerable to erosion and traffic.74 
In 1956, about a third of the network corresponded to earth tracks with little or no earthworks 
at all (‘pistes’).75 The rest of the network consisted of roads, which means the construction 
involved earthworks (such as drainage or embankments), but even in this category the 
majority of the road length was not paved.76 
Maintenance costs also weighed heavily on FWA’s finances. In the early 1950s, the ideal 
expenditure to maintain an earth road was about 60,000 to 80,000 CFA francs per km per 
year, and that sum could increase to 800,000 or 1,000,000 CFA francs per km if a light 
bituminous surfacing was provided.77 Yet, the maintenance budget of FWA at the time was 
of only about 20,000 to 50,000 CFA francs per km.78 This was particularly challenging 
because maintenance and improvements were meant to be funded with local budgets, while 
metropole money (such as FIDES funds) was to be used exclusively for new construction.79  
The high construction and maintenance costs in FWA resulted from varied factors. First, the 
natural environment presented a significant challenge. From extremely dry areas, to zones of 
tropical rainfall, conditions were often very different even within the same territory. The need 
for bridges and important drainage works considerably increased the prices of road projects, 
and inadequate works would render maintenance almost impossible.80 Heavy rains also had 
to be taken into account in the planning of the works as often a year would only include about 
200 working days due to climate conditions.81 In dry areas or seasons, corrugation was one 
of the most challenging problems that roads faced (see Chapter 2). In addition, the long 
distances and the low density of the population made very expensive the transport of workers, 
materials, equipment, and other supplies (such as spare parts and food for the workers).82  
 
73 ‘The need for treating the soil to a depth of at least some 8 to 10 centimetres, the fact that a travel-mixer 
must be employed for the work, and the quantities of binder which have to be incorporated, combine to 
give a final cost which is high’, Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 24. 
74 Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 25. 
75 Annexe F. ANOM 3TP/78, Afrique Occidentale Française, 1953-1957, République Française, Afrique 
Occidentale Française, Sommaire Conditions Économiques (1956), 30 (hereinafter: AOF, Sommaire 
Conditions Économiques). 
76 AOF, Sommaire Conditions Économiques, 30. 
77 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 10. 
78 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 5. 
79 ANOM, 3TP/85, Projets Routiers Divers en Afrique 1950-1957, Fonds Européen, ‘Renforcement 
Route Togo-Nigeria, Sous-Dossier Technique’ (ca. 1955), 2.  
80 Some projects could need many bridges; depending on the difficulties found in the foundations a 
reinforced concrete bridge with a roadway of 3.50 m-wide could cost on average about 250,000 to 
350,000 CFA per metre of structure. Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 27. 
81 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 8. 




The cost of road works also depended on other factors, such as the availability and cost of 
labour and equipment, the cost of fuel, lubricant and other supplies, and of course, on the 
condition and technical specifications of the road. In particular, engineers constantly 
complained about the scarcity and high cost of labour in French sub-Saharan Africa after the 
abolition of forced labour in 1946.83 In the post-war period, migration towards Anglophone 
African countries (and especially to the Gold Coast) also contributed to the increasingly high 
cost of manual labour.84 Given the scarcity of labour, engineers in FWA were considering 
employing women for heavy construction and maintenance works in the early 1950s, as some 
engineers in other colonies did (in particular in Gabon, French Equatorial Africa).85  
Growing traffic was also a decisive factor. The construction and expansion of maritime ports 
contributed greatly to the increasing traffic.86 From 1930 to the mid-1950s, the number of 
vehicles in use multiplied by ten reaching almost 70,000 in 1956.87 In 1956, Senegal and 
Ivory Coast were by far the territories with the largest vehicle fleet (see Table 3.1).88 Another 
sign of the increase in the use of motor vehicles was the rise of fuel consumption. In fact, it 
more than tripled from 1950 to 1957, passing from 109,400 m3 in 1950 to 367,055 m3 in 
1970.89 What made this increase in traffic particularly damaging was its weight. Although in 
Ivory Coast, for instance, most goods were moved in light trucks (2 to 5 tons), traffic on some 
unpaved roads could reach 1,000 vehicles per day in 1959.90 In addition, traffic norms 
 
83 Recent research points out that despite the formal abolition of forced labour some practices continued, 
see Introduction note 77.  
84 Migration to look for employment in, for example, gold mines or cocoa plantations became permanent 
instead of seasonal after the Second World War, due to economic difficulties resulting from the conflict 
and also to the abolition of forced labour. Joanna Warson, ‘Protecting Empire from Without: 
Francophone African Migrant Workers, British West Africa and French Efforts to Maintain Power in 
Africa, 1945-1960’, in Andrew W.M. Smith and Chris Jeppesen (eds.), Britain, France and the 
Decolonization of Africa: Future Imperfect (London, 2017), 158. 
85 Women extracted and transported materials, such as gravel from riverbeds. Gilbert Meunier, ‘Un 
Problème, le Réseau des Routes du Gabon’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des Aérodromes, 23 (June 
1953), 39. According to Freed, in the 1920s and 1930s the use of female labour in French central Africa 
was less about the scarcity of labour than about cultural practices that saw the work with earth as an 
exclusively female task. Freed, ‘Networks of (Colonial) Power’, 215.  
86 Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 381. 
87 In January 1930 there were in total approximately 6,700 vehicles in use, by January 1952 there were 
about 40,200 and by December 1956 there were 69,928 vehicles in circulation. International Chamber of 
Commerce, A Statistical Survey of World Highway Transport (Paris, 1931), 13; International Road 
Federation (IRF), World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition (London, 1953), 16; AOF, Sommaire 
Conditions Économiques, 32. 
88 AOF, Sommaire Conditions Économiques, 32. 
89 M. Giraud, ‘Programme Routier de l’Afrique Occidentale Française’, in Revue Générale des Routes et 
des Aérodromes, 321 (Oct. 1958), 84. 
90 The majority of roads carried from 40 to 300 vehicles per day, but some earth roads carried 400 to 
vehicles per day, reaching peaks of 1,000 vehicles per day. Tracks usually carried up to 40 vehicles a day. 




followed the metropolitan Code de la Route, which meant that 13 ton-axle load lorries were 
permitted, the circulation of which was extremely damaging, if less frequent.91  
 
Table 3.1 Motor vehicle fleet in French West Africa in December 1956 





Ivory Coast 20,451 
Dahomey 3,159 
Niger 4,649 
Upper Volta  2,729 
Total French West Africa 69,928 
 
Source: ANOM 3TP/78, Afrique Occidentale Française, 1953-1957, République Française, Afrique 
Occidentale Française, Sommaire Conditions Économiques (1956), 32. 
 
Many engineers considered this combination of heavy lorries with low-cost roads a 
contradictory policy.92 Transport costs on bad surfaces could sometimes be double the price 
of those on a well-maintained surface. For instance, in Senegal in 1953, it was considered 
that transport cost 9 to 10 CFA francs per ton-km on bitumen roads, 12 to 15 CFA francs on 
good earth roads, and 18 to 20 CFA francs on bad earth roads and tracks.93 
 
91 ANOM, BIB SOM D/BR/2360, Bureau Central d'Études pour les Équipements d'Outre-Mer, 
Recommandations du Comité Technique Crée pour l'Étude Générale des Routes Économiques (Paris, 
1951), 15; Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 13. 
92 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 14. 




The new mechanised maintenance regimes 
Engineers in FWA established intensive regimes of maintenance that were meant to 
progressively improve roads over time, a process the engineers called ‘progressive 
maintenance’ – the same concept described in Chapter 1 as ‘stage construction’.94 Schemes 
of progressive maintenance were established by graduates of the École des Ponts since at 
least 1950, and increasing experience and equipment were gained throughout the decade.95 
These new maintenance regimes relied heavily on modern earth-moving machinery. 
Mechanisation started in a significant way after the Second World War, justified by the 
scarcity and cost of manual labour (and not by issues with the quality or speed of manual 
work).96 The impression that American machinery had made on French engineers during the 
conflict was also an influential factor (see Chapter 2).97 Although in FWA French lorries 
(Citroën, Renault) were common, the majority of earth-moving machinery came from the US, 
and above all, from Caterpillar, which was the brand that dominated the market.98 If the D8 
Caterpillar tractor was ubiquitous, the motor-grader was considered the key element of any 
construction or maintenance project (see Figure 3.2). Motor-graders could work maintaining 
about 500 km of road per year, and while in 1951 there were 50 in the whole of FWA, the 
numbers were expected to double quickly.99 These machines were expensive. For instance, 
in 1953, in Dakar, a motor-grader Caterpillar 12 cost 3,700,000 CFA francs, a D8 cost 
4,400,000 CFA francs and a Letourneau scraper 3,350,000 CFA francs, which, together with 
a Marion 1,5 Cv shovel (16,000,000 CFA francs), made 80 per cent of the total cost of 
machinery for a road construction project.100  
 
Figure 3.2 Maintenance of earth road with motor-grader, 1952101 
 
94 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 9. 
95 Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 381, 401. 
96 This was the case of manual maintenance, whose cost was ‘the main reason for which the system had 
become obsolete’. Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed 
Countries’, 5. 
97 See also Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 565. 
98 Each maintenance and construction unit was usually conformed by one or two tractors, a bulldozer, a 
scraper, a roller, a motor-grader, and a few lorries. A list of machinery in construction and maintenance 
units can be found in Annexe G. 
99 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 8. 
100 Giraud, ‘Prix de Revient des Travaux Routiers Entrepris au Sénégal’, 23. 
101 This picture is from French Cameroon but it illustrates the type of heavy machinery used in FWA in 





Source : Roger Delahaye, ‘La Construction de la Route Douala-Edéa’, in Revue Générale des Routes et des 
Aérodromes, 22 (Nov. 1952), 71, 79. 
 
Many machines were modified to respond to local conditions. The solutions adopted to deal 
with corrugations are a good example. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there were no machines 
specially designed to deal with this problem, so different alternatives were employed. Three 
of these were: ‘planing’ machines (parallel or inclined blades mounted on a chassis and drawn 
by a pneumatically-tyred tractor), trains of pneumatic tyres (mounted on a fixed chassis or 
coupled to chains and drawn by a tractor or lorry), and light motor-graders.102 The efficacy 
of each method was still being tested so there was no consensus on which one obtained better 
results. Often, the choice of method was more related to the availability of equipment than on 
technical superiority. For instance, in Niger (following the example of the Company on the 
Gao-Tessalit road in the Sahara) a device was built consisting of a ‘kind of drag formed by 
rails connected to each other in the shape of a V’; in Senegal a similar device was built 
‘formed by a kind of plane with scraper blade and saw teeth in front’, each of these artefacts 
was drawn by 35-40 hp tractor.103 Despite these efforts, corrugations could reappear after no 
longer than a week from reshaping, as was the case in the Bamako-Segou road, which carried 
about 100 to 200 vehicles a day (half of which were 5 ton lorries).104 
Regimes of mechanised maintenance were put in place across FWA but the one adopted in 
Ivory Coast in the early 1950s seems to have been one of the most developed and 
 
102 Chauchoy and Lantenois, ‘Low Cost Roads, FWA’, 27. 
103 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 6. 
104 Lantenois, ‘Construction of Roads in Thinly Populated or Under-Developed Countries’, 6. 
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successful.105 The work was divided between three main groups: the road sectors (‘secteurs 
routiers’), the machine teams (‘équipes d’engins’) and the reloading groups (‘groupe de 
rechargement’). Road sectors consisted of groups of 20 workers under the authority of a 
leader; these groups were in charge of doing manual ordinary maintenance of about 120 km 
of roads and 200 km of tracks.106 The machines teams had the responsibility of doing more 
significant improvements and reshaping the roads when necessary. They would usually have 
at their disposal two to four motor-graders.107 Finally, the reloading groups were in charge of 
transporting materials to refill the roads whenever the rolling surface was insufficient.108 In 
total, in 1959 there were 24 motor-graders doing work on over 7,000 km of road with a 
frequency of 7 to 20 days on each road.109 The good conditions of the machines were 
permanently controlled by flying teams of mechanics that periodically visited the sites or 
made special trips in case important repairs were needed.110 Each machine was checked every 
three weeks, which shows the importance of maintenance in all stages of road development.111  
By the late 1950s, after ten years of working with the mechanised maintenance teams, the 
method was considered very successful. Heavy rains were not a threat for the roads anymore 
and it seemed that dust was the only persistent problem on the network.112 The maintenance 
regime allowed unpaved roads to bear peaks of 1,000 vehicles per day.113 The few bitumen 
roads, on the other hand, were carrying timber articulated lorries with axle loads surpassing 
the permitted 13 tons per axle.114 Yves Meau, an engineer who transferred from Mali to Ivory 
Coast in 1959 remembers having been impressed upon his arrival with the territory’s well-
structured and well-equipped maintenance services, efficacious organisation of mechanised 
works, and excellent road structures.115  
 
105 Maintenance was the responsibility of the Service des Travaux Publics and the chiefs of the 
Circonscriptions Administratives. The Subdivision of Mechanical Equipment (Subdivision d’Outillage 
Méchanique, SOM) provided the machinery for the Service des Travaux Publics, and also ensured the 
maintenance and inspection of the plant. ANOM, BIB ECOL//10917, J. Millier, ‘L’Effort Routier en Côte 
d’Ivoire’, in Giraud et. al., Routes en Afrique Occidentale Française: Conférences Prononcées à Dakar le 
28 Novembre 1956 (April 1957), 23 (hereainfter: Millier, ‘L’Effort Routier en Côte d’Ivoire’).  
106 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 26. 
107 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 26. 
108 Because of rain and dust, the road levels frequently went down and materials to put it back to the usual 
level were necessary. Millier, ‘L’Effort Routier en Côte d’Ivoire’, 23. 
109 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 28. 
110 Millier, ‘L’Effort Routier en Côte d’Ivoire’, 23. 
111 Millier, ‘L’Effort Routier en Côte d’Ivoire’, 23. 
112 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 26. 
113 Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 26.  
114 Bourdillon, Les Ingénieurs des Ponts au Service de l’Afrique, 422. 




In fact, by 1959, engineers in Ivory Coast believed they had discovered potentially universal 
concepts for maintaining roads in ‘under-developed’ countries everywhere, with the 
variations environmental conditions would demand.116 The first one was the need to intervene 
before the road was deformed either by rain or by traffic, as it would render the works cheaper. 
The second one was periodic maintenance, although the frequency of maintenance varied 
according to the type of road: rural tracks should be maintained every six months, an earth 
road bearing about 100 to 300 vehicles per day every fourteen days, and some stretches with 
heavy traffic or particularly difficult environmental conditions every seven days. In addition, 
maintenance and improvement works were to be light and fast, keeping significant reshaping 
to a minimum. Ditches were to be avoided because the topography of the country did not 
make them absolutely necessary, and this would allow for faster interventions. However, the 
camber of the road was rather steep (five per cent) to guarantee the drainage of water – despite 
the fact that it could be uncomfortable for the drivers. It is worth noting here that both ditches 
and road cambers were built explicitly with the objective of facilitating maintenance, but had 
to be thought early on, even before actual construction, during the process of design. 
Furthermore, maintenance teams worked all year long, even during heavy rains, which was 
only possible because the interventions were superficial and therefore did not require major 
earthworks. Finally, the team leaders for major works were chosen carefully: the engineer 
needed at least one year of experience following closely the work of maintenance units before 
being put in charge. 
In general, the maintenance regimes of the 1950s seem to have contributed to the reduction 
of transport costs in FWA. Lorry tariffs diminished from 18-20 francs per ton-km in 1950, to 
8 francs or less in 1957.117 Road conditions were most likely linked to this reduction. By 
1956, although a small percentage of roads were paved (i.e. less than 5 per cent on average 
in Senegal, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Sudan), almost 50 per cent of the road network in 
these territories was all-weather.118 The engineers also noted that the imports of vehicle spare 
parts had risen at a slower pace than fuel consumption in the same period, which they 
interpreted as a consequence of the improvement of the circulation conditions.119  
 
116 This paragraph is based on: Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 26-28. 
117 It seems these prices were given in nominal value. In 1959, 1 CFA franc was equivalent to 2 
metropolitan francs. Giraud and Millier, ‘Routes à Faible Prix de Revient’, 9, 26. 
118 Giraud, ‘La Politique Routière et ses Conséquences’, 11. 







The study of road development in FWA and the Algerian Sahara in the 1950s has revealed 
similarities between the two cases. Both tell a story about roads crossing vast, largely 
uninhabited areas carrying increasingly heavier lorries. They also illustrate how roads 
acquired increasing importance as compared to railways. The central role of road transport 
explains the significant efforts undertaken by both private firms and the public administration 
to support road development. These comprised the investment on road projects and research, 
the mechanisation of construction and maintenance, the use of materials laboratories, and the 
realisation of organisational and administrative changes, amongst others. 
The case of the Algerian Sahara stands out because of the abundant resources available and 
the emphasis that the construction of paved roads acquired during this period. It is also an 
example of how ‘old’ local practices continued to be used, while new knowledge was 
produced to serve the pioneering endeavour of building motorable roads in this environmental 
context. This case also illustrates that the use of laboratory tests for road construction became 
essential, but not sufficient, as experience and time were considered necessary to confirm all 
findings. 
Maintenance appears in both cases as a determinant factor since it conditioned transport costs 
and made the difference between a passable road and a bad investment. Hence, maintenance 
was a concern from the moment the road characteristics were being designed, to the moment 
in which the road had to serve a rising traffic, passing through the construction process. The 
case of FWA is remarkable for its success, as the mechanised maintenance schemes 
established, especially in Ivory Coast, allowed low-cost roads to carry rising freight traffic 
under good conditions. 
153 
 
Chapter 4 Roads as railways: Argentina’s road development, 1930-1970 
 
Argentina started the twentieth century a wealthy country, and the industrialisation policies 
of the 1930s and the post-war period managed to produce substantive economic growth. The 
country’s wealth was reflected in its large transport system. By the middle of the twentieth 
century, with about 42,800 km of railways, Argentina had the most extensive railway network 
in Latin America, and one of the largest in the world.1 Outside of Europe and North America, 
only India rivalled Argentina’s rail length.2 The country also had a large total road network, 
as by 1952 it was longer than that of Great Britain, Italy or Spain at the time.3 Argentina’s 
vehicle fleet was the second largest in the region at the time, behind that of Brazil.4  
However, from 1950 to 1970, roads struggled to keep up with the rising transport demands, 
which is perhaps not surprising given that the replacement of railways by roads as the main 
freight transport method, a process that had started in the 1930s, was consolidated in the two 
decades after the Second World War. In fact, by the late 1960s, despite the road network still 
consisting of almost 40 per cent unpaved surfaces, it carried twice as much freight than 
railways (in ton-km).5 Neither railway nor road engineers welcomed this shift, as it was 
commonly considered that railways were the best method to carry goods over long distances. 
And yet, in 1968, while railways carried about 20 million tons originating, roads carried over 
260 million tons originating.6  
This chapter argues that Argentina’s national road network was able to withstand rising lorry 
traffic in the post-war period mostly due to maintenance and improvement works, as well as 
to the shift from building mostly seasonal to all-weather roads. I also suggest that the success 
of these developments was facilitated by the experience that road authorities and construction 
firms had acquired in the interwar years. 
 
1 International Road Federation (IRF), World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition (London, 1953), 
19-21. 
2 Excluding Australia and the Eastern Bloc. India had about 54,900 km of railways in 1952. IRF, World 
Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition (London, 1953), 20. 
3  See Annexe A.  
4 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development 
Association (IDA), ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina’ (Washington D.C., March 1971), 3 
(hereinafter: IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’). 
5 See Annexe L and below. Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (DNV), Panorama Vial de la República 
Argentina. Situación Actual de la Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (Buenos Aires, 1970), 27 (hereinafter: 
DNV, Panorama Vial). 
6 IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentine Railways’ (Washington D.C., March 




This chapter starts by briefly presenting the Argentinian road building experience of the 
1930s and 1940s, highlighting the influence of the American model in the construction of 
low-cost (and concrete) roads. This first section shows that the use of materials laboratories 
and road-building machinery started in the 1930s and suggests that this early modernisation 
gave the emerging national construction industry and the Dirección Nacional de Vialidad 
(DNV), the authority in charge of national road development, experience which would prove 
valuable to road programmes after the war. The second section of the chapter highlights the 
challenges that the DNV had to face from 1950 to 1970, when roads became the main carriers 
of goods by land. The difficulties the DNV had to tackle came from both the rising number 
of lorries and the scarcity of funds that resulted from the state’s inability to adapt tax 
legislation to accommodate growing inflation, and to its prioritisation of the interests of the 
state-owned energy company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF). This section ends by 
laying out the different policies adopted by the DNV during the period, emphasising that the 
pace of new construction radically decreased after 1943. Instead, a combination of routine 
maintenance, small improvements, and a shift from building mostly unimproved earth roads 
to building almost exclusively all-weather roads were the measures that allowed roads to 
carry such traffic increases. The final section of the chapter shows how these developments 
built on the modernisation efforts of the previous two decades. I point out that although road 
engineering in other countries seem to have had some influence on Argentinian engineers, 
and in particular Mexico and Brazil, the American model was the main example for these 
professionals throughout the period.  
It is important to stress Argentina’s wealth: in 1913, Argentina had the tenth highest level of 
income per capita in the world, and by the late 1920s, the country's GDP per capita was the 
highest in the region (and not far from that of the US).7 As a response to the Great Depression, 
Argentina (like many other Latin American countries, and Colombia in particular) adopted 
an inward-looking model of economic development that generated a considerable industrial 
base which was further developed after the Second World War.8 Argentina’s industrialisation 
efforts in the 1950s and 1960s were so successful that it warranted the country the label of 
‘semi-industrialised’, alongside Mexico and Brazil.9 By 1970, Argentina still had the highest 
GDP per capita in Latin America (1,055 US dollars per capita in 1970 prices), and the 
country’s GDP growth rate (at constant prices) had increased from 2.8 per cent in 1950-1960 
 
7 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, 3rd ed. (New 
York, 2014), 161, Appendix 4, 528. 
8 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America, 253. 




to 4.4 per cent in 1961-1970.10 Nevertheless, Argentina’s national industry remained largely 
dependent on the imports of capital and intermediate goods throughout the period (and 
especially of machinery and equipment), which caused severe balance-of-payment problems, 
as well as exchange-rate instability, and inflation.11 These economic problems were 
influenced by political instability; in fact, the governments of Perón (1946-1955), Frondizi 
(1958-1962), and Illia (1963-1966) were all cut short by military coups, and were followed 
by a military dictatorship led by Onganía (1966-1970).12 
Argentina had a large and relatively robust transport system by the early 1950s. This system 
consisted of railways built mostly from the mid-nineteenth century until about the 1920s 
(mostly British-owned until their nationalisation, which was completed in 1951), and of roads 
resulting from an accelerated pace of construction that took place in the 1930s and early 
1940s.13 From the 1930s onwards, compared to the rapid expansion of the road network, the 
growth of the railway mileage was very slow.14 In addition, the railways suffered from a rising 
deficit and a deterioration of service that made them unable to compete with the developing 
lorry transport.15 The fact that roads were carrying a larger proportion of goods than railways 
is all the more remarkable given the long distances they had to cross, as in Argentina distances 
of about 300 km were considered medium and only hauls of about 1,000 km were considered 
to be long.  
The Argentinian case is therefore particular because, as a relatively wealthy Latin American 
country, it nevertheless depended on low-cost roads, and unimproved unpaved roads 
 
10 As Bulmer-Thomas argues, in general, the rate of growth of Latin American GDP compared favourably 
with other developing countries during the period (as it was higher than that of East Asia) and was faster 
than the rate of growth in the developed countries. Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin 
America, Table 9.4, 330-36. 
11 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America, 303-06. See also Luis Alberto Romero, A 
History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century (Pennsylvania, 2013) and Annexe H. 
12 There were also a few de facto interim presidents in-between these administrations. About the 
relationship between political and economic instability in Argentina during the period see Guido di Tella 
and Rudiger Dornbusch (eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83 (London, 1989). 
13 In 1971, the Staff Appraisal of a highway loan project at the World Bank characterised Argentina’s 
road network in the mid-1940s as ‘one of the finest in the world’. IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project 
Argentina, 1971’, 3; H.R. Stones, British Railways in Argentina, 1860-1948 (Bromley, 1993), 3. 
14 The length of the railway network grew from about 38,300 km in 1930 to about 43,700 km in 1965. In 
contrast, from 1934 to 1969, over 35,000 km of new national roads were built (without taking into 
account provincial or municipal roads). Directory of Railway Officials & Year Book 1966-1967 (London, 
1967), 572; DNV, Memoria 1963-1966 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 13; Biblioteca Nacional Mariano Moreno 
(Argentina), Departamento de Archivos, Fondo Centro de Estudios Nacionales, Subfondo Arturo Frondizi 
(hereinafter: AR-BNMM-ARCH-CEN), 03.4.4.4 Caja UC 108. Naciones Unidas Consejo Económico y 
Social, Comisión Económica Para América Latina, Los Problemas del Transporte de la Argentina y la 
Orientación de sus Soluciones (Santiago de Chile, 1958), 79; DNV, Memoria 1968-1969 (Buenos Aires, 
s.d.), 10. 
15 Mario J. López and Jorge E. Waddell (eds.), Nueva Historia del Ferrocarril en la Argentina. 150 Años 




continued to play a role until the late 1960s – in a way they do not seem to have done in the 
developed world at the time. In addition, Argentina’s position at the beginning of the century 
also facilitated the country’s early adoption of modern machinery and methods. Unlike the 
examples presented in the previous chapter (and Chapter 5), Argentina’s adaptation of 
American approaches started before the Second World War. However, just as the case of 
FWA, road development in Argentina after the war is a story about the crucial role that 
maintenance and improvement acquired to allow the growing circulation of freight – although 
to a much larger scale. Argentinian railways did not benefit from the protection their 
counterparts had in FWA and suffered from the competition of the growing trucking industry 
(which was, in turn, taking advantage of the declining railway services).  
The history of road development in Argentina has attracted considerable attention from its 
infancy in the first decades of the century, until the end of the second Juan Domingo Perón 
administration in 1955. Authors such as Melina Piglia and Anahí Ballent have focused on the 
relationship between the state and private associations (and in particular automobile clubs) in 
the first half of the twentieth century arguing that these private actors influenced the country’s 
road policy by promoting the use of automobiles for racing but also for tourism, an activity 
that was increasingly seen as economically important for the nation.16 Some of the crucial 
material consequences of the clubs’ rhetoric have also been noted, such as the creation of a 
vast network of service stations across the territory as a result of the association between the 
Automóvil Club Argentino (ACA) and YPF.17 However, while these authors mention the 
importance of low-cost roads, they do not explain the meaning or the implications of this 
construction method. In addition, even though the role of roads in the substitution of imports 
and the development of agriculture has been mentioned, by concentrating on the promotion 
of tourism, the historiography has largely neglected the consequences of rising lorry traffic.  
Valeria Gruschetsky studied the influence of American road engineering and administrative 
organisation in Argentina from 1920 to 1940.18 According to her, the experience of the US 
was referenced in engineering conferences and publications, and its influence was visible in 
 
16 Anahí Ballent, ‘Kilómetro Cero: La Construcción del Universo Simbólico del Camino en la Argentina 
de los Años Treinta’, in Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani, 
no. 27 (June 2005), 107–37. Piglia also highlights the part that automobile clubs played in the 
establishment of road transport as a public issue and adds that under the Perón administration the ACA 
managed to remain close to the state in great part because it succeeded in creating an image of itself as a 
technical, apolitical body. Melina Piglia, Autos, Rutas y Turismo: El Automóvil Club Argentino y el 
Estado (Buenos Aires, 2014). 
17 Energy company founded in 1922. 
18 Valeria Gruschetsky, ‘Saberes Sin Fronteras. La Vialidad Norteamericana como Modelo de la 
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad, 1920-1940’, in Mariano Ben Plotkin, and Eduardo A. Zimmermann 




the way the DNV was set up and in the establishment of taxes for road users to fund road 
development (as opposed to tolls).19 Nevertheless, while Gruschetsky stated that the 
adaptation of American knowledge was key for the construction of the low-cost road network 
during the period, she did not go into detail about what this entailed and she did not delve 
into the role that Argentinian engineering played in the region.  
The main sources used in this chapter are the Memorias and varied technical publications 
from the DNV. The journals from the DNV and the Asociación Argentina de Carreteras 
(AAC) were also valuable sources to understand the Argentinian engineers’ position in 
relation to national and international road-related developments. Finally, staff appraisal 
reports of road projects with the World Bank, as well as studies commissioned to foreign 
consultants, were vital to access some general data and assessments about road development 
during the period. This was particularly useful due to the fact that limited DNV data is 
available today, partly because data collection was inconsistent throughout the period, but 
also because political instability (during and after the period of study) resulted in the loss of 
significant material, making it difficult to grasp a general picture of road development and to 
evaluate the results of the varied measures taken. 
 
The experience of the 1930s and 1940s 
 
Low-cost roads and the influence of American road engineering 
From 1933 to 1947, about 28,500 km of national roads were built, of which only 10 per cent 
were paved.20 Figure 4.1 shows that from 1930 to 1943 the number of kilometres built per 
year reached peaks that the country would not see again throughout the period. This figure 
also indicates that in this period of accelerated construction, most of the new roads were 
seasonal with dirt surfaces (‘tierra’). Historians Ballent and Gruschetsky have characterised 
these unpaved roads as ‘low-cost’ (‘bajo costo’) because they were the result of the 
prioritisation of the extension of road length to the detriment of the quality of the surface.21 
According to them, this policy had the objective of promoting agricultural production, 
creating jobs, and contributing to national integration by covering as much of the vast national 
 
19 Canada and New Zealand road financing were also influential. Gruschetsky, ‘Saberes Sin Fronteras’, 
189.  
20 DNV, Memoria 1936 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 131; República Argentina, Ministry of Public Works and 
Services, Transportation Planning Group, A Long Range Transportation Plan (Buenos Aires, 1962), Main 
Report, 43 (hereinafter: TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan).  




territory as possible in a short amount of time.22 In 1931, Argentina had an automobile density 
per inhabitant comparable to that of France and Great Britain (1 automobile per 26 
inhabitants), and a motor vehicle density in relation to the road network of about 95 vehicles 
per kilometre of road (almost four times higher than that of the US).23 However, traffic was 
concentrated around the capital, and by 1935 Justiniano Allende Posse (director of the DNV 
from 1932 to 1938) considered that low traffic density was one of the main problems the 
DNV had to confront.24 In 1950, railways were still carrying more freight than roads by far 
(in ton-km).25  
 
Figure 4.1 Length of new roads built per type of surface in Argentina, 1933-1970 (km) 
 
Note: In red, all-weather roads; in yellow, dirt roads; and in black total of national roads. 
Source: DNV, Panorama Vial, Fig. 7.  
 
 
22 Ballent argues that despite the influence that automobile clubs exerted in the construction of roads 
geared towards tourism from the mid-1930s onwards (and despite the construction of certain large 
projects designed to satisfy urban transport demands), the director of the DNV from 1932 to 1938 
maintained a discourse that favoured unpaved low-cost roads. Ballent, ‘Kilómetro Cero’, 128; 
Gruschetsky, ‘Saberes Sin Fronteras’, 197. 
23 Ballent, ‘Kilómetro Cero’, 111. 
24 DNV, Memoria 1935, Speech by Allende Posse, 38, quoted in Ballent, ‘Kilómetro Cero’, 117. 
25 See Graph 4.1. IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 2. 
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The evidence seems to suggest that low-cost construction was indeed adopted in Argentina 
in the 1930s – not least because of the funds restrictions brought about by the Depression. 
Although further research is needed on the construction methods employed in this period, 
explicit references to low-cost roads (‘caminos de bajo costo’) were being made as early as 
1936.26 The term was used to refer to roads that were built minimising costs, deferring the 
construction of a paved surface, and following particular modern methods that were being 
developed by the US at the time (see Chapter 2). These methods consisted of the use of 
laboratory tests and soil mechanics on the one hand, and of road-building machinery on the 
other. Although it is unclear what percentage of roads were built with these modern methods, 
American techniques were known and adopted since at least the mid-1930s. In 1936, for 
example, under the direction of an American engineer, Noel S. Anderson, several 
experimental stretches of stabilised low-cost roads were built in the provinces of Buenos 
Aires, Córdoba, and Santiago del Estero after conducting laboratory studies of the soils, 
aggregates (such as rock) and bituminous materials that were employed in the works.27 In 
fact, the Argentinian engineer Juan Carlos Bustos (who worked at the DNV, reported on these 
road experiments, and taught university classes on low-cost construction in the 1930s) 
insisted on the fact that learning how to recognise materials, predict their behaviour, and 
manipulate them in order to guarantee the stability of the road was central to the definition of 
a low-cost road.28 Bustos also connected low-cost construction with the use of modern 
machinery, as mechanisation increased the speed of road works and reduced labour costs.29 
Connections with the US resulted in a clear understanding of the significance of US low-cost 
road building methods. In 1936, the president of the DNV, the engineer Justiniano Allende 
Posse, travelled to the US with two technicians to learn about the road building experiments 
that were being carried out there.30 This was considered a great opportunity – in 1936 the 
DNV saw the US as an ‘enormous experimental laboratory’, where the investment of 
 
26 See Juan Carlos Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’, in DNV, Publicaciones Técnicas Vol. 5, 2ª ed. 
(Buenos Aires, 1936), 128; DNV, Memoria 1936, 9; Mario San Miguel, ‘La Construcción de Obras 
Básicas y su Relación con los Firmes de Bajo Costo’, in Caminos, 27 (Jul.-Aug. 1938), 63-73. 
27 In 1952 Noel S. Anderson was a District Engineer of the BPR in the Physical Research Branch, 
Research Division (Columbia, S.C.). These experiments were also possible due to the growing production 
of bituminous materials, making available different types of mixtures that could suit various traffic, 
materials, and weather conditions. Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’. For staff of the BPR see: United 
States Civil Service Commission, Official Register of the United States (Washington D.C., 1952), 405-
456.  
28 For him, determining what materials would allow to entrust the stability of the road (in great part or 
completely) to the soil that bore it was at the very centre of the definition of what a low-cost road was. 
Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’, 75, 79. 
29 Bustos pointed out that mechanisation allowed the completion of more than 1 km per day and 
demanded only a few cents per square meter in labour costs. Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’, 79. 




hundreds of millions of dollars allowed the performance of experiments leading to precise 
conclusions about all types of works.31 For the DNV, this trip confirmed the importance of 
promoting low-cost roads, which they understood to mean focusing on guaranteeing transport 
continuity while leaving to one side more expensive works deemed not strictly necessary.32 
In 1938, the DNV engineer Mario San Miguel published an article explaining methods of 
building low-cost roads in Caminos (the official journal of the DNV) and his bibliography 
was almost entirely American.33  
Another example of the influence of the US in the 1930s is concrete construction. During the 
interwar years, the US was the main referent for concrete road construction in the world, and 
by the middle of the century it was the country with the largest mileage of concrete roads in 
the world.34 It is difficult to measure the length of concrete construction in Argentina because 
the data did not distinguish between concrete and bitumen surfaces; they were usually both 
classified in the category ‘superior pavement’.35 However, concrete (with and without 
reinforcement) was being used in road construction since the first half of the century. For 
instance, in 1936, the stretch of the Ruta 9 between Rosario and the Capital Federal was paved 
with reinforced concrete due to the heavy traffic it carried.36 The engineering professor 
Eduardo Arenas stated in 1951 that a great part of the concrete construction undertaken in the 
first half of the century was, however, unnecessary at the time.37 For him, the first long 
concrete road built in the country, in 1927 (from Morón to Luján), was in large part the result 
 
31 DNV, Memoria 1936, 9. 
32 Bustos noted that although low-cost construction required low initial investment, it was not clear that 
this type of construction was cheaper in the long-term if all costs were taken into account (construction, 
maintenance, reconstruction and operation). Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’, 128; DNV, Memoria 
1936, 9. 
33 Out of seven references only two were not American publications, they were Argentinian (and one of 
the latter was an article describing a trip to the US that two Argentinian engineers undertook). The 
American references included the Bulletin of the University of Illinois, the 1937 Convention Proceeding 
of the American Road Builders Association, and an article by R. Proctor in the American magazine 
Engineering News-Record. San Miguel, ‘La Construcción de Obras Básicas’, 73. 
34 Peter J Hughil, ‘Good Roads and the Automobile in the United States 1880-1929’, in Geographical 
Review, 72 (1982), 342; A.R. Collins and D.R. Sharp, ‘The Design and Construction of Concrete Roads 
Overseas’, in Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 9 (Jan. 1958), 24.  
35 The DNV distinguished between ‘superior pavement’ (i.e. concrete, bituminous carpets, bituminous 
macadam, etc.) and ‘economical pavement’ (i.e. stabilised base, light bituminous treatment, and other 
improvements). 
36 DNV, Memoria 1936, 131. 
37 Eduardo Arenas was a professor of road engineering at the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires in 
the mid-1950s. Eduardo Arenas, ‘Algunos Problemas Técnicos de Nuestra Vialidad, Conferencia en 
Córdoba, 31 de Julio de 1951’ in Cámara Argentina de la Construcción, Algunos Problemas Técnicos de 
Nuestra Vialidad (Buenos Aires, 1952), 59-62 (hereinafter: Arenas, ‘Algunos Problemas Técnicos de 
Nuestra Vialidad’); American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO), Análisis del Beneficio 
de los Usuarios en el Mejoramiento de Caminos, Parte 1, Traducido y Editado por la Asociación 





of the intense desire to build a resistant surface with a method that was becoming very popular 
in the US.38 During the 1940s, concrete construction continued and given the difficulty of 
finding steel during wartime, non-reinforced concrete became the preferred method (Figure 
4.2).39 Although some of the concrete stretches built in the 1930s and 1940s were suffering 
from poor maintenance conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, many of them were still in 
operation two decades after being built (Figure 4.3).40  
 
Figure 4.2 Photo of a construction site of a reinforced concrete road in Argentina, 1943 
 
Source: DNV, Memoria 1943 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 92. 
 
Figure 4.3 Advertisement from the Argentinian Institute of Portland Cement, 1955 
 
38 He did not specify whose desire this was, but it is likely that both engineers and the government wanted 
to adopt this technique since it was considered very advanced at the time. ‘No tengo inconveniente alguno 
en declarar que ese proyecto fue elaborado bajo la presión de un doble temor: el que derivaba de la falta 
de experiencia – pues en el país no la había de ninguna clase sobre el tema — y el que provenía del deseo 
intenso de propiciar con una obra sólida y duradera de generalización de un tipo de calzada que en 
Estados Unidos, espejo donde comenzábamos a mirarnos, gozaba ya de grandes simpatías’. Arenas, 
‘Algunos Problemas Técnicos de Nuestra Vialidad’, 61. 
39 In 1943, some of the most important concrete surfaces in execution were: Medoza-Villavicencio (Ruta 
7 - Mendoza), Rosario-Santa Teresa (Ruta 178-Santa Fe), Rio Salado-Las Flores km 25 (Ruta 3-Buenos 
Aires). DNV, Memoria 1943 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 103-104. 
40 About concrete roads needing maintenance and repairs see: DNV, Memoria 1950 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 
115; DNV, Memoria 1959-1962 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 33; Arenas, ‘Algunos Problemas Técnicos de 
Nuestra Vialidad’, 62. 





Source: Instituto del Cemento Portland Argentino, ‘Carretera de Santa Fe a Rosario, Después de 24 Años 
de Uso’, in Caminos, 153 (Nov. 1955), 33. 
 
As early as the 1930s, Argentinian engineers were conscious of the need to adapt American 
approaches to local conditions. Although Argentinian engineers were aware of the results of 
various experiments carried out in the US (such as those carried out at different universities), 
Argentinian engineering professors taught their students to conduct their own tests.41 And 
even if American methods and norms (such as those of the Bureau of Public Roads, BPR) 
were used to conduct soil tests, for example, engineers and contractors were expected to adapt 
the project and construction methods to the characteristics of the local materials.42  
 
41 San Miguel, ‘La Construcción de Obras Básicas’, 72-73. 
42 San Miguel, ‘La Construcción de Obras Básicas’, 63. 
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Institutional and private construction experience 
The creation of the DNV in 1932 provided the country with an institution that coordinated 
large-scale operations and established a tax regime for road funding that was essential for 
road development throughout the century. The DNV was in charge of building some road 
projects (and of providing the necessary studies), supervising all construction, managing its 
plant and equipment at a national scale, and maintaining the national network.43  
The DNV acquired valuable experience using materials laboratories early on. In the 1930s, 
the DNV even had its own specialised laboratories: physical and mechanical, chemical, and 
soils.44 In 1937, these laboratories received over 1,800 samples of different materials such as 
concrete, cement, sand, bituminous materials, amongst others.45 The tests were carried out 
before and during the execution of works, being an essential step in the process of planning 
and supervising road projects.46 By the early 1940s, these facilities were also receiving 
samples from private firms and other governmental agencies (such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture).47 Due to the high demand and aiming to increase the speed with which results 
were obtained, the DNV started building laboratories across the country, and by 1943 there 
were 21 in total.48 Meanwhile, the DNV organised short courses for the technical staff of the 
provincial authorities with the aim of diffusing certain specialties, and in particular geology, 
asphaltic materials, bituminous treatments, and soil mechanics.49 Geology was a field that 
grew in importance for the DNV due to the exploration of areas to find materials that could 
be used for road construction.50 Given the wide range of applications of materials tests, 
laboratories were also being created outside the DNV, where road building was not the only 
research area – although it was one of the most active ones.51 For instance, the province of 
Buenos Aires founded in 1942 the Laboratorio de Ensayo de Materiales e Investigaciones 
 
43 Since the early 1940s, the DNV’s Department of Maintenance distributed its tasks between a 
Maintenance and a Construction Division. The tasks of the latter comprised the construction of airstrips 
and road reconstruction. However, the vast majority of construction was performed by private firms. 
DNV, Memoria 1943, 127-128. 
44 DNV, Memoria 1937 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 74.  
45 DNV, Memoria 1937, 74, 77. 
46 DNV, Memoria 1937, 74, 77.  
47 In 1943, for instance, the DNV carried out a study of soil stabilisation with asphalt in order to build 
underground grain deposits. The study was commissioned by the Grain Maintenance Commission of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. DNV, Memoria 1943, 146. 
48 DNV, Memoria 1943, 151. 
49 DNV, Memoria 1943, 151-152. 
50 DNV, Memoria 1952-1953 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 109.  




Tecnológicas (LEMIT), whose coverage expanded from provincial projects to national and 
private research in the course of its first two decades of existence.52 
Private firms also gained significant experience. Although the DNV carried out some minor 
construction projects, most of the roads were built by small firms of limited, but growing 
capacity. In 1932-39, there were about 120 road construction firms.53 Funds scarcity and the 
difficulty of acquiring spare parts during the Second World War, added to the Peronist 
barriers to the imports of plant and equipment, considerably affected the work of these 
enterprises.54 Therefore, by 1940-46 their number had diminished to 80.55 Although in the 
late 1940s and 1950s Argentinian construction firms had relatively little capital available and 
their plant was considered old (and often obsolete), the experience that these firms acquired 
from the 1930s onwards seems to have been useful for the growth that the industry saw in the 
1960s (see below).56  
Institutional maintenance experience 
The DNV also acquired important maintenance experience in this period. Maintenance 
included progressive improvements, managing ferries, placing and repairing traffic signs, 
planting trees and building fences.57 The DNV’s Department of Maintenance administered 
and distributed the budget and plant across the country according to the length of the network 
and the type of work required.58 Despite the difficulty of acquiring machines and spare parts 
during the war, in the early 1940s the DNV had at its disposal a considerable number of 
machines, such as 345 graders, 88 motor-graders, 283 lorries, and 164 tractors (Figure 4.4).59 
Although the DNV sometimes hired private firms for maintenance works, it usually carried 
out all maintenance itself.60 The DNV limited the number of maintenance contracts because 
 
52 Anon., ‘LEMIT’, 21. 
53 Luis de Carli, ‘Aspectos Generales del Problema Vial, Conferencia en la Sede Central de la Cámara 
Argentina de la Construcción, 24 de Julio de 1951’ in Cámara Argentina de la Construcción, Algunos 
Problemas Técnicos de Nuestra Vialidad (Buenos Aires, 1952), 35 (hereainafter: De Carli, ‘Aspectos 
Generales del Problema Vial’). 
54 De Carli, ‘Aspectos Generales del Problema Vial’, 35-36. 
55 De Carli, ‘Aspectos Generales del Problema Vial’, 35. 
56 This topic merits further research. Pedro Petriz, ‘De una Política Vial Para el País’, in Carreteras, n. 19 
(Sept.-Dec. 1959), 13-14; AR-BNMM-ARCH-CEN, 03.4.4.4 Caja UC 108. Coverdale & Colpitts, 
Consulting Engineers, NEDECO Netherlands Engineering Consultants, RENARDET SAUTI Consulting 
Engineers, Estudio de los Transportes Argentinos. Fase I. Volumen 1. Informe (1960),160 (hereinafter: 
Coverdale & Colpitts et. al., Estudio de los Transportes Argentinos). 
57 DNV, Memoria 1943, 128. 
58 DNV, Memoria 1943, 131. 
59 The DNV also had 658 ‘conservadoras’ (or ‘maintainers’) but I have not been able to find a description 
of what these were. DNV, Memoria 1943,131. 
60 In Catamarca private firms were hired for maintenance works with satisfactory results. In 1957, 15,000 
km of unpaved provincial roads were being maintained this way. Anon. ‘La Vialidad Provincial en 




of the intricacy and wide range of works needed, preferring to supervise the work directly.61 
The proportion of national roads that underwent consistent maintenance increased 
considerably from 1943 to 1950, going from 67 per cent to 82 per cent.62 
 
Figure 4.4 Motor-grader used for road maintenance in Argentina, 1943 
 
Source: DNV, Memoria 1943, 92. 
 
Roads for goods 
 
The challenges of growing lorry traffic and scarce funds 
Although in 1950 railways carried almost twice as many ton-km than roads, by the late 1960s 
the situation was very different (Graph 4.1). In fact, from 1961 onwards, lorries carried more 
ton-km than railways.63 In 1968, roads transported more than double the ton-km than the 
railways did, which corresponded to about 68 per cent of the goods moved by land (excluding 
pipelines).64 Lorries transported goods mostly in bulk. For instance, in the early 1960s, only 
 
61 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 57. 
62 In 1943 the total length of the national network was 61,049 km and the length maintained was 41,069 
km. DNV, Memoria 1943, 131; DNV, Memoria 1950.  
63 In 1961, roads carried over 17 million ton-km whereas railways moved 14 million ton-km. IBRD, 
‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 2.  
64 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 2. 




about 16 per cent of the goods carried by lorry corresponded to small manufactured 
products.65 The city of Buenos Aires was the destination of more than half the goods and the 
average haul distance was 300 to 400 km, although wine could travel for even longer 
distances.66 In fact, the route from Mendoza to Buenos Aires (a little over 1,000 km) was the 
longest route bearing heavy traffic, mostly due to the production of wine and to what the 
Ministry of Public Works and Services qualified in 1962 as an inadequate railway service 
between the two areas.67 Therefore, during the 1950s and 1960s, roads were carrying very 
heavy volumes of bulk goods over long distances – thus acting like railways.  
 
Graph 4.1 Freight traffic by road and by railway in Argentina, 1950-1968 (millions of 
ton-km) 
 
Source: IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 2. 
 
Roads were absorbing considerable traffic from the railways, which continuously reduced 
their share in the transport of goods during the period. Between 1950 and 1968, the railways’ 
 
65 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 25. 
66 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 25. 
67 In 1962, apart from the roads in the vicinity of major urban centres (Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario, 
Tucumán and Mendoza), and some stretches in zones of particular agricultural, mineral or industrial 
development, the majority of the network carried a few hundred vehicles per day, without reaching 1,000 













share of the total freight movement (in ton-km, including coastal shipping, river transport and 
pipelines) declined from 55 per cent to 17 per cent.68 In contrast, during the same period, the 
roads’ share increased from 26 to about 36 per cent.69 The decline of the railway traffic was 
linked to the growing deterioration of the service. According to Jorge E. Waddell, the 
nationalisation of the railways (started in the 1930s and completed in 1951) did not prompt 
the establishment of an integrated transport policy which, added to the effects of the Great 
Depression and the limited investment in the maintenance and renovation of the system from 
the 1940s to the 1960s, put the railways at a disadvantage compared to the rapidly growing 
trucking industry.70 Apart from a few isolated attempts to renew the stock, the state did not 
solve pressing structural problems (such as the duplication of lines or the growing operational 
deficit), and it did not launch any large railway projects during the period.71 In 1959, the 
president of the DNV, the engineer Pedro Petriz, lamented the competition between roads 
and railways (that he also associated with the decline of the railway service), and he added 
that the shift from rail to road was not to be celebrated, as roads were suffering from heavier 
and denser traffic than they were designed to carry.72 
The growth of lorry traffic in the period was indeed reflected in the increasing difficulty of 
maintaining the road network. The number of lorries almost tripled between 1954 and 1968 
(Graph 4.2).73 The capacity of the lorries was, however, not very large. In 1958, 89 per cent 
of the lorries had a total capacity of less than 4 tons (partly because 32 per cent of the lorries 
were pick-ups).74 Nevertheless, the growing use of trailer and semi-trailers increased the 
capacity of each vehicle.75 In addition, although the use of trailers distributed the loads over 
more axles, overloading was common. In the late 1950s, Argentina’s vehicle weight 
regulations stated a maximum of 10 tons per axle (in line with American-manufactured 
lorries), but it was not uncommon to see loads of 13 tons per axle and more.76 Overloading 
 
68 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 2. 
69 In fact, the railways were the only transport method that decreased its share in the period, as the 
proportion of ton-km carried by river transport and coastal shipping combined increased from 17 to 36 
per cent. IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a First Railway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 2. 
70 López and Waddell, Nueva Historia del Ferrocarril en la Argentina, 157-208. 
71 López and Waddell, Nueva Historia del Ferrocarril en la Argentina, 157-208. 
72 Pedro Petriz, ‘Fijación de una Política Caminera Nacional’, in DNV, Conferencias Sobre Temas Viales 
(Buenos Aires, 1960), 28. 
73 Asociación Argentina de Carreteras (AAC), Informe Sobre la Situación Vial Argentina Presentado al 
Ministerio de Economía de la Nación (Buenos Aires, 1965), 14; IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway 
Construction and Maintenance Project, Argentina’ (Washington D.C., June 1961), Annexe 1 (hereinafter: 
IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1961’). 
74 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 23. 
75 A census carried out in 1961 confirmed that vehicles on rural roads had an average net load greater than 
12 tons. TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 23. 




was so ingrained in the practices of the lorry companies that they relied on it, also taking 
advantage of the lack of regulation of transport prices.77 Meanwhile, conscious of the 
importance that road transport had acquired in the country, the DNV saw the sudden 
enforcement of weight norms as potentially damaging for the economy as they considered 
the railways unable to serve the demand this would generate.78 By the late 1960s, the lack of 
traffic statistics does not allow for a complete picture of the problem of overloading, but the 
establishment of some survey stations from 1950 to 1968 confirmed that in some provinces 
about 90 per cent of the lorries were overloaded by 1970.79  
Overloading generated a great number of problems for the DNV, especially because the 
network was mostly unpaved, even by the late 1960s. In 1969, about 44 per cent of the 
national road network was paved, 20 per cent had all-weather surfaces (i.e. unpaved improved 
surfaces), and the rest was either a track or an earth road without an improved surface.80 
Moreover, not only were most roads unpaved, the pavements built in previous decades had 
not been designed to carry the loads they were bearing and many required reconstruction.81 
Finally, as we will see below, the increase in lorry traffic also required the modification of 
general road geometrical characteristics (curves, gradients and width), which was a very 
expensive process. 
 
Graph 4.2 Motor vehicle registration in Argentina, 1954-1968 (thousands) 
 
77 DNV, Memoria 1957-1958 (Buenos Aires, s.d.), 63. 
78 Even if some engineers suggested it, in order to follow the example of the US at the time. Anon., 
Carreteras, 11 (Jul.-Sept. 1957), 49; DNV, Memoria 1957-1958, 63. 
79 These provinces were: Tucumán, Salta and Jujuy. DNV, Panorama Vial, 36. 
80 See Annexe L. DNV, Panorama Vial, Graph 14, 27. 





Note: Buses and motorcycles not included.  
Sources: Asociación Argentina de Carreteras, Informe Sobre la Situación Vial Argentina Presentado al 
Ministerio de Economía de la Nación (Buenos Aires, 1965), 14; IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway 
Construction and Maintenance Project, Argentina’ (Washington D.C., June 1961), Annexe 1; IBRD, 
‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 3.  
 
In fact, despite the importance that road transport had acquired in relation to the railways, the 
DNV continuously listed the scarcity of funds as a major obstacle for its work during the 
period.82 First, despite receiving substantial sums to fund road projects from different 
international agencies after 1961, Argentina struggled to produce enough funds to complete 
some of these projects.83 For instance, the Argentinian state failed to cover its share of the 
 
82 Indeed, over the 1950s and 1960s, the DNV’s Memorias often attributed the impossibility of 
completing its maintenance and improvements objectives to the lack of resources. DNV, Memoria 1952-
1953, 13; DNV, Memoria 1957-1958, 3; DNV, Memoria 1963-1966, 1. 
83 Argentina received about 183.5 million USD from 1961 to 1969 for road projects (i.e. more than the 
amount Colombia received from the World Bank for road projects from 1950 to 1970, Chapter 5). The 
majority of this money (coming from the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, USAID and the Inter-
American Development Bank) was destined to road improvements, as well as consulting services, and the 
purchase of machinery for road maintenance. IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 















first road project with the World Bank. Originally the Bank had lent 48.5 million USD for 
the first road project in 1961, but this amount was reduced to 32 million in 1965 due to, 
according to the Bank, the poor execution of the works, inadequate management of the 
project, ineffective use of the consultants, and lack of local funds.84 It is likely that these were 
issues common to all road projects in Argentina during the time. Second, the state did not 
provide enough funds for the DNV to guarantee the completion of its own construction and 
maintenance programmes throughout the period, as we will see below. This was partly due 
to the rapid increase in costs. For example, maintenance costs per kilometre doubled from 
1950 to 1954, going from about 1,000 to 2,160 pesos per year (pesos of 1950).85 This rapid 
rise in maintenance costs was attributed to the growing intensity and weight of traffic, to the 
poor conditions of maintenance machinery, and to the higher costs of labour, materials, 
administration, etc., due to rising inflation.86  
However, the limited availability of funds for road development appears to have been more 
an issue related to the collection and distribution of money than to actual scarcity. Argentina 
was indeed a relatively wealthy country, and roads seem to have been receiving a higher 
proportion of funds than railways. Between 1951 and 1960, for instance, roads received an 
average of 0.88 per cent of the GNP, while railways received 0.51 per cent, a significantly 
smaller amount, especially because railways were operated by the state after their 
nationalisation.87 Nevertheless, the DNV considered roads had been underfunded since the 
mid-1930s. In 1970, the DNV compared the percentage of GDP spent on roads in different 
countries in 1963. It concluded that both developed and developing countries had spent on 
average 2.33 per cent of their GDP on roads that year (with the exception of certain island or 
‘semi-island’ countries), and that, since Argentina had never dedicated more than 1.80 per 
cent of its GDP per year to road development from 1935 to 1970, the country had accumulated 
a considerable deficit in road investment over time.88  
The availability of funds for road development was affected by the state’s failure to adapt the 
tax legislation to the changing financial situation of the country, as well as to the state’s 
 
84 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 1. 
85 AR-BNMM-ARCH-CEN, 03.4.4.4 Caja UC 108. Naciones Unidas Consejo Económico y Social, 
Comisión Económica Para América Latina, Los Problemas del Transporte de la Argentina y la 
Orientación de sus Soluciones (Santiago de Chile, 1958), 286 (hereinafter: CEPAL, Los Problemas del 
Transporte de la Argentina). 
86 CEPAL, Los Problemas del Transporte de la Argentina, 286-287; TPG, A Long Range Transportation 
Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 18. This process had already started in the late 1940s, see e.g. De Carli, 
‘Aspectos Generales del Problema Vial’, 29. 
87 Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, Luxardo, José D., Los Caminos en la República Argentina (1966), 48.  




prioritisation of YPF’s interests. The most significant contribution to road development came 
from the taxes on gasoline, gas oil, and tyres.89 However, rising prices were a constant 
preoccupation for the DNV because they made the real value of the tax revenues diminish.90 
To remedy this, in 1958, the taxes on gasoline and oil passed from being a specific value per 
litre to being a percentage of the retail price (i.e. 50 per cent in 1960-61).91 However, already 
in 1961, the state changed the tax on fuel consumption (from being a percentage of the retail 
price to being a tax on ‘retention’) in order to support YPF, as the company was struggling to 
fund its operation and pay its tax contribution to road development.92 This reduced the funds 
available for road development until the mid- and late-1960s (when the situation was 
modified with a special contribution from the National Treasury and the creation of an 
additional tax to naphtha consumption).93  
The way in which tax collections were distributed also contributed to the limited availability 
of funds for the national road network. First, from 1950 to 1970 a significant proportion of 
the money that was destined to road development was directed towards the provincial 
network – as opposed to the national one, which consisted of the main trunk roads of the 
country (Figure 4.5).94 Second, both the national energy fund (Fondo Nacional de Energía, 
created in 1947) and the General National Revenues received a considerable percentage of 
the tax on fuel consumption. For instance, in 1965, 52.5 per cent of the tax on fuel 
consumption was directed to the General Revenues and the Fondo Nacional de Energía.95 It 
is important to note, however, that petroleum consumption was not limited to motor vehicle 
fuel but included, notably, industrial production. Nonetheless, the amounts collected from 
taxes exclusively related to the use of roads and motor vehicles were not fully directed to road 
development either. As the World Bank pointed out in 1971:  
 
89 From 1953 to 1960 these taxes passed from providing 55 per cent to almost 85 per cent of the National 
Road Fund’s revenues. Other sources included taxes on vehicle sales, lubricants, etc. TPG, A Long Range 
Transportation Plan, Main Report, 76. 
90 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Main Report, 76. 
91 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Main Report, 76. 
92 At the time, the retail price for gasoline, oil, and other petroleum fuels was fixed by the Secretary for 
Power and Fuels and it was composed of the tax for the National Road Fund and the ‘retention’ (i.e. the 
amount YPF retained to cover its costs, including exploitation, transport, and distribution). By changing 
the tax, the amount YPF paid to the Road Fund diminished considerably: for regular gasoline from m$n 
2.70 to 1.74 per litre, and for oil from m$n 2.50 to 1.47 per litre. TPG, A Long Range Transportation 
Plan, Main Report, 76; DNV, Panorama Vial, 44. 
93 These special measures were taken in 1967-69. Naphtha is a fuel derived from petroleum. DNV, 
Panorama Vial, 46.  
94 DNV, Panorama Vial, 47. 
95 Since the late 1940s the fund was receiving more than 50 per cent of the amounts collected from the tax 
to petroleum consumption. AAC, Informe Sobre la Situación Vial, 2; Juan S. Revuelta, ‘La Red Nacional 




Historically, total receipts from taxes on vehicle ownership and use have exceeded 
total expenditures on the highway system. The costs of investing in, administering 
and maintaining the highway system are met from a combination of earmarked fuel, 
tire and vehicle taxes and general revenues... The amount allocated from general 
revenues for highway expenditures has been less than the yield of the non-earmarked 
portion of taxes on vehicle ownership and use which goes into general revenues.96  
Engineers often characterised the distribution of tax collections as unjustified and 
illegitimate.97 Meanwhile, the energy sector resisted any changes to the tax legislation that 
would diminish its allocations.98  
 
Figure 4.5 Graph of total investments in roads in Argentina (in millions of pesos 
constant value 1969)99  
 
Note: in black, national network; in blue, provincial network. 
Source: DNV, Panorama Vial, Fig. 23, 47.  
 
 
96 The emphasis is made in the original text. IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 8. 
97 e.g. Juan S. Revuelta, ‘La Red Nacional de Vialidad’, in Caminos, 286 (Dec. 1966), 12-13. 
98 For instance, in 1958, President Frondizi struggled to convince the Secretary of Energy and Fuel 
(Meira) of the need to allocate more funds for road development. He argued that, unlike roads, the energy 
sector was more likely to receive funds from abroad. Anon., ‘Profunda Conmoción de la Vialidad del 
País’, in Carreteras, n. 56 (Dec. 1958), 1.  
99 Including construction of airports, buildings, etc. 
[Picture removed from ethesis 




What road policy? 
The accelerated growth of road transport was not accompanied by a similar expansion of the 
road network length. Figure 4.1 shows that from building almost 3,500 km of road in 1943, 
Argentina went on to build less than 1,000 km per year from 1946 until 1962.100 Although in 
1967 almost 2,000 km of new road were built, on average from 1960 to 1969 no more than 
900 km were built per year.101 The fact that, by 1960, about 80 per cent of the roads had been 
built before 1945 had repercussions for road maintenance, as roads were not built to withstand 
such heavy traffic.102 In addition, although the proportion of national roads that were paved 
increased from 10 per cent in 1950 to 44 per cent in 1969, a significant portion of the network 
remained unpaved throughout the period.103  
Despite the lack of a long-term plan resulting from the country’s political instability, certain 
trends can be identified in the measures undertaken by the DNV throughout the period in 
order to allow for the traffic increase. First, certain major improvements were continuously 
deferred. Already in the early 1950s, the need to adapt roads to the new lorries in circulation 
was a concern – as even concrete surfaces were failing under the growing loads.104 Roads 
needed to be wider, the curves smoother and the surfaces more resistant. The lack of funds 
was, however, a major obstacle to carrying out all these improvements. As a result, the DNV 
postponed certain works to improve the roads’ structural characteristics, such as the widening 
of the basic works in some routes and the reinforcement of roads’ shoulders (often used as 
borrow pits).105 Throughout the 1950s, and especially after 1957, the DNV did carry out 
expensive improvements, mostly renewing paved and improved surfaces, but also rebuilding 
bases and embankments in urgent cases.106 Nevertheless, according to Petriz, these efforts 
were not only insufficient, they had been in vain.107 He qualified them as ephemeral solutions 
that did nothing to solve structural damages that needed to be fixed urgently.108 By 1960, only 
 
100 DNV, Panorama Vial, Fig. 7. 
101 DNV, Panorama Vial, Fig. 7. 
102 Pedro Petriz, ‘Necesidades del País y Bases para el Desarrollo de la Obra Vial’, in DNV, Conferencias 
Sobre Temas Viales (Buenos Aires, 1960), 18. 
103 See Annexe L. DNV, Panorama Vial, 27. 
104 The roads to access the Gran Buenos Aires were the most affected by this. For example, the Ruta 8 in 
the sections to access the Gran Buenos Aires was carrying more than 1,500 vehicles per day, more than 
any other access route. DNV, Memoria 1950, 115. See also De Carli, ‘Aspectos Generales del Problema 
Vial’, 27. 
105 DNV, Memoria 1950, 115. 
106 For instance, between 1953 and 1959, the DNV maintained 88 per cent of the concrete roads, 40 per 
cent of the asphalt surfaces, and 68 per cent of the bituminous treatments. DNV, Memoria 1952-1953, 12-
13; DNV, Memoria 1957-1958, 31-37; Petriz, ‘Necesidades del País’, 19. 
107 ‘Gastamos pues y gastamos mal’. Pedro Petriz, ‘Necesidades del País y Bases para el Desarrollo de la 
Obra Vial’, in DNV, Conferencias Sobre Temas Viales (Buenos Aires, 1960), 20. 




one third of the national roads provided all-weather service and, with only two exceptions, 
none of the main roads in the country were paved over their entire length.109  
Not even the 1961 World Bank loan (which provided assistance for the reconstruction and 
improvement of more than 2,500 km of roads, as well as for the purchase of road maintenance 
machinery and equipment for workshops) managed to alleviate the critical situation of the 
network.110 Funds continued to be an obstacle for the upgrade of the width, the profile and 
the alignment of roads in the 1960s.111 In 1965, for instance, the engineer Luis Apolinar 
Cardozo identified several deficiencies of earth roads in the Buenos Aires province that were 
difficult to solve. Many roads and tracks were the result of spontaneous use or of the division 
of land and were therefore not adequate for motor vehicles, especially in relation to curves.112 
For similar reasons, not only were roads sometimes too narrow for lorries, they also did not 
offer enough space for the movement of earth and other materials. This was particularly 
problematic since, to save money on transport costs, the areas along the roads were used as 
borrow pits, for which it was necessary to dig very deep ditches, making transit conditions 
dangerous.113 In the late 1960s more plans were made to widen roads, fix their alignments 
and improve their surfaces. Although considerable progress was achieved, especially in 1967-
69, by 1970 many roads still needed upgrading. The second road loan from the World Bank 
in 1971 had therefore the main objective of performing a range of improvements on more 
than 1,000 km of roads.114  
Notwithstanding, in 1971, the World Bank considered the general maintenance conditions of 
the national network as good, especially in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa 
Fe, Mendoza and Tucumán.115 In fact, although the DNV deferred some major upgrades, 
basic maintenance was carried out throughout the period. During the 1950s, an increasingly 
 
109 The rest were impassable during rains and even for several days thereafter. This was particularly 
problematic for the transport of perishable goods. In addition to the national network, the provincial roads 
were in even worse conditions (about 130,000 km). IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 
1961’, 3-4. 
110 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1961’, i. 
111 By 1962, reconstruction, widening and reinforcement were still a major concern. By 1966, the lack of 
funds continued to prevent the adaptation of roads to the heavy lorries. The DNV stated they were behind 
schedule for: extending the width of roads to 6 metres, improving the shoulders, performing basic 
maintenance of the main roads, amongst others. DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 4; DNV, Memoria 1963-
1966, 1. 
112 Luis Apolinar Cardozo, ‘Sobre Mejoramiento y Consolidación de Caminos de Tierra’, in Dirección de 
Vialidad, Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Séptimo Concurso de Trabajos Viales 
(Oct. 1965), 233. 
113 Apolinar Cardozo, ‘Sobre Mejoramiento y Consolidación de Caminos de Tierra’, 233. 
114 The project also included the construction of some sections of freeway and money for consulting 
services for the supervision of construction works and the preparation of future projects. IBRD, 
‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, ii.  




high proportion of the DNV’s budget was spent on maintenance, reaching a peak in 1955-57, 
when maintenance expenditure surpassed construction expenditure (Figure 4.6). Many 
challenges hindered the efficiency of these efforts. Apart from the heavy traffic and funds 
scarcity, since the majority of roads was built before 1945 and were not meant to carry such 
heavy traffic, maintenance was becoming increasingly challenging.116 In addition, as 
previously mentioned, a large portion of the national network was unpaved throughout the 
period, and the proportion of all-weather roads was only 20 per cent in 1950, and less than 35 
per cent in 1960; although by 1969 it had risen to about 64 per cent.117 After the peak of 
maintenance investment in 1955-57, this type of work received a relatively steady amount of 
money until 1970 (Figure 4.6). This allowed for the employment of more than 6,000 labourers 
in the repair and restoration of roads.118 However, given the rise in traffic and maintenance 
costs, these efforts of ordinary maintenance would probably have fallen short of keeping 
roads passable on their own. 
 
Figure 4.6 Construction and maintenance expenditure of the Dirección Nacional de 
Vialidad, 1933-1970 (millions of pesos of 1971) 
 
 
116 For instance, in 1957-58 the DNV stated there were about 7,800 km of national roads that demanded 
extraordinary maintenance work to remain passable. DNV, Memoria 1957-1958, 61; Bustos, ‘Caminos de 
Bajo Costo’; Petriz, ‘Necesidades del País’, 18. 
117 See Annexe L. DNV, Panorama Vial, 27. 
118 For example, in 1963, 6,877 out of 9,824 labourers were employed on maintenance works. In 1966: 
6,140 out of 9,137 workers. The rest were in charge of the workshops and warehouses, as well as ferry 
services (balsas), the planting of trees along the roads and of weighing vehicles (at the growing number of 
weighing stations). DNV, Memoria 1963-1966, 35. 




Note: in grey, construction; in orange, maintenance. 
Source: DNV, Panorama Vial, Fig. 20. 
 
Indeed, in the 1960s, the DNV considerably increased its construction expenditure (Figure 
4.6), contributing to the consolidation of the road network as the main land transport method 
in several ways. First, unlike the roads built in the 1930s and 1940s, the roads built after these 
decades were predominantly all-weather. Figure 4.1 clearly illustrates that after representing 
a small proportion of the newly built roads in the 1930s and 1940s, from 1950 onwards the 
vast majority of new construction was all-weather. This type of construction involved both 
paved surfaces (called ‘superior’ by the DNV), and ‘economical’ or ‘improved’ ones, i.e. 
those which had received some type of treatment (such as soil stabilisation) making earth 
surfaces more resistant to heavy rains and traffic (see also Chapter 2).119 All-weather roads 
offered a considerably cheaper and more reliable service than seasonal ones. Operating a lorry 
on an unimproved earth road was almost twice as expensive than on a paved surface.120 The 
growing length of paved roads therefore benefitted the lorry companies greatly, which were 
already taking advantage of the generally flat terrain and the lack of freight rates 
regulations.121 
Second, not only were all-weather roads more resistant, they also made maintenance itself 
easier. Although the cost of maintaining a kilometre of paved or improved road was higher 
than that of a kilometre of a seasonal unimproved surface, the latter required special attention 
after rains and demanded a higher proportion of investment in machinery.122 For example, in 
1968, 49 per cent of the total cost of maintaining a kilometre of unimproved earth road was 
related to machinery and equipment, against 29 per cent in the case of a kilometre of paved 
 
119 About the DNV’s pavement categories see above note 35.  
120 In 1962 the average cost of a three-axle lorry operation was: 14.7 pesos per km on a paved surface, 
21.6 on gravel, and 26.9 on a dirt road. In 1971, on flat terrain, the cost of operating a goods vehicle was 
on average 8.5 US c/km on a paved road, 12.15 US c/km on a gravel surface and 18.5 US c/km on an 
earth road. The difference between flat and mountainous terrain was no more than 1 US c/km, which 
means that the surface was a more determinant factor than topography in terms of vehicle operation costs. 
TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Main Report, 45; IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project 
Argentina, 1971’, 36.  
121 In 1962, some provinces regulated the lorry freight rates of certain products (such as Buenos Aires and 
Santa Fe in the case of grain). IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 6; TPG, A Long 
Range Transportation Plan, Main Report, 50. 
122 In 1968, for example, the DNV spent on average 369 million pesos maintaining each kilometre of 
superior pavement, 237 and 214 million for every kilometre of intermediate and improved surface 





road.123 In addition, all-weather roads, just as heavy traffic, were mostly concentrated in the 
provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza and Santa Fe.124 Therefore, the maintenance 
of these roads was relatively easy to coordinate, especially given that maintenance was 
managed by the central DNV office.125 Finally, the length of the national road network 
actually diminished over time because many roads were transferred from the national to the 
provincial network, thus reducing the length the DNV was responsible for maintaining.126  
Third, the DNV’s category of ‘construction’ actually included some reconstruction and 
improvement works.127 On average, from 1959 to 1969, about 30 per cent of construction 
works corresponded to reconstruction and improvement – a nonnegligible percentage.128 
Construction works also included paving existing roads. For instance, in 1962-63, out of 224 
road works completed by the DNV, 16 consisted of paving existing roads, which 
corresponded to about 485 km of paved surfaces of different type (both superior and 
economical pavements).129 On average, the DNV built about 300 km of paved surfaces on 
existing roads every year in 1963-66 and 1968-69 – although this represented only about 10 
to 20 per cent of the length of works completed every year.130  
Moreover, construction also included a portion of ‘progressive improvements’ since at least 
1950.131 The DNV gave no clear definition of what it understood by this term (sometimes 
called ‘mejora progresiva’ or ‘conservación mejorativa’), but it seems it was related to the 
concept of upgradeability (Chapter 1). Progressive improvements comprised everything from 
major repairs of works of art, to surface stabilisation, paving, and even putting traffic signs 
along the roads.132 What differentiated these works from other improvements was their 
 
123 It corresponded to 28 per cent of the cost of total maintenance for roads of ‘superior’ pavements, and 
30 per cent of the total maintenance cost of roads of ‘intermediate’ pavements. DNV, Memoria 1968-
1969, 152.  
124 See Annexes I, J and K. 
125 In 1970 the DNV had the objective of starting a decentralisation process of maintenance works, 
leaving the central DNV office in charge of only the supervision of both maintenance and construction. 
DNV, Panorama Vial, 31. 
126 There is no data about the length of transferred roads.  
127 The rest of the ‘construction’ works consisted of basic works, paving and bridges. DNV, Memoria 
1963-1966, 29.  
128 There is limited data for the period 1950-1959, but it seems the percentage was similar. DNV, 
Memoria 1950; DNV, Memoria 1952-1953; DNV, Memoria 1957-1958; DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 15; 
DNV, Memoria 1963-1966, 15; DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 14-15. 
129 The data does not distinguish between the different types of pavement done on existing roads. Thus, 
both superior and economical pavement are included in these figures. The figure for 1962-63 only 
includes 10 months in that year. From 1962 to 1964, the total number of road works was 373, of which 39 
corresponded to paving existing roads, i.e. 861 km of new paved surfaces on existing roads. DNV, 
Memoria 1963-1966, 30. 
130 DNV, Memoria 1963-1966, 29; DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 81, 88. 
131 DNV, Memoria 1950, 43. 




explicit objective of gradually upgrading roads over time, thus protecting previous 
investments while deferring demanding works.133 In the early 1950s, the DNV considered 
this a novel method, and one that blurred the limits between maintenance and construction: 
‘we should not establish a clear division between road maintenance and construction. On the 
contrary, between the two of them we must introduce and apply the concept of improving 
while maintaining’.134 It is very difficult to measure the extent of the application of this 
method as the concept is only used in a few of the Memorias of the DNV. Nonetheless, it 
seems that the works in the category of progressive maintenance represented a significant 
proportion of construction works for at least some of the administrations in the period.135 In  
general, from 1959 to 1969, works of progressive improvement corresponded on average to 
10 per cent of the total kilometres of road works in execution.136 Thus, despite the fact that 
certain upgrades were deferred during the 1950s and 1960s, road improvements were indeed 
taking place under both the maintenance and the construction works category, even if these 
remained a minority of the total invested on road works. 
The DNV therefore responded to the growth of road transport demands from 1950 to 1970 
by continuing basic maintenance, building all-weather roads, performing some progressive 
upgrades, and deferring certain expensive structural improvements. This combination seemed 
to have yielded good results, as by the early 1970s maintenance conditions were considered 
as generally good by the World Bank, and both the Bank and the DNV considered the length 
of the network as sufficient for the needs of the moment.137 The DNV was concerned with 
some major issues, however, such as the fact that only 65 per cent of the national network 
was all-weather, compromising the quality and cost of the service.138 Meanwhile, the Bank 
also estimated that there had been a tendency to provide stronger pavements than initially 
necessary (just as it did in the case of Colombia, Chapter 5).139 Accordingly, the Bank 
 
133 ‘Como no es posible por ahora reconstruir esos tramos, se los ha mantenido con mejoras progresivas y 
conservación, impidiendo que el capital invertido en sus bases se pierda al desintegrarse éstas’, DNV, 
Memoria 1952-1953, 13.  
134 ‘No debemos establecer una línea divisoria neta entre las áreas de conservación de caminos y las de 
construcción. Por el contrario, entre ambas debemos introducir y aplicar el concepto de conservar 
mejorando’, DNV, Memoria 1952-1953, 56. 
135 In 1961 and 1962, for instance, out of the total amount spent by the DNV in the works that were 
completed those two years, progressive improvements were attributed more funds than basic works, 
reconstruction, and paving (i.e. 48 and 37 per cent of the total in 1961 and 1962 respectively). DNV, 
Memoria 1959-1962, 30-31. 
136 DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 15; DNV, Memoria 1963-1966, 15; DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 14-15. 
137 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 10; DNV, Panorama Vial, 1, 64, 103. 
138 DNV, Panorama Vial, 1, 64, 103. 




suggested that in future, in order to optimise investments, stage construction principles should 
be applied (see Chapter 1).140  
 
Building on previous efforts  
 
The continuous American influence and the Argentinian engineers’ position in the field 
American road engineering approaches continued to be considered the main example to 
follow. As in the 1930s, DNV personnel frequently travelled to the US to observe the work 
of different Highway Departments and road laboratories. In the early 1950s, some 
scholarships were in place, in association with the International Road Federation (IRF), to 
offer specialisations and placements in the US to Argentinian engineers. For instance, in 
1954, a competition amongst experienced road engineers was opened to select a candidate 
for a position in Colorado, with the condition of coming back to Argentina and working there 
for at least two years.141 In 1961, the engineer Alberto Lanne, Chief of the Pavements 
Division of the DNV, went to the US for nine months to study the newest methods and 
machines used in road construction and maintenance. He visited a new Koehring machinery 
exhibition in Milwaukee, the laboratory of the Portland Cement Association in Illinois, he 
took a course on laboratory tests and techniques in California, and in Kansas he undertook 
research on compacting methods that he submitted to the BPR.142  
Several translations of articles and books by different American associations, institutions and 
engineers were published in Argentina. For instance, in 1960, the AAC, with the supervision 
of engineers such as Eduardo Arenas and Enrique Humet, and with the approval of the 
American Association of Highway Officials (AASHO), translated an AASHO publication 
dating from 1952 on the subject of road improvements and their benefits for users.143 This 
publication was meant to circulate amongst the members of the AAC free of charge.144 The 
journal Caminos also published regularly translated articles from American, British and 
French road institutions or engineers. Amongst the sources featured journals such as 
Contractors Record and Public Works Engineer (UK), Revue Générale des Routes et des 
 
140 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 9, Annexe 1. 
141 Roberto Gorostiaga, ‘Aspectos de la Vialidad Argentina’, in Carreteras, n. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1955), 21. 
142 Alberto Lanne, ‘Resultados de un Viaje de Estudio de Estados Unidos’, in Caminos, 225 (Nov. 1961). 
143 Many other publications from the AASHO were translated with the permission of the association.  See 
e.g. AAC, Reunión Regional Sud-Americana de la International Road Federation (Buenos Aires, 1960); 
AASHO, Análisis del Beneficio de los Usuarios, Introducción. 
144 In 1955 the AAC had about 500 associates. AASHO, Análisis del Beneficio de los Usuarios, 




Aérodromes (France), Better Roads (US) and the Bulletin of the IRF (US), as well as 
publications from Highway Departments from different American states such as Texas and 
California, and those of organisations such as the BPR, the Asphalt Institute (US), and the 
Association of Public Roads Functionaries (US).145 Translations from American sources were 
the most numerous and revolved around topics such as mechanised maintenance, soil 
stabilisation and low-cost construction in general.146 These translations were published 
without comments or adaptations, which means it was up to the reader to adapt the content to 
the local circumstances. In fact, that was a more or less explicit objective of the conferences 
and courses on road engineering since the 1930s: to provide the general knowledge necessary 
to interpret American publications and modify their suggestions according to the particular 
problems encountered.147  
Foreign consultants were also important influences in Argentina, especially in the 1960s. In 
the late 1950s, the new government commissioned studies to evaluate the condition of the 
transport system; the most comprehensive was the Long Range Transportation Plan for 
Argentina, produced with the contribution of the United Nations Special Fund for Assistance, 
with the Bank for Reconstruction and Development acting as Executive Agency.148 However, 
the extent to which the recommendations of foreign consultants were followed is difficult to 
trace. Given the political instability of the country many measures taken by one 
administration were often reversed by the following one, and despite the major importance 
of foreign studies in some respects (by, for example, providing traffic surveys), it seems the 
adoption of their suggestions was rather limited.149  
In fact, broadly speaking, American approaches were sometimes difficult to adapt to the 
Argentinian context, not only because of environmental conditions (such as weather and soil 
characteristics), but also due to social and institutional differences, such as, for example, 
 
145 Prys Williams, ‘Aspectos Económicos del Transporte Carretero’, in Caminos, 153 (Nov. 1955); Roger 
Q. Spencer Jr., ‘Prácticas de Mantenimiento de Carreteras’, in Caminos, 175 (Sept. 1957); Anon., 
‘Estabilización de Suelos y Agregados’, in Caminos, 209 (Jul. 1960); Anon., ‘Un Distrito Rural 
Encuentra Manera de Obtener Buenos Caminos a un Costo Reducido’, in Caminos, 195 (May 1959); 
H.A. Radzikowski, ‘Requisitos en los Equipos de Construcción y Mantenimiento de Carreteras’, in 
Caminos, 193 (May 1959); Harry J. McGregor, ‘Nuestro Transporte Caminero’, in Caminos, 155 (Jan. 
1956); Dirección de Vialidad, Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Provincia de Buenos Aires, La 
Estabilización de los Suelos por Medio del Cemento, Publicación N. 18 (1962). 
146 Spencer Jr., ‘Prácticas de Mantenimiento de Carreteras’; Anon., ‘Estabilización de Suelos y 
Agregados’; Anon., ‘Un Distrito Rural Encuentra Manera de Obtener Buenos Caminos a un Costo 
Reducido’; Radzikowski, ‘Requisitos en los Equipos’. 
147 The engineer J. Carlos Bustos made this explicit in 1936. Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’, 75.  
148 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Main Report, i. Other studies were CEPAL, Los Problemas 
del Transporte de la Argentina; Coverdale & Colpitts et. al., Estudio de los Transportes Argentinos. 
149 See e.g. in relation to roads that should replace railways, very limited adoption of the closure of lines 




traffic regulations and the feasibility of enforcing them.150 In addition, sometimes the lack of 
data in Argentina made the adaptation of American approaches impossible. For instance, in 
1954, the journal of the AAC quoted statistics from the US to discuss the problem of road 
user safety, whereas for Argentina it was only possible to make vague statements claiming 
road safety was also a challenge.151 
Technical influence from other Latin American countries seems to have been relatively 
limited. Argentinian engineers were aware of new programmes being developed not only in 
Latin America, but all over the world. For instance, Caminos had a section called ‘Foreign 
Emphasis’ featuring very brief information about road programmes and general road-related 
news from varied countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey and Greece.152 The Pan-
American Highway Congresses were also crucial opportunities to get to know in detail what 
other countries in the continent were doing. Nevertheless, most of the references quoted in 
technical publications were either Argentinian or American.153 Two Latin American countries 
seem to stand out though. Brazil and especially Mexico were important examples for the 
financing and development of networks of low-trafficked rural roads. As the next chapter will 
show for the case of Colombia, in Argentina Mexico’s financing scheme for this kind of 
project was considered pioneering and it was praised for connecting previously isolated parts 
of the territory.154 The Brazilian example was also admired for the way in which technical 
knowledge was distributed, as in order to receive federal funding, the states were obliged to 
provide technical assistance to municipal authorities.155 The extent to which these examples 
influenced Argentinian road engineers and administration remains to be studied, however.  
It seems that by hosting international events and by comparing the country to the developed 
world, Argentinian road engineers were attempting to position themselves as relevant players 
in the field at a global level, and as leaders in Latin America. Argentinian engineers often 
compared the country’s transport system to that of European and North American countries 
– and not only with the ones in other South American countries. For instance, in 1970, to 
 
150  Juan F. García Balado, ‘Criterios Actuales y Tendencias en los Proyectos y Construcciones de 
Hormigón y Suelo-Cemento’, in Carreteras, n. 11 (Jul.-Sept. 1957), 49-53. 
151 Anon., ‘Vialidad Nacional Invertirá $ 443.000.000 en 1954’, in Noticias Camineras, n. 1 (May 1954), 
7. 
152 For example, the January 1956 issue announced the launch of a new programme of road construction 
in Brazil, the completion of a new bridge in the frontier between Greece and Turkey and the creation of a 
new tax on naphtha in Ecuador to build roads connecting with other countries. Anon., ‘Enfoques 
Extranjeros’, in Caminos, 155 (Jan. 1956), 31. 
153 See e.g. Ezequiel Ogueta, ‘Predicciones de Tránsito Para Obras Viales Financiadas por el Sistema de 
Peaje’, in Dirección de Vialidad, Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Publicación 
N. 80 (Aug. 1968); DNV, Memoria 1952-1953, 53. 
154 Petriz, ‘Necesidades del País’, 16-17. 




evaluate the evolution and significance of maintenance investment in Argentina, the DNV 
saw fit to compare its maintenance expenditure to that of the US (Figure 4.7).156 Several 
comparisons of the sort can be found in the same report.157 The main reference was the US, 
but some European countries (mainly France and Germany) were also often used as 
comparisons, as well as Mexico and Brazil.158 To reinforce their position as relevant figures 
in road engineering, the DNV hosted various events, inviting representatives from prestigious 
organisations in the US, Europe and some Latin American countries. For example, in 1960, 
a conference about concrete construction was held in Buenos Aires, featuring papers by 
experts from the Highway Research Board, the École des Ponts et Chaussées, the Centro 
Italiano de Studi e Riserchi, the US Department of Public Works, and the Universidad 
Católica de Chile, amongst others.159 In 1964, the Vth Argentinian Congress of Roads and 
Transit also assembled delegates from US, France, Sweden, Great Britain and a few Latin 
American countries.160 In 1959 and 1966 Argentina also held two of the meetings of the 
technical commission of road terminology from the Pan-American Highway Congress, 
receiving delegates from Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay and the US.161 It is 
difficult to measure the success of the Argentinian engineers’ attempts of positioning 
themselves at a global level. My research suggests that their initiatives had limited success 
outside Latin America, and that the role they played within the region was similar to that of 
Mexico and Brazil (see Chapter 5). 
 
Figure 4.7 Graphs showing the evolution of maintenance expenditure in Argentina 
(1935-1970) and the US (1956-1968) 
 
156 DNV, Panorama Vial, 43. 
157 See e.g. the comparison of the rate of traffic growth and the related increases in maintenance costs (5.7 
per cent per year for the US and 11 per cent per year for Argentina, which meant that maintenance costs 
in Argentina were duplicated every ten years, and not every twelve as it would be the case in the US). 
DNV, Panorama Vial, 41. 
158 See e.g. graph with the evolution of land freight transport by road and by train from 1945 to 1969 in 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Germany, the US and France. Australia, Canada and South Africa were 
sometimes also considered comparable to Argentina. DNV, Panorama Vial, 2, 52.  
159 Anon., ‘Técnicos Argentinos y Extranjeros en una Conferencia Sobre Hormigón’, in Caminos, 214 
(Dec. 1960).  
160 DNV, Memoria 1963-1966, 23. 





Note: The unit for the main graph is millions of pesos of 1960. For the US graph, the index is 1960 = 100. 
Source: DNV, Panorama Vial, Fig. 21, 43.  
 
The growth of construction firms and the increased use of materials laboratories and heavy 
machinery 
After a period of decline in the 1940s related to imports barriers and the Second World War 
(see above), the Argentinian construction industry slowly recovered in the 1950s and 
especially in the 1960s, gaining the recognition of the World Bank as well developed by 1971. 
In 1960, although about 450 firms were registered to work for road projects with the DNV, a 
foreign study on the Argentinian transport sector commissioned that year found that the 
capacity of construction firms was very limited.162 Construction works did not always respect 
the established specifications, a fact that another study attributed to the incompetence of the 
contractors and negligence of the DNV inspectors.163 In addition, projects were frequently 
finished with delays, although this was also related to late payments and delivery of technical 
 
162 According to the consultants, although about 100 of the firms pretended to have a capacity of more 
than 30 million pesos a year, this was not accurate. A major factor was the poor condition of the plant. 
However, many firms did not provide the information requested, in particular surveys of their plant. The 
majority of firms had contracts for works for less than 50 million pesos per year. Only 14 firms had a 
capacity higher than that, of which only 3 had a capacity of 200 million pesos per year. Of the 191 
projects in execution in 1960 (due to be finished in 2 to 4 years), the majority cost less than 20 million, 
and only 35 cost more than 30 million pesos. Coverdale & Colpitts et. al., Estudio de los Transportes 
Argentinos, 161, 166. 
163 TPG, A Long Range Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 56. 




instructions from the DNV (delays of four months or more).164 Nonetheless, by the early 
1970s, over twenty large construction firms were able to handle contracts of up to 15 million 
USD a year – although a few were subsidiaries of large international firms.165 In the 1971 
road project with the World Bank, local firms were able to win all the contracts bidding 
against international firms (partly because of low prices related to a lull in the pace of 
construction).166 It is also telling that for that same project the vast majority of consulting 
firms engaged in detailed engineering were Argentinian.167  
Furthermore, by 1961, almost twenty years after being founded, the LEMIT was receiving 
funds from private firms as well as from the Buenos Aires province, had a staff of 275 people 
(amongst which there were 110 technicians), an area of 5,000 square metres exclusively for 
laboratories and workshops, and an additional terrain with experimental plant and laboratories 
of about 3,500 square metres.168 In this period, the LEMIT published 78 original research 
publications and analysed over 200,000 samples.169 The laboratory was also a repository of 
both national and foreign knowledge, as its library contained over 8,000 items and some 
members of staff had attended specialisation programmes in the US, Brazil, France, Great 
Britain, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden.170 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, materials 
laboratories grew in number and capacity across the country and, in 1969, based on the 
experienced acquired, a programme to build several new mobile laboratories was being 
drafted.171 
Finally, in the 1950s, as the Peronist government had started introducing higher wages and 
benefits for the workers, machines were becoming increasingly attractive for engineers and 
other staff at the DNV as a way to keep costs to a minimum.172 As previously mentioned, 
machines were already in use in the first half of the century but, by 1950, a great number of 
machines were thought to be in poor condition, and both construction firms and the DNV 
 
164 The World Bank noted that in the early 1960s the road works it financed took twice as much time as 
they were meant to take and with higher costs than estimated. The Bank associated the delays with the 
instability of the government and an ‘improper’ use of the consultants. TPG, A Long Range 
Transportation Plan, Appendix 2 Highways, 56; IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 
1971’, Annexe 1, 1.  
165 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 10. 
166 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, 10. 
167 IBRD, ‘Appraisal of a Highway Project Argentina, 1971’, Table 11.  
168 Anon., ‘LEMIT’, 22. 
169 Anon., ‘LEMIT’, 22. 
170 Anon., ‘LEMIT’, 25. 
171 DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 39, 47. 
172 No details were provided comparing the costs of mechanised and manual labour. It seems quoting the 
opinion of American road experts was enough to legitimise the superiority of machines. See e.g. 
translation of an article by a works inspector at the Maintenance Division of the Highway Department in 




considered they needed more. In the early 1950s, the DNV was struggling to find construction 
firms with the necessary plant and thus capacity to let some of its contracts.173 Many 
construction firms were using machines considered old, which slowed down works and made 
them more expensive, even by the late 1950s.174 Maintenance work was also suffering from 
a lack of machinery, and the DNV often used animals instead of machines in the early 
1950s.175 In fact, earth roads needed constant maintenance with heavy machinery (for re-
profiling and remodelling) and some tasks were neglected due to machine scarcity, even in 
the early 1960s.176 For instance, from 1959 to 1962, limited maintenance was conducted on 
the less trafficked roads, reducing the attention paid to drainage, passes, traffic signs, amongst 
others.177  
The shortage of machinery was also related to the difficulty of getting spare parts. Many 
machines stayed idle for long periods of time due to the unavailability of spares, worsening 
their condition.178 For instance, in the late 1950s, the DNV had at its disposal about 2,500 
machines, of which only 60 per cent were in good condition, 11 per cent needed to be 
discarded, and the rest were waiting for spares and repairs.179 In fact, despite the imports of 
machines made possible by two loans from the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank in 
the late 1950s, spare parts remained a problem. The DNV bought with these loans more than 
1,000 machines, amongst which featured 699 motor graders and 404 tractors of different 
kinds.180 The machines were mostly from the US, but a small proportion came from Italy, 
Great Britain and Japan.181 However, Argentina’s protectionist measures in the post-war 
period made the importing of spare parts difficult. Many road engineers saw this policy as 
harming, since manufacturing some spare parts was expensive and time consuming.182  
Nonetheless, it seems that this policy did result in the production of different types of road-
building machines in Argentina, although more research is needed on this topic. By 1957, 
 
173 De Carli, ‘Aspectos Generales del Problema Vial’, 43; DNV, Memoria 1950, 42.  
174 ‘Anon., ‘La Importación de Maquinaria Vial’, in Caminos, 178 (Dec. 1957); CEPAL, Los Problemas 
del Transporte de la Argentina, 287. 
175 This practice was common in the early 1950s but there was no mention of it after 1953. DNV, 
Memoria 1951, 113; DNV, Memoria 1952-1953, 158.  
176 DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 33.  
177 DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 33.  
178 Coverdale & Colpitts et. al., Estudio de los Transportes Argentinos, 160.  
179 80 per cent of these machines were used for maintenance, 15 per cent in the construction works 
undertook by the DNV, and 5 per cent were lent to contractors. Coverdale & Colpitts et. al., Estudio de 
los Transportes Argentinos, 171. 
180 DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 57. 
181 DNV, Memoria 1959-1962, 57. 
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there were eight factories making a significant contribution to the mechanisation of road 
works, especially in relation to small machines.183 The DNV did not keep an inventory of 
machines according to their origin, however; and it also seems that a considerable portion of 
national production actually corresponded to manufacturing foreign brands according to their 
designs (Figure 4.8). Despite the good quality of the machines produced, the factories 
struggled due to the lack of continuity of the demand resulting from the absence of a sustained 
purchase plan from the DNV and from the lack of credit opportunities available to the 
construction firms.184 Moreover, most tractors produced in these factories were destined for 
agricultural production, and not road works.185 
 
Figure 4.8 Advertisement of Trillor, distributor of Sika products in Argentina, 1956 
 
Source: Trillor, ‘Equipos Vibradores y Compactadores para la Construcción y Pavimentos’, in Caminos, 
161 (Jul. 1956), 34. 
 
Despite these problems, the number of machines used in the country increased considerably 
during the period. For instance, as Table 4.1 shows, the number of tractors owned by the 
 
183 ‘Anon., ‘Lo Esperado: Tendremos Máquinas Viales’, in Caminos, 165 (Nov. 1956); Manuel J. Cintolo, 
Síntesis del Nacimiento y Desarrollo de la Industria Vial’, in Carreteras, n. 11 (Jul.-Sept. 1957), 55. 
184 Cintolo, ‘Síntesis del Nacimiento y Desarrollo de la Industria Vial’, 55. 
185 Cintolo, ‘Síntesis del Nacimiento y Desarrollo de la Industria Vial’, 55. 




DNV almost multiplied by ten from 1943 to 1968-69, as did the number of motor-graders. 
Lorries were very numerous, which was connected to the need to transport large amounts of 
materials over long distances (see also Chapter 5). Similarly, the large number pick-ups and 
jeeps (and the large quantity of caravans), could be related to the long distances and to the 
need to transport workers to distant working sites.186 Unlike the cases studied in Chapter 3 
and 5, however, Argentina continued to use a large number of non-motorised graders until 
the late 1960s. The use of these machines was related to the early experience of motorisation 
in Argentina, as they were already widely employed for road construction in the 1930s, pulled 
by tractors.187  
 
Table 4.1 Number of some of the most numerous machines owned by the Dirección 
Nacional de Vialidad and used for maintenance works (1943, 1958, 1968-69) 
 Tractors Motor 
Graders 
Graders Lorries Pick-ups 
and 
Jeeps 
Total DNV 1943 164 88 345 283 129 




1958 300 451 n.d. 700 n.d. 
1968-69 510 730 n.d. 435 (*) 450 
 
(*) This figure includes 320 dumper trucks and 115 ‘camiones regadores’. 
Sources: DNV, Memoria 1943, 143; Dirección Nacional de Vialidad, Memoria 1957-1958, 64; DNV, 
Memoria 1968-1969, 151, 162-69.  
 
The increasing use of machines required knowledge about how to coordinate, operate and 
repair them. Engineering journals were an important tool to keep road engineers up to date 
with the newest machines in the international market.188 The DNV also played an important 
role in diffusing techniques of operation and repair. In the late 1960s, the Dirección Principal 
 
186 The DNV had about 800 caravans in 1968-69. DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 162-169. 
187 Bustos, ‘Caminos de Bajo Costo’, 19-39. 
188 See e.g. Anon., ‘Equipos para Obras Camineras’, in Caminos, 283 (Sept. 1966), 39; ‘Anon., 




de Equipos at the DNV was in charge of sending inspectors across the country, distributing 
machine maintenance manuals to operators and mechanics.189 This practice obtained good 
results according to the DNV, as the number of accidents diminished and the machines 
seemed to be having longer lives.190 Supervision was also a major task for the DNV. 
Maintenance was directed by foremen responsible for sections of different size; in the early 
1960s sections consisted of 400 to 500 km of roads, although when roads were paved or bore 
heavy traffic the length was reduced to 200 km.191 Since the maintenance of the national 
network was managed by the DNV from Buenos Aires, the successful coordination of such a 
massive enterprise over such a vast territory is remarkable. Already in 1943, more than half 
of the national network was receiving constant maintenance, evidence of the significant 
experience the DNV had acquired before the war, and by 1961 the proportion of national 
roads that were regularly maintained had already reached over 94 per cent.192 
Despite the rising number of machines, manual labour continued to be important throughout 
the period. In 1968-69, for example, although the DNV used more than 700 tractors for 
maintenance, it employed more than 10,000 labourers on this type of works every year.193 
Almost half of these workers were not permanent employees: they were ‘transitory’, probably 
hired for particularly demanding projects and times of the year.194 Without including the costs 
of buying machinery, the DNV could sometimes spend more on personnel than on machine 
operation per year. That was the case of the maintenance division of the DNV in 1969, for 
example.195 This was related to the fact that the staff needed for machine warehouses and 
workshops were not included in the category of machine operation, but in personnel (along 




189 DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 160. 
190 DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 161. 
191 Accordingly, when foremen dealt with roads with light traffic, the length of the network they were 
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Highways, 57. 
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193 DNV, Memoria 1968-1969, 128. 
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In the early twentieth century, Argentina’s transport system reflected the country’s wealth. 
Not only was the railway system large, the rapidly growing road network was built with the 
latest methods and machinery at the time, i.e. following the American model. This included 
the construction of low-cost roads and the use of earth-moving machinery and materials 
laboratory tests. However, from 1950 to 1970, road freight surpassed railway freight – a shift 
related to the decline of the railway system. The growing traffic of lorries caused serious 
strain on the road network, which had not been built to bear such heavy loads. At the same 
time, the funds available to the DNV were limited due to inflation but also in great part due 
to the state’s incapacity to adapt the tax legislation to the changing financial situation of the 
country, as well as to its prioritisation of YPF.  
Nonetheless, the DNV managed to respond to the rising demands with a policy that combined 
routine maintenance, relatively small progressive improvements (especially from 1950 to 
1960), and a shift from building mostly unimproved earth roads to building almost 
exclusively all-weather roads (from 1950 onwards, but especially in the 1960s). The pace of 
construction did not attain the levels of the 1930s and early 1940s again after 1944 – when 
lorry traffic was rising to unprecedented levels. Although the construction of all-weather 
roads contributed significantly, the massive increase of lorry transport from 1950 to 1970 
would not have been possible without the major maintenance, improvements, and paving 
efforts of the DNV. In this process, the experience that the DNV and the private sector had 
acquired in the two decades before the Second World War proved invaluable. The number of 
materials laboratories and road-building machines rose. Construction firms gained capacity 
and the length of the national road network that was constantly maintained by the DNV 
reached 94 per cent by 1961. Although Argentinian road engineers followed the work of their 
counterparts in other countries, and in particular Mexico and Brazil, the US continued to be 




Chapter 5 The unintended role of maintenance in Colombian road 
development, 1950-1970 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s Colombia experienced a major transformation of its transport system. 
From carrying about the same volume of freight (in ton-km) as railways in 1950, by 1970 
motor vehicles were carrying more than 70 per cent of freight.1 However, there was relatively 
little road building during the period.2 This chapter examines how Colombia’s road 
infrastructure allowed for the radical increase in road transport over the 1950s and 1960s. It 
argues that road maintenance and improvements enabled the growth of increasingly heavy 
traffic over mostly unpaved roads. Further, this chapter argues that this phenomenon was not 
the result of a clear planned policy, but rather of the state’s inability to make new and old 
railway transport competitive and of its failure to offer adequate support and planning for the 
construction of a road network that could satisfactorily face the challenging traffic and 
environmental conditions. Attempting to render the existing national road infrastructure fit to 
respond to the rising transport demands, the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Obras 
Públicas, MOP) accelerated the mechanisation of maintenance, and promoted the adaptation 
of foreign knowledge, practices and techniques, from not only the US and Europe, but also 
from other Latin American countries (as its counterpart did in Argentina, Chapter 4). 
Nevertheless, the MOP’s administrative problems limited the success of its modernising 
efforts. Therefore, despite allowing the growth of traffic, road conditions continued to be poor 
and the flow of traffic highly weather dependent.  
The economic historian Álvaro Pachón shows in his overview of the Colombian transport 
infrastructure in the second half of the twentieth century that roads became the most 
prominent transport method in the period despite being mostly unpaved. For him, the rise in 
road transport facilitated the integration of the national market and promoted economic 
growth, especially during the 1950s. Pachón argues that this was a result of economic 
policies, and not of a transformation of the road infrastructure, since by the middle of the 
twentieth century roads were already connecting the largest urban centres to each other, as 
 
1 Álvaro Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo Veinte’, in Álvaro 
Pachón and Maria Teresa Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En Colombia Durante El Siglo XX: 
Una Descripción Desde El Punto de Vista Económico (Bogotá, 2006), 277-486. 
2 Even with the problems caused by the Great Depression and the Second World War, more kilometres of 
road were built from 1930 to 1950 than from 1950 to 1970 (about 10,200 km and 7,700 km respectively). 




well as to the main production areas.3 However, he does not explain how a network of mostly 
unpaved roads in poor condition allowed for such a radical increase in road transport. I will 
show that maintenance is key to understanding this phenomenon.  
Historians Marta J. Villaveces and Ramón E. Hernández argue that the Colombian 
Government prioritised road maintenance over new construction from 1945 to 1990, and they 
associate this with the neglect of road development in favour of electric energy.4 However, 
they do not present any evidence of the proportion of funds invested in maintenance as 
compared to construction, they do not study what maintenance meant or entailed, and they 
make only marginal references to the investment in other transport methods. In addition, they 
argue that prioritising road maintenance was the result of a planned policy. I will challenge 
their arguments by showing first that the state spent more on construction than on 
maintenance and, second, that despite the investment priorities, maintenance did acquire an 
essential role, not as part of a governmental plan, but as the result of the state’s limited success 
building roads and promoting railway traffic. 
The Colombian transport system makes for a particularly interesting case given its unusual 
combination of road, rail, animal, and river transport, as well as due to the location of its 
capital Bogotá at 2,600 m above sea level, about 500 km away from the Pacific coast, and 
over 900 km away from the Caribbean coast. In 1950 Colombia’s transport system consisted 
of 3,000 km of railways (built mostly between the 1900s and 1920s), 12,200 km of roads 
(built mostly in the 1930s and 1940s), navigation from the interior towards the Caribbean 
over the Magdalena River, and a network of mule tracks. Pack mules were the major land 
transport method since the sixteenth century, and they not only survived but also in many 
instances thrived with the arrival of the railways in the late nineteenth century.5 Mules 
continued to play an important economic role, especially in the mountainous coffee regions, 
at least until the 1930s, when roads started to replace them.6 Although cases in which animal 
and rail transport coexisted an complemented each other are not uncommon, the economic 
centrality of pack animals in the twentieth century is a more unusual phenomenon, 
comparable perhaps to other Andean countries and to the camel caravans of the Sahara. 
Furthermore, the Magdalena River, which had played a crucial role since colonial times, 
 
3 Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte’ and María Teresa Ramírez, ‘Desarrollo de la Infraestructura 
de Transporte en Colombia, 1900-1950’, in Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En 
Colombia, 54-55. 
4 Marta Juanita Villaveces Niño and Ramón Eduardo Hernández Ortega, ‘Carreteras y Red Eléctrica en 
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5 Germán Ferro Medina, A Lomo de Mula (Bogotá, 1994). 




remained a major transport artery throughout the twentieth century, despite the problems it 
presented during periods of both heavy and scarce rains. The Magdalena River was not 
replaced by the Ferrocarril del Atlántico, the railway that ran parallel to it (built from 1953 to 
1961), for the latter attracted little business. Unable to coordinate the different transport 
methods at its disposal, the Colombian state failed to take full advantage of this multimodal 
system, putting increasing pressure on the road network. 
The evolution of road and rail transport in Colombia tells a similar story to the one in 
Argentina over this period, although at a different scale given Colombia’s considerably lower 
income. In the 1920s, while Argentina’s GDP was the highest in Latin America, Colombia’s 
was one of the lowest.7 Although Colombia reached rates of GDP growth of 4.6 per cent and 
5.2 per cent in 1950-1960 and 1960-1970 respectively, by 1968 Colombia’s GDP was 
approximatively three times lower than Argentina’s (which was by then lower than that of 
Mexico and Brazil).8 The scale of road construction was also different: whereas Argentina 
built about 35,000 km of national roads from 1934 to 1969, Colombia only built 17,915 km 
of national roads from 1931 to 1970.9 The density of the Argentinian total road network was 
considerably higher than that of Colombia throughout the period. While Argentina had about 
80 km of road per 10,000 inhabitants in 1954, Colombia had less than 20 km, and by 1967 
these densities had increased to 86.3 km and 23.5 km respectively.10 By 1970, Argentina had 
0,07 km of road per square kilometre, while Colombia had 0,04 km of road per square 
kilometre.11 Traffic was also much heavier in Argentina; for example, in 1968 Argentinian 
national roads carried 26,671 million ton-km of freight, while Colombian national roads 
carried about 10,285 million ton-km in 1970.12 In addition, Argentina’s railway network was 
 
7 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, 3rd ed. (New 
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8 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean estimated that in 1968 Colombia’s 
GDP at factor cost was 6,959 million USD (at 1960 prices), while Argentina’s was 20,103 million USD 
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over ten times larger than Colombia’s in 1950 (42,800 km and 3,000 km respectively).13 
Another significant difference is that, unlike Argentina (and most Latin American nations), 
Colombia engaged in a large railway construction project during this period. The Ferrocarril 
del Atlántico was about 670 km-long and connected the capital with the northern railway 
terminus of Fundación, therefore linking Bogotá to the Caribbean coast.14 However, this 
major investment did not meet with success and did not stop the decline of the railways. 
Therefore, despite these various differences, both countries experienced a shift from railways 
to roads as main transporters of freight from 1950 to 1970. Both nations managed to respond 
to these demands mostly by maintaining and improving the road network, experiencing a 
slower pace of construction in this period than in the two previous decades. 
As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the mechanisation of maintenance was a significant 
phenomenon of the post-war period, especially due to the large proportion of unpaved roads. 
Similar fleets of machines were used in Colombia. For instance, motor-graders were 
considered essential for maintenance works, especially on unpaved roads and, in the 1950s, 
one motor-grader was used to maintain more or less 200 km of road, while efforts were being 
made to increase the number of these machines. In addition, similarly to Argentina, dumper 
trucks acquired a particularly important role due to the need of moving large quantities of 
materials. Although in all the cases studied local conditions and the scarcity of funds made 
necessary the adaptation of certain machines to perform maintenance tasks, such as tractors 
and lorries (and, in this case, dumper trucks), in Colombia the need for specialised road 
machinery was more pressing because of the structural deficiencies of the network. In fact, 
in Colombia there seems to have been considerably less control over road construction and 
maintenance than in Ivory Coast, as the MOP offered little technical guidance to the emergent 
Colombian construction firms, and foremen with little experience were in charge of 
supervising and coordinating maintenance. This meant that most roads had poor technical 
standards and road maintenance often involved reconstruction – an arduous task that was 
especially difficult without experienced staff and modern machinery. In fact, unlike 
Argentina, Colombia did not experience an early modernisation of road construction and 
maintenance, and this generated an additional challenge for the MOP, which struggled to 
manage and coordinate efficiently the new road maintenance mechanised regime. Finally, 
although both countries suffered from political instability during the period, Colombia 
 
13 See above and Chapter 4. 
14 At the time the capital was already connected to the Pacific coast by rail. Carlos Sanclemente, 




experienced a violent internal conflict known as ‘La Violencia’ from 1948 to 1958, as well 
as the emergence of guerrillas in the 1960s.15 
This chapter argues that maintenance and improvement efforts were the factors that allowed 
the national road infrastructure to respond to the rising transport demands in this period. The 
first section shows that the important role that improving and maintaining acquired was 
actually unintended. Despite growing investment in both railway and road development (from 
the National Government and the World Bank), the state failed to make railways a 
competitive transport system and obtained little results from its road construction 
programmes. While railways were losing traffic to heavy vehicles, the lack of adequate 
planning and technical support from the MOP produced few and deficient new roads. In this 
context, maintenance and improvements were the factors keeping roads passable and 
allowing for the massive increase in road transport. The second section of the chapter 
examines what these maintenance processes entailed. After examining the challenges the 
MOP encountered, I argue that the poor technical specifications of the roads made 
maintenance particularly difficult. These deficiencies demanded structural modifications of 
the roads, making the acquisition of more heavy machinery desirable, if not necessary given 
the urgent demands. The growing number of mostly American machines required new 
knowledge to work with them – from operators, engineers and administrators. Both national 
and foreign knowledge, practices and techniques were mobilised and, even though the US 
had a predominant role in terms of the production and circulation of road engineering 
knowledge, a Latin American engineering network was also influential for Colombian roads. 
This section ends presenting the limits of the modernisation of maintenance and improvement 
processes. The MOP's administrative issues dispersed resources and hindered its efforts, 
which is why roads did not reach optimal conditions.  
The main sources used in this chapter were the archives of the MOP at the Archivo General 
de la Nación (AGN), and the Memoirs of the MOP that can be found in the library of this 
archive.16 The main national engineering journal, Anales de Ingeniería de Colombia, also 
provided important technical information and as well as valuable insights into the technical 
debates in which Colombian engineers participated. The Biblioteca Nacional and the Ramón 
de Zubiría library at the Universidad de los Andes also offered transport studies and road 
engineering publications made or commissioned by the MOP. Finally, Maria Teresa Ramírez 
 
15 Although further research is needed to determine how these factors affected transport infrastructure, the 
armed conflict certainly had an impact on the funds available and the socio-political context. 
16 Although the MOP changed its name to Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transporte in 1960, we will 




and Álvaro Pachón’s book on Colombia’s transport development over the twentieth century 
was particularly useful, as it contains considerable data on transport development.17  
 
The unintended role of maintenance and improvements 
 
The failure of the railways and the rise of road transport 
In 1950, despite the impulse that road construction received in the previous two decades, the 
national road network was in poor condition. Road construction over the 1930s and 1940s 
had not followed an integrated plan but rather the political interests of individual members of 
Congress with little consideration for technical studies, resulting in an unfinished and 
fragmented network.18 To make matters worse, the rainy seasons of 1945 and 1950 destroyed 
a significant part of the road infrastructure, and by 1950 less than one per cent of the national 
road network was paved.19 Despite this, as previously mentioned, by the middle of the 
twentieth century the road network linked the main cities and productive areas.20 Annexe M 
shows how concentrated the road and rail networks were, following a north to southwest axe, 
which corresponds more or less with the Andes mountain chain, connecting Bogotá and other 
large cities in the interior to the Pacific and Caribbean coasts.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, investment in both the railway and road 
infrastructures grew. Public investment in roads increased significantly faster than in railways 
as Graph 5.1 illustrates, and multiplied by more than eight times during this period.21 
 
17 In particular, it contained a CD-ROM with several tables, graphs and maps with data collected by them 
from various sources including the Ministry of Public Works, the National Administrative Statistics 
Department (DANE), and the World Bank, among others. 
18 Ramírez, ‘Desarrollo de la Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, 1900-1950’, 63. 
19 Annexe O. 
20 Ramírez, ‘Desarrollo de la Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, 1900-1950’, 54-55.  
21 The government used different means to collect money for road development. From 1954, construction 
contracts started being assigned to private firms through concessions financed with income from tolls and 
bridge-tolls. Tolls were managed by Juntas that supervised the collection and the investments. In 
December 1966, an ad-valorem tax on fuel consumption was established at the rate of 114 per cent over 
the refinery price for petrol, and 55.5 per cent for the case of Diesel (previously the tax was fixed at 15 
cents per gallon of petrol). The same year, the National Road Fund was established, collecting money 
from the fuel taxes, tolls and other additional funds for particular projects from the national government. 
Therefore, taxpayers were in the late 1960s paying for about 50 per cent of the government’s national 
road expenditures. MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1960 (Bogotá, 1960), 147; Herman Felstehausen, 
Conceptos de Planeamiento Para Mejorar Carreteras y Caminos Colombianos (Bogotá, 1969), 13; 
Asociación Colombiana de Ingenieros Contratistas (ACIC), Quinto Congreso de Ingeniería de Obras 
Públicas, Anales, Tomo I (Bogotá, 1965), 98; IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of the Sixth Highway Construction 
Project, Colombia’ (Washington D.C., 1970), 6. Another fund was created in 1960 to finance the 
'Caminos Vecinales', rural roads of local importance that were mostly unpaved and had low traffic, see 




However, although railway investment through the newly nationalised Ferrocarriles 
Nacionales de Colombia (FNC, 1954) grew at a much slower rate, it was nonetheless 
significant. The construction of the Ferrocarril del Atlántico (from 1953 to 1961) was the 
single most expensive transport project of the period.22 Its construction was suggested by the 
first World Bank Mission in Colombia as a way to diminish transfers between rail and other 
methods and allow for a more efficient use of equipment and maintenance facilities.23 At this 
prospect the National Government invested over 470 million pesos, or about 70 per cent of 
the total cost of the project. 24 Money also came from the World Bank. From 1951 to 1970, 
during the same period, the Bank lent 93.7 million USD for railway construction, 
rehabilitation and improvement projects (compared with nine road projects covered with 
World Bank loans of 135.5 million USD).25 Apart from financing the Ferrocarril del 
Atlántico, the Bank also lent money to build new railway repair shops and purchase new 
equipment and spare parts.26 Therefore, although investment from both the National 
Government and the World Bank prioritised roads over railways, railways were still an 
important item in their economic development agendas. 
 
Graph 5.1 Evolution of road and rail investments from the Colombian National 
Government, 1951-1970 (millions of pesos of 1997) 
 
22 Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte’, 281-283. 
23 World Bank (WB), The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia : Summary (English), 
(Washington, D.C., 1950), 29. 
24 Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte’, 281-283. 
25 World Bank Projects and Operations http://projects.worldbank.org/ (26/04/2018) 
26 See e.g. the first railway loan from the World Bank to the Colombian Government in 1952 for a total of 






Source: Based on data from Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Anexo 
II.7B.  
 
However, investment in railways did not stop the decline of the FNC. The Ferrocarril del 
Atlántico was a disappointment: construction took longer than expected due to the lack of 
adequate preliminary studies and to execution problems that included losses related to the 
actions of subversive groups.27 Moreover, as historian Álvaro Pachón has stated, the railway 
never attracted the freight it was expected to carry as the Magdalena River maintained its 
traffic by managing to accommodate the increased demand and by remaining cheaper than 
rail transport throughout the period.28 In fact, the focus on the Ferrocarril del Atlántico might 
have had negative consequences for the railway system as it resulted in a reduced 
maintenance budget for the rest of the network. Efforts to modernise the railway system seem 
to have been too little too late. For instance, the purchase of Diesel-electric locomotives in 
1967 seems to have had counterproductive results, as the sleepers and rails were in bad 
conditions and were too light for the new heavy locomotives.29 The cost of rail transport 
increased steadily during the period, making railways unable to compete with lorries, which 
were gradually improving their service. In fact, in 1949 the cost of transporting one ton-km 
was about 1.2 pesos by road and 0.07 pesos by rail and, by 1972, the costs were 0.29 and 0.59 
 
27 WB, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia, 29; Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de 
Transporte’, 281. 
28 Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte’, 282, Cuadro II.16.  
















respectively.30 This caused a continuous decrease in railway traffic, only exacerbating the 
deficit of FNC, which historians have attributed to institutional problems, bad tariffs policy 
design, and the lack of homogeneity of the system, amongst other factors.31 
It is not surprising, therefore, that railways were increasingly losing traffic to lorries. The lack 
of coordination between rail and road transport had started in the first half of the century, but 
the second half saw the aggravation of this phenomenon.32 As we can see in Graph 5.2, even 
though both methods carried similar freight volumes (in ton-km) at the start of the period, 
and even though railway freight did increase in these two decades, freight transported by lorry 
grew significantly faster. The comparison of the land transport networks over time also shows 
how the majority of the new roads built in the 1950s and 1960s ran parallel to railways, such 
as the road connecting Bogotá to the Magdalena River and the one linking Medellín and Cali 
– and thus to the Pacific port of Buenaventura (see Annexes M and N). Indeed, while the 
FNC struggled with rising deficit and a decreasing share of goods traffic, road transport was 
becoming faster and freight suffered less damages and losses on lorries than on rails, making 
road transport cheaper, ‘even in the cases in which transport by rail was substantially lower’.33 
Therefore, the state’s failure to make the railways competitive and coordinate between rail 
and road traffic contributed to the predominance roads acquired during the period. In an easier 
and cheaper way than the railways, roads could still allow traffic continuity and growth even 
if maintenance conditions were not optimal which, in the context of a poorly planned and 
executed transport policy, put them at a clear advantage.  
 
Graph 5.2 Transport of freight by rail and lorry in Colombia in 1950, 1960 and 1975 
(ton-km) 
 
30 In pesos corrientes (nominal value). Figure does not take into account regional differences. Pachón and 
Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Cuadro II.16. 
31 See e.g. Ramírez, ‘Desarrollo de la Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, 1900-1950’, 54-55.  
32 Donald S. Barnhart, ‘Colombian Transportation Problems and Policies, 1923-1948’ (Univ. of Chicago 
D.Phil. thesis, 1953), 190-193.  
33 MOP, Parsons, Brinckerhorff, Quade & Douglas, Estudio del Transporte Nacional: Plan de 





Source: Based on data from Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Cuadro 
II.20.  
 
The limits of road construction and the unintended role of maintenance 
The majority of the money the government spent on roads was directed towards road 
construction. Although funds for maintenance represented a significant proportion, they did 
not correspond to more than 50 per cent of the annual national investment on roads throughout 
the period. Figure 5.1 illustrates how in 1950 almost 50 per cent of the budget for roads was 
spent on maintenance, and in 1958 about a third of the budget was used for this purpose.34 In 
1969, maintenance funds had once again risen to correspond to 40 per cent of annual 
expenditure on roads.35 Although these figures are not precise (and some improvements 
actually required significant reconstruction works, while construction might have also 
included expensive permanent structures such as bridges and tunnels), they do suggest that 
maintenance was not the highest investment priority of the government. In particular, 
maintenance expenditure never exceeded construction expenditure, as it did in Argentina in 
the early 1950s (see Chapter 4). 
 
Figure 5.1 Graph comparing road construction and maintenance expenditure in 
Colombia, 1949-1958 (pesos) 
 
34 MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1958 (Bogotá, 1958), 33 
35 Herman Felstehausen, ‘Planning Problems in Improving Colombian Roads and Highways’, in Ekistics 
















Note: in dark grey, maintenance. 
Source: MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1958, 33. 
 
Nevertheless, the rise in construction funds was not reflected in the extension of the road 
network. This becomes evident if we compare public investment in roads with the growth of 
the road length (see Graphs 5.3 and 5.4). While funds for road development multiplied by 
eight times, the length of the network did not even double going from 12,200 km to 19,915 
km (see Annexe O). Although it is not clear what operations the money for road construction 
was meant to fund (it is possible that the creation of materials laboratories was included, for 
example), it seems that the extension of the road length was indeed a key objective, as 
frequent complaints about the delays of construction works from the MOP and the World 
Bank suggest. In fact, some of the World Bank loans in the 1960s included road projects that 
were supposed to be finished with the help of previous loans. For instance, in 1961, the Roads 
Project financed by the Bank included the continuation of the construction of 721 km of roads 
started under earlier projects.36 
 
36 IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a Fourth Highway Project, Colombia’ (Washington D.C., 1961), i. 
[Picture removed from ethesis 





Graph 5.3 Length of the Colombian national road network, 1951-1970 (km) 
 
Source: Based on data from Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Anexo 
II.37.  
 
Graph 5.4 National investment in road development in Colombia, 1951-1970 (in million 
pesos of 1997) 
 


























































































































































































In fact, the lack of adequate planning and the consequent continuous modifications of the 
projects generated a great waste of resources and made progress on construction slow. First, 
different institutions had the power to intervene in road development decisions, which 
resulted in a lack of coherence. Although the MOP created two road development plans for 
the national road network during the period (the Plan Vial 1 and 2), the National Congress 
could also approve the construction of simultaneous road projects.37 The Congress did not 
have to coordinate its actions with the MOP and was free to evaluate the benefits of road 
projects according to its own criteria, which were often more political than economic, social, 
or technical.38 Without a general road development plan, efforts and resources were dispersed 
across many work fronts. For instance, in the year 1957-1958 approximately 142 million 
pesos were spent on isolated road projects, the equivalent of about a third of the money the 
National Government had spent in the framework of the Plan Vial 1 from 1953 to 1958.39 
Already in 1960 the Minister of Public Works had pointed out the need to concentrate efforts 
on some roads of national importance (as opposed to roads of regional relevance), but by 
1969 the lack of investment coordination was still seen by observers as a main problem for 
the Colombian road network.40  
Second, the absence of detailed preliminary studies caused costly delays and mistakes that 
considerably hindered road development in the short and long terms. In the early 1950s, the 
lack of traffic statistics, inadequate maps, and little experience in the use of machinery, 
resulted in the constant revision of the projects’ budgets during construction, which made 
planning road investments a difficult task. The Colombian road engineer Victor Archila 
argued in 1954 that the main defect of the Plan Vial 1 was the inadequacy of its initial budget. 
Planners had no knowledge of the necessary technical characteristics of each project, so they 
assumed they would all cost the same.41 This, however, was not the case, as the price of each 
type of surface was different depending on traffic, work, and environmental conditions.42 In 
addition, precise routes for the roads were not determined, and the cost of materials was based 
on conjecture.43 Therefore, the Plan ended up exceeding its original budget and taking more 
 
37 Road projects were also approved by decrees from the government during the years in which the 
Congress was closed, 1949-1957. MOP, Parsons, Brinckerhorff, Quade & Douglas, Estudio del 
Transporte Nacional: Plan de Mejoramiento para los Transportes Nacionales (Bogotá, 1962), I-31. 
38 In addition, every Departamento and Municipio had the autonomy of planning its own network, 
although for practical reasons this chapter focuses on the national road network. 
39 MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1958, 15, 20. 
40 See Felstehausen, Conceptos de Planeamiento, 2; MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1960, 340. 
41 For instance, they assumed that paving 1 km of road cost 20,000 pesos per km, and therefore 600 km of 
paving would cost 12 million pesos. Victor Archila Briceño, ‘El Segundo Plan Vial’, in Anales de 
Ingeniería de Colombia, 58 (August 1954), 12. 
42 Archila, ‘El Segundo Plan Vial’, 12. 




than ten years to complete instead of the planned three.44 The World Bank explained the slow 
progress of construction in the projects it financed in the 1950s with the following reasons: 
‘heavy seasonal rainfall, precipitous and unstable terrain, shortage of funds because of local 
inflation, and an unforeseen growth of traffic’.45 Therefore, as construction advanced, the 
World Bank found that ‘more work was required and more equipment needed than originally 
anticipated’.46 The Bank changed the standards of the roads themselves to respond to the 
increasing transport demands and constraining conditions.47 Although the availability of 
technical studies improved in the 1960s with the work of foreign studies and the emergence 
of Colombian consulting firms, errors already made were difficult to correct given that 
investments in transport infrastructure were long-term and their final product could only be 
modified in a limited way.48  
In addition to the problems generated from inadequate planning, the lack of technical support 
the MOP offered for the actual construction process also had a detrimental effect on the 
quality of the works. Although the MOP was not responsible for the construction of roads, it 
was in charge of supervising the private firms that were hired to build them, and of 
maintaining the roads after they were finished. The proportion of Colombian firms hired by 
the MOP increased during the period, but their resources and experience tended to be limited 
(at least at the beginning of the period).49 Struggling with limited staff and resources, 
however, the MOP often neglected its supervisory role. This resulted in the construction of 
roads with poor technical standards, which made maintenance more difficult and 
 
44 The Plan was supposed to cost 160 million pesos and to be finished in three years, by 1954 it was 
considered that it would cost 300 million and would take 5 to 6 years to finish. By 1958, 380 million had 
been spent. Archila, ‘El Segundo Plan Vial’, 12; MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1958, 15. 
45 IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a Fourth Highway Project, Colombia’ (Washington D.C., 1961), 1. 
46 IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a Fourth Highway Project, Colombia’ (Washington D.C., 1961), 2. 
47 Changes included a reduction of maximum gradients in mountainous terrain, reducing the severity of 
curves, increase in the width of the finished grade and the paving, higher types of surfacing because of 
weather conditions and thicker bituminous surfaces to carry heavier traffic loads. IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal 
of a Fourth Highway Project, Colombia’ (Washington D.C., 1961), 3. 
48 Felstehausen, Conceptos de Planeamiento, 2. 
49 In 1960, there were about 200 Colombian construction firms, having each no more than two or three 
machines at their disposal, and a low average of marginal monthly investment. In 1965, the budgets of 
small firms usually went from 200,000 to 400,000 pesos per month and, given the high demands, if works 
were to be finished within ‘reasonable timelines’, firms capable of keeping an investment rhythm of more 
than 1 million pesos per month were needed – which made hiring foreign firms necessary for large 
projects. By 1970, all construction in the World Bank road project included in that year’s loan was being 
carried out by Colombian contractors. Yet, the Bank thought more room could be given to foreign 
contractors as it considered the Colombian contracting industry could be strained by handling this project 
on top of the ongoing work. ACIC, Quinto Congreso, 104-105; IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of the Sixth 




demanding.50 Moreover, although the MOP had published manuals about certain aspects of 
road construction (such as geometrical standards, how to determine the best route and how to 
build bases and different surfaces, amongst others) from the beginning of the century and 
especially after the 1920s, by 1950 there were no established methods to verify the quality of 
materials or the works.51 The first volume presenting a complete description of norms and 
specifications for road construction was published in 1966 and was based on standards from 
the American Bureau of Public Roads (BPR).52 Apart from the fact that these publications 
were scarce, there is little evidence of the impact they had on road planning and construction. 
It seems they had a limited application given that in the 1970s many roads were carrying 
about three to five times more traffic than they were designed to bear.53 
In addition, the MOP did little to protect the emergent Colombian construction firms from 
going bankrupt. During the 1950s and 1960s, having a construction firm in Colombia was 
highly risky and improving the chances of having a successful venture became a priority for 
the Colombian Association of Engineering Contractors (Asociación Colombiana de 
Ingenieros Contratistas, ACIC), founded in 1954.54 Most construction contracts were made 
by unit price, which means the MOP paid firms for each project based on estimated quantities 
of items (e.g. earthworks, bases, paving, etc.) and their unit prices. If the estimate was not 
accurate, the project exceeded the budgeted cost and it was the contractor’s responsibility to 
cover for it – and this was a common phenomenon. As firms acquired more experience they 
were more likely to make precise estimates; currency devaluation, however, meant that unit 
prices became obsolete in a short amount of time.55 This was particularly problematic for 
construction firms given the long timelines of their projects.56 In 1963, the ACIC created a 
few formulas to readjust the unit prices taking into account factors such as machinery and the 
prices of materials, labour costs and administration fees.57 Although the MOP approved the 
use of the formulas, factors such as speculation and false scarcity could still put the small 
 
50 AGN, AO, MOPT, División Ingeniería de Materiales, 51-15-209, Informes – Planos – Laboratorio 
Central – Ley 4 de 1966 – Decreto No. 248/66 (1962-1968), Letter from Reinaldo Perdomo, Jefe Rama 
Técnica to Alfredo D. Bateman, Director del Ministerio (1 July 1965). 
51 Fernando Sánchez Sabogal, ‘Notas Para Una Crónica de las Especificaciones de Construcción de 
Carreteras en Colombia’, in Academia Colombiana de Historia de la Ingeniería y de las Obras Públicas, 
Apuntes Para la Historia de la Ingeniería en Colombia, VIII (2012-2013), 77-79. 
52 Sánchez Sabogal, ‘Notas Para Una Crónica’, 80. 
53 Sánchez Sabogal, ‘Notas Para Una Crónica’, 81. 
54 ACIC, Quinto Congreso, President's opening statement, 23. 
55 ACIC, Quinto Congreso, 119. 
56 ACIC, Quinto Congreso, 119. 
57 Carlos Obando V., ‘Reajuste de los Precios Unitarios en los Contratos del Ministerio de Obras 




construction firms at risk.58 In addition, construction contracts protected the state if the 
contractor failed to finish works on time (or at all). This situation was very common due to 
the lack of adequate preliminary studies, and often resulted in the bankruptcy of the firms 
and/or the abandonment of the work.59  
Therefore, although the state was expecting to promote railway traffic and expand the road 
network, it failed to do so, thus making maintenance and improvements the processes that 
ultimately allowed the increase of road traffic. This was also possible due to the loans from 
the World Bank, as road improvements (and not only construction) featured in the projects it 
financed. All of these included some type of road improvement (whether it was reconstruction 
or just paving); some of them included support for the implementation of more effective 
maintenance schemes; and two loans were issued to purchase machinery and equipment to 
be used for maintenance.60 Although new construction was important, improvements 
sometimes were first on the agenda. For instance, the first road loan in 1951 had the objective 
of building 115 km of new roads and reconstructing 2,906 km of existing ones.61 Another 
example is the road project of 1970, which envisaged the construction of a 9.5 km road and 
a bridge across the Magdalena River but, above all, provided funds to pave 1,600 km of road, 
as well as to upgrade a stretch of the road to Buenaventura (parallel to the Ferrocarril del 
Pacífico).62 
 
Improving and maintaining the Colombian road network 
 
 
58 ACIC, Quinto Congreso, 121. 
59 Francisco Manrique S., ‘Asociación de Ingenieros Contratistas. La Industria de la Construcción de 
Obras Públicas’, in Anales de Ingeniería de Colombia, 74 (April-June 1965), 13. 
60 IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on the Proposed Loan 
to the Republic of Colombia’ (Washington D.C., April 1951); IBRD, ‘Appraisal of Revised Highway 
Project in Colombia’ (Washington D.C., September 1953); IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the 
President to the Executive Directors on the Proposed Loan to the Republic of Colombia’ (Washington 
D.C., May 1956); IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a 
Proposed Loan and a Proposed Development Credit to the Republic of Colombia for a Road Project’ 
(Washington D.C., August 1961); IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive 
Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Republic of Colombia for the Fifth Highway Project’ (Washington 
D.C., July 1968); IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a 
Proposed Loan to the Republic of Colombia for the Sixth Highway Project’ (Washington D.C., April 
1970). 
61 IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on the Proposed Loan 
to the Republic of Colombia’ (Washington D.C., April 1951), 2-3. 
62 IBRD, ‘Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan 




The objectives and particular challenges 
We have seen that maintenance and improvements were the tasks which kept roads passable 
to a growing amount of traffic, but what did they entail? There were two kinds of maintenance 
work: routine and special. Routine maintenance comprised patching and correcting small 
surface defects, cleaning and repairing drainage works, fixing the traffic signs and other small 
improvements. Special maintenance corresponded to more expensive and demanding works 
that were needed to ensure the stability and functioning of the road, such as rebuilding the 
bases and the surfaces.63 Improvement works could also include paving, which would often 
require considerable reconstruction depending on the quality of the maintenance the road had 
received after being built, and also depending on the technical specifications they had when 
they were first finished. During this period, a considerable amount of paving took place. 
Paved surfaces were mostly made of asphalt.64 The government saw paving as a way of 
reducing future maintenance costs.  
As Graph 5.5 shows, although the length of unpaved roads surpassed paved roads throughout 
the period, the length of paved roads went from 100 km in 1950 to about 4,800 km by 1970.65 
However, this still represented only about 24 per cent of the total length. By 1969, paved 
roads were still a minority and there were no continuously paved roads between the centre of 
the country and the coasts.66 
 
Graph 5.5 Evolution of the national road network in Colombia, 1950-1970 (km) 
 
63 AGN, AO, MOPT, Secretaría General, 166-27, Compañía Mexicana de Consultores en Ingeniería SA 
(COMEC) and Frederic Harris Engineering Corporation, Misión Técnica COMEC-HARRIS, Información 
al Señor Ministro Acerca de las Necesidades de Equipo para la Conservación de Carreteras a Cargo del 
Ministerio (Bogotá, 1969), 3 (hereinafter: Misión Técnica COMEC-HARRIS). 
64 The high prices of concrete surfaces had limited its use to some major airports and streets in Bogotá, 
Medellín and Cali from the 1930s to the 1960s. Other factors that seem to have had an important 
influence in the choice of asphalt as the preferred paving surface in Colombia are the support of the state 
to petroleum exploitation with the creation of the Colombian Petroleum Enterprise (known today as 
Ecopetrol) and the nationalisation of the Tropical Oil Company’s concession in 1951, as well as the 
introduction of Esso and Texaco lubricants and other petroleum products from the mid-1950s onwards. 
By 1938, Colombia was producing over 200,000 tons of cement per year. Anon., ‘145 Años de Historia 
de los Pavimentos de Concreto’, in Noticreto 100 (May-June 2010), 88; Hernando Vargas Caicedo and 
Juan Pablo Ortega Samper, ‘100 Años de Cemento en Colombia, Notas Sobre Su Origen’, in Noticreto 
100 (May-June 2010), 61; Ecopetrol, https://www.ecopetrol.com.co/wps/portal/es/ecopetrol-web/nuestra-
empresa/sala-de-prensa/publicaciones/otras-publicaciones/cronica-de-la-concesion-de-mares/reversion-
de-la-concesion-de-mares (26/04/2018); Esso Mobil Colombia, https://combustiblescolombia.com/the-
transition (26/04/2018). 
65 Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Anexo II.37 





Source: Based on data from Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Anexo 
II.37.   
 
Therefore, most of the network was unpaved, which implied particular kinds of obstacles for 
maintenance. Unpaved roads were mostly made of gravel or crushed rock, sometimes 
stabilised with cement or asphalt. Engineers used different terms to talk about unpaved roads: 
earth roads, ‘motorable’ (‘carreteable’), or roads of ‘superficie afirmada’, but for practical 
reasons (and because the data usually only differentiates between paved and unpaved 
surfaces), I will use the term ‘unpaved’ to refer to all these types of surfaces. Unpaved roads 
were distinguishable from mule tracks, often known as ‘caminos de herradura’, because their 
construction involved the use of engineering knowledge and techniques in order to allow the 
traffic of motor vehicles. Given the important proportion of unpaved roads, especially those 
made of gravel, in 1966 the road engineer Guillermo Caro Mendoza published in Anales an 
article explaining the major problems around the maintenance of gravel roads, and the 
methods to solve them based on his experience. As in FWA, corrugations were a recurrent 
problem (see Chapter 3), but Colombian gravel roads also had other particular defects such 
as such the lack of verges and poor surface conditions resulting from the use of inadequate 
materials (e.g. aggregates that were too large, lack or excess of binders, deficient grading, 
amongst others).67  
 













Whether paved or not, however, roads were badly prepared to cope with the growth of traffic. 
First, the number of vehicles not only increased, their weight did as well, and roads were not 
designed to bear these ever-heavier loads. The total number of vehicles used in Colombia 
multiplied by five times from 1949 to 1970, and goods vehicles occupied an increasingly 
larger proportion of the traffic.68 The number of lorries multiplied by about three times from 
1949 to 1970, going from 16,540 to 60,442.69 The capacity of the lorries themselves doubled. 
In the 1950s, the average capacity of a lorry in Colombia was about 3 ton, in 1963 it rose to 
about 4.6 ton, and in 1969 it was about 6 ton.70 Although lorries were a significant part of the 
vehicle fleet, they were not the only vehicles used to carry goods. Jeeps and dumper trucks 
went from representing about 17 per cent of the fleet in 1950, to 38 per cent in 1970, i.e. more 
than any other category of vehicle, including lorries (see Table 5.1). However, the real 
problem with the increase of heavy traffic was that many roads were carrying significantly 
more traffic than they were designed to bear. For instance, in 1971, 70 per cent of the vehicles 
on the road from Armenia to Ibagué (considered one of the most important roads in the 
country since it connected Bogotá to Cali and thus the Pacific Ocean) were heavy lorries, and 
the road was carrying over 200 per cent of its original bearing capacity.71 Moreover, the high 
proportion of unpaved roads that were carrying heavy vehicles made maintenance works very 
difficult. In 1960, although a little over half of the unpaved roads were carrying less than 250 
vehicles per day, the rest of the unpaved roads had to bear from 250 to 2,000 vehicles per 
day.72 
 
Table 5.1 Motor vehicle fleet by type of vehicle in Colombia, 1950-1970 (in percentage) 
Year Automobiles  Lorries Buses  Jeeps, dumper 
trucks 
1950 42 28 12 17 
1960 40 24 8 28 
1970 32 20 10 38 
 
 
68 Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, Anexo II.40.  
69 Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte, Anexo II.40. 
70 Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte’, 345. 
71 Durán, ‘Análisis de la Situación’, 18. 




Source: Based on data from Pachón and Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte en Colombia, 344.  
 
In addition, the damage inflicted on the roads by heavy vehicles was exacerbated by the 
unorthodox use of the fleet. Vehicles were used about three years longer than it was 
considered safe (sometimes more) due to the high taxes on the imports of vehicles and their 
spare parts – particularly in the case of lorries.73 The common phenomenon of overloading 
also increased the damage that heavy vehicles caused to the surfaces as it facilitated the 
formation of potholes during the rains and of corrugations in the dry season. By 1970, the 
government had not managed to enforce weight regulations on lorries and a prompt 
enforcement of the norms seemed unlikely.74 The use of hybrid vehicles to carry both 
passengers and freight (often called ‘chivas’) also contributed to intensify the wear and tear 
of the surfaces, as they were not designed to carry heavy loads.  
The Colombian tropical climate and rugged topography also made road maintenance a 
challenging endeavour.75 For instance, in 1958 the MOP stated that the ‘excessive influence’ 
of meteorological factors was one of the potential causes of the rapid deterioration of asphalt 
roads, as damages were appearing very fast even on roads that had been built with optimal 
technical procedures.76 Moreover, the high temperatures of certain regions were severely 
damaging the tyres of motor vehicles to the point that some transport companies had decided 
to travel only at night on certain routes.77 Yet, perhaps the environmental factor that most 
affected road works was the scarcity of adequate construction materials. In an interview with 
Enrique Ramírez Romero, former President of the Sociedad Colombiana de Ingenieros (SCI) 
and former intern at the Central Materials Laboratory in Bogotá, he stated that the soil in 
many areas of the country, despite being very fertile, was not adequate for road works.78 
Therefore, large quantities of sand, rock and other materials had to be moved, making the 
 
73 According to a study commissioned by the MOP in 1962, a public transport vehicle should only be 
used for a maximum of five years, but in Colombia buses were used for an average of eight years. The 
study estimated that if old models were put out of circulation, this would mean retiring almost 70 per cent 
of public service vehicles. The lorry fleet was particularly old: in 1967 the fleet of lorries was 
considerably older than the fleet of buses and automobiles. MOP, Parsons, Brinckerhorff, Quade & 
Douglas, Estudio del Transporte Nacional: Plan de Mejoramiento para los Transportes Nacionales 
(Bogotá, 1962), I-29; Pachón, ‘La Infraestructura de Transporte’, 347.  
74 Weight regulations dated from 1955: 8.2 m tonnes for single axles and 14.5 m tonnes for tandem axles. 
IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of the Sixth Highway Construction Project, Colombia’ (Washington D.C., April 
1970), 12. 
75 These factors also affected construction prices. As an example, in 1969, the construction price of a 
kilometre of paved road in humid mountainous terrain could be about three times the cost of one in well-
drained flat terrain. Felstehausen, Conceptos de Planeamiento, 15. 
76 MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1958, 37. 
77 MOP, Memoria de Obras Públicas 1958, 37. 




transport of materials one of the most expensive items of a project. For instance, in 
mountainous areas it was often very difficult to find good rock, and while in some regions 
soils could have potentially been used, important resources would have been necessary to 
make them ready to use (e.g. crushing or stabilising). On top of that, given the huge diversity 
of soils, considerable time and money were also needed to determine the soil properties and 
ensure they were fit for purpose. Although the difficulty of accessing materials affected 
construction more than maintenance, it was still an essential part of improvement works, 
especially when they required significant reconstruction. 
Nonetheless, the difficulties of keeping the roads passable were ultimately determined by the 
way roads were built, used, and maintained. Traffic and environmental conditions only 
exacerbated the problems that technical structural deficiencies caused. Inadequate design, 
cleaning and maintenance of roads played an important role in the acceleration of 
deterioration processes. In 1971, the MOP lamented that almost no attention had been paid 
until then to the control of water, the exploitation of forestry resources, and the inadequate 
use of land, leading to the exacerbation of destructive processes.79 For instance, the lack of 
vegetation along the roads resulted in erosion and landslides, which could result in river 
sedimentation, and the associated increase of flood risk and reduction of water quality.80 In 
the 1960s, most unpaved roads also suffered from a lack of verges, which presented a risk not 
only for the safety of the users, but also for the adequate drainage of the roads and therefore 
for the stability of the road itself.81 In addition, ditches were neglected and often became 
blocked by crops, weeds, sedimentation and even landslide deposits.82 Moreover, inadequate 
drainage considerably increased maintenance costs. For instance, in 1969 it was considered 
that correcting road design and drainage would cut in half the cost of maintenance per 
kilometre of road, regardless of whether the road was paved or not.83 The combination of 
construction defects and maintenance neglect over time often made expensive emergency 
works necessary after heavy rains. For example, the rainy season of 1970 caused about 500 
million pesos worth of damage and some roads were only opened to traffic after three months 
of works that were not even considered permanent solutions.84  
 
79 Durán, ‘Análisis de la Situación’, 18. 
80 Durán, ‘Análisis de la Situación’, 18. 
81 Guillermo Caro Mendoza, ‘Mantenimiento de Carreteras en Grava’, in Anales de Ingeniería de 
Colombia, 75 (April-June 1966), 112. 
82 Caro, ‘Mantenimiento de Carreteras’, 111. Peasants also sometimes used ditches to grow crops causing 
landslides due to the removal of the impervious vegetation layer. Misión Técnica COMEC-HARRIS, 175. 
83 Felstehausen, Conceptos de Planeamiento, 15. 




The modernisation of maintenance: new knowledge and the existence of a Latin American 
engineering network 
To make its deficient road network fit to respond to the transport demands, the Colombian 
government considered it necessary to modernise its maintenance activities. An essential part 
of this process was the availability of specialised engineers who could understand and adapt 
modern engineering techniques to the Colombian context. This was possible because from 
the 1950s onwards, Colombian universities with engineering programmes such as the 
National University of Colombia, the Javeriana University, and Los Andes University in 
Bogotá, started introducing more specialised engineering programmes.85 Moreover, these 
institutions, along with others such as the Colombian Institute of Technical Norms (Instituto 
Colombiano de Normas Técnicas), offered short courses on soil properties, types of paving 
surfaces, and paving methods design, amongst other related topics.86 These courses usually 
took place in Bogotá and the speakers were either American experts or Colombian engineers 
with an American degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Colorado 
School of Mines, or the Universities of Harvard, Pittsburgh and Illinois.87 Although the 
government did not offer these courses, the MOP received invitations to them and it seems it 
encouraged members of its staff to attend.88 
As these courses and the education of Colombian engineers suggest, American norms and 
methods were highly influential in Colombia. In the MOP’s publications determining 
construction and maintenance norms, most of the references were American (e.g. Highway 
Research Board, the American Association of State Highway Officials, and different states’ 
road authorities).89 For instance, in 1965, the MOP published a book containing methods, 
norms and technical specifications for road construction and maintenance in which the 
American influence was evident.90 The chapter on flexible paving surfaces, for example, 
referenced the development of design methods in the US after the Second World War.91 The 
publication stated how during the war American engineers determined the thickness of paving 
surfaces through appearance and estimations, but that given the need to build a great length 
 
85 The Mines School in Medellín was also important. 
86 AGN, AO, MOPT, División Ingeniería de Materiales, 51-15-209, Informes – Planos – Laboratorio 
Central – Ley 4 de 1966 – Decreto No. 248/66 (1962-1968), Correspondencia. 
87 AGN, AO, MOPT, División Ingeniería de Materiales, 51-15-209, Informes – Planos – Laboratorio 
Central – Ley 4 de 1966 – Decreto No. 248/66 (1962-1968), Correspondencia. 
88 AGN, AO, MOPT, División Ingeniería de Materiales, 51-15-209, Informes – Planos – Laboratorio 
Central – Ley 4 de 1966 – Decreto No. 248/66 (1962-1968), Correspondencia. 
89 See for e.g. MOP, Especificaciones Normales Especificaciones Normales para la Construcción de 
Carreteras y Calles (Bogotá, 1955).  
90 MOP, Normas de Diseños y Especificaciones de Materiales para Carreteras (Bogotá, 1965). 




of roads with military purposes, the US lead several investigations into road design methods.92 
However, since these methods were still relatively recent by the mid-1960s, there was no 
consensus about which was the best. For example, to decide the method to measure soil 
bearing capacity, the Colombian MOP carried out its own research taking into account local 
materials and conditions, and after comparing different methods, such as those used in 
California, Kansas, Oregon and Wyoming, it concluded that the CBR was the one that should 
be adopted.93  
Soil stabilisation is another example of the American influence in road engineering in 
Colombia, where the scarcity of funds made this method particularly attractive (see Chapter 
2).94 Soil-cement was the most widely known stabilisation method in the country in the 1960s, 
and it was first used in the US in the 1920s.95 By 1965, experience in Colombia had shown 
that soils stabilised with cement constituted an excellent surface capable of withstanding high 
volumes of traffic if it was properly protected by a layer of bituminous material.96 For 
Colombia's traffic conditions, having about 50 per cent of heavy vehicles, it was proven that 
a base stabilised with cement was able to bear traffic of 1,000 vehicles per day without 
suffering major damages.97 However, this was also the most expensive method of stabilisation 
in the country, so it was exclusively used in roads of heavy traffic or that were so important 
that it was likely that they will develop heavy traffic.98 Great Britain also used soil 
stabilisation extensively, particularly in its African colonies, and Colombian engineers were 
well aware of the findings of the RRL on this and other topics, as we will see below. 
Although the US was the main referent in terms of road development, Colombian engineers 
also looked elsewhere for valuable knowledge and techniques. Great Britain, and in particular 
the Overseas/Tropical Section of the RRL, was an important source of knowledge for 
Colombian engineers.99 Due to the RRL's research on roads in Central and East Africa, 
engineers in Colombia found relevant its work on the comparison between transport costs on 
 
92 MOP, Normas de Diseños y Especificaciones, D120-2. 
93 See Chapter 2. MOP, Normas de Diseños y Especificaciones, D120-2. 
94 MOP, Normas de Diseños y Especificaciones, D150-1. 
95 MOP, Normas de Diseños y Especificaciones, D150-5. 
96 Hiram B. Preston, ‘La Estabilización de Suelos Como Una Solución al Problema de Mantenimiento de 
las Carreteras Colombianas’, in Anales de Ingeniería de Colombia, 74 (September-October 1965), 33. 
97 Preston, ‘La Estabilización de Suelos’, 33. 
98 Preston, ‘La Estabilización de Suelos’, 33. 
99 France and Germany were also significant influence. For instance, French hydraulic laboratories were 
sometimes consulted in complicated cases, such as for the Ciénaga-Barranquilla road. In addition, a 
German mission visited the Central Laboratory in 1967 to assess its efficiency. AGN, AO, MOPT, 
División Ingeniería de Materiales, 4-2-418, Carretera Ciénaga-Barranquilla, Informes – Planos (1956-
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paved and unpaved surfaces. For instance, in an article in 1965, the engineer Guillermo Caro 
mentioned an article written by R.S. Millard and R.S.P. Bonney from the RRL on the 
operation costs of buses and lorries on different surfaces in Africa.100 The conclusion Caro 
extracted from this article was that transport costs varied more between badly and properly 
maintained unpaved roads, than between paved and well-kept unpaved roads. Therefore, an 
unpaved road, if properly maintained, could bring similar benefits than a paved road, for a 
considerably lower price.101 Although this research originated in Great Britain, it is worth 
noting that in this particular case, the article was accessed via Road International (the journal 
belonging to the originally American-based International Road Federation).102  
Furthermore, although American and European experts were major references, the technical 
specifications of countries such as Mexico, Argentina, and Chile were also consulted for the 
elaboration of local maintenance and construction norms.103 Sebastián Ospina, the most 
prominent Colombian advocate of roads, and of motorable unpaved roads in particular, 
acknowledged that he had first encountered ‘carreteables’ for public service in Argentina in 
the 1920s. At the time, Ospina travelled to Buenos Aires to attend the first Pan-American 
Highway Congress in 1925, taking the opportunity to travel across Argentina and other South 
American countries. In Argentina, in the mountainous area of Sierras de Córdoba, he saw for 
the first time roads that were ‘less about science’ and more about ‘daring to vanquish the 
difficulties of a rugged topography’.104 He then went onto Brazil and Venezuela, where he 
learned that there were thousands of kilometres of ‘carreteables’ which were maintained ‘with 
such care that the lack of rigour in their specifications was forgotten’.105 Although he might 
be exaggerating the success of these countries to convince his colleagues of the desirability 
of motorable unpaved roads, it is telling that his first encounter with this approach to road 
building took place in other South American countries. It is also worth noting that the very 
opportunity that prompted his trip (the Pan-American Highway Congress) was orchestrated 
by the US in the first place.  
 
100 R.S. Millard and R.S.P. Bonney, ‘The Costs of Operating Buses and Trucks on Roads with Different 
Surfaces in Africa’, in Road International (June, 1965), 18-23, 26-27, quoted in Caro, ‘Mantenimiento de 
Carreteras’, 115. 
101 Caro, ‘Mantenimiento de Carreteras’, 115. 
102 This article was quoted in World Bank reports in 1967 and as late as 1987, when it was still considered 
valuable to discuss the economic appraisal of transport projects despite giving ‘out-of-date information on 
vehicle operating costs’. IBRD, Hans A. Adler, Sector and project planning in transportation 
(Washington D.C., 1967); IBRD, Hans A. Adler, Economic Appraisal of Transport Projects. A Manual 
With Case Studies, Revised and Expanded Edition (Washington D.C., 1987), 327.  
103 MOP, Especificaciones Normales, Part 1. 
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In addition, Mexico and Argentina seem to have had a particularly influential role in 
Colombia in terms of road engineering and administration. For instance, Mexico’s experience 
was referenced when creating a programme of financing low traffic rural roads (‘caminos 
vecinales’). In 1961, Anales published an article on Mexico’s system of ‘Caminos Vecinales’ 
with the objective of extracting lessons from the problems they encountered, such as the poor 
road conditions resulting from the expectation that nearby inhabitants would take care of 
maintenance themselves.106 In 1960, Colombia created its Fondo Nacional de Caminos 
Vecinales, independent from the MOP. Although the fund’s progress was very slow and only 
took off in the 1970s and 1980s, thirty years after its creation Mexico was still considered a 
pioneer and an example of this type of road financing method.107 Apart from the example of 
the mountain ‘carreteables’, Argentina’s influence can be illustrated with the use of a 
document produced by the Argentinian Dirección Nacional de Vialidad as the basis for a 
Colombian compilation of road terminology in 1968.108 Concerned about the diversity of 
terms used in road construction and maintenance, Argentinian engineers put together a list of 
definitions of the main road engineering terms used in different countries, including their 
equivalent in English, French and sometimes Portuguese. The Colombian MOP adapted this 
document including some suggestions made by the SCI. For instance, to define maintenance, 
after considering the words used for it in different languages and countries (e.g. maintenance 
in English, ‘entretien’ in French, ‘mantenimiento’ in Nicaragua), the MOP decided to use 
‘conservación’, the term also used in Argentina (since they thought ‘mantenimiento’ was 
related to sustenance).109 Yet, the MOP adopted a definition of maintenance proposed by the 
SCI: ‘works necessary so that any type of road or structure maintains conditions of adequate 
service’, thus moving away from the definition accepted by the 2nd Meeting of the Technical 
Commission of Terminology of the Pan-American Highway Congress (i.e. ‘works done to 
avoid that any road or structure loses permanently the characteristics of the built work’).110 
 
106 Anon. ‘Los Caminos Vecinales de México’, in Anales de Ingeniería de Colombia, 67 (August-
September 1961), 16. 
107 The Fund provided on average 66.7 million pesos per year in the 1960s, while in the 1970s, it provided 
on average 252.7 million pesos per year. However, there is little data on the actual progress of the 
Caminos Vecinales. Broadly speaking, in its first 30 years of existence, the programme built and did 
improvement works on almost 31,000 km of unpaved roads. MOP, Fondo Nacional de Caminos 
Vecinales, 1986-1990. 30 Años (Bogotá, 1990), 12, 19. 
108 AGN, AO, MOPT, Secretaría General, 197-32, Términos de la Sección 2 – Construcción y 
Conservación de Obras Viales (1968).  
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The modernisation of maintenance: new machines and how to work with them 
The other significant transformation that maintenance underwent in this period was the 
acceleration of mechanisation. Indeed, one of the most important investments made with the 
money destined for maintenance (from both the National Government and the World Bank 
loans) was the expansion of the machinery. As the MOP was struggling to keep up, the lack 
of machinery was identified as one of the most determinant obstacles for the development of 
the road network.111 For the MOP, in 1945, the purchase of a bulldozer Caterpillar TD7 
(considered to be as efficient as 80 workers) presented the advantage of not demanding paid 
holidays, sick leave, costly safe and hygienic working conditions, life insurance or severance 
packages.112 In the 1950s, the first loan from the World Bank involved the acquisition of 
heavy equipment, given the mountainous terrain and the consequent need to move 
considerable amounts of material.113 By 1958, the MOP had at its disposal 206 motor-graders, 
242 tractors, 660 dumper trucks, and 145 rollers, amongst others.114 Ten years later, in 1969, 
the MOP had 377 motor-graders, 32 agricultural tractors, 250 crawler tractors (Caterpillar D5 
or alike), 1,086 dumper trucks, and 197 rollers, amongst others.115 Road construction was 
also mechanising rapidly during this period, but given that it was carried out by private firms, 
finding information and figures is difficult. In 1957, however, the MOP gave an estimate of 
the number of machines owned by private construction companies. Their fleet included 177 
bulldozers, 53 motor-graders, 160 tractors, and 503 dumper trucks, which was comparable to 
the MOP’s fleet at the time.116 The majority of the machines used in Colombia were 
American. Indeed, when calculating the price of any road works, to determine how much 
investment was required for machinery and/or spare parts, only the price of the certified dollar 
and the American price indexes were considered, as most machines came from the US.117 
This was in great part due to the fact that the money available to purchase machinery came 
from the World Bank, and buying American brands was often a condition of the loans. 
Therefore, although Ruston (UK), Massey Ferguson (Canada) and Komatsu (Japan) 
machines could be found, Caterpillar was ubiquitous, and other American brands were the 
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norm (e.g. Barber Greene, Austin, Bucyrus, International, Allis-Chalmers).118 Similarly, 
General Motors, Dodge and Ford were the most common brands of lorries.119  
Although the number and type of machines used in Colombia were similar to the ones 
carrying out maintenance work in French West Africa, there was a big difference: the dumper 
truck. First created in the US in the 1930s, the motorised dumper truck was designed to 
transport heavy materials replacing dump railcars and wagons.120 After the Second World 
War, new models of these trucks were created to be able to carry heavier loads by increasing 
the size and the number of wheels, amongst other modifications.121 Other ‘off-highway’ 
trucks (i.e. too heavy and wide to circulate on most public roads) were also created in the 
1960s, such as the articulated dumper truck.122 Dumper trucks were used extensively in 
Colombia: they were the most numerous piece of equipment used. These vehicles facilitated 
the transportation of heavy materials over long distances, an expensive but necessary effort 
due to the types of rock and soil that were most frequent in the country (as previously 
mentioned). However, Colombia did not use the largest vehicles available on the market: the 
trucks used in the late 1960s were able to carry 3 to 5 Yd3, while trucks carrying up to 10 Yd3 
were already available since at least the early 1960s.123 This is not surprising, as the larger 
and heavier the vehicles, the wider, harder, and more stable the roads needed to be.  
The acquisition of new machines required new knowledge from the workers. During the 
1950s and the early 1960s, most road workers had learned by doing, working alongside 
foreign and national engineering firms.124 In 1957, the creation of the National Vocational 
Training Agency (‘Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje’, or SENA), with the support of the 
International Labour Organisation, marked an important moment in the history of labour in 
the country as the institution aimed to provide technical education in the fields of agriculture, 
mining, commerce, and industry. The SENA generated the first generation of Colombian 
topographers, for example, and thus played an important role in the modernisation of road 
development.125 However, it is likely that the SENA’s impact was only felt at least a few 
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years after its foundation. The MOP also played a role in the formation of machine operators 
and mechanics. The following picture illustrates some of this training (Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2 Mechanics of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas in training, ca 1957 
 
Source: Mechanics training on a Caterpillar D7. MOP, Realizaciones de Obras Públicas Nacionales, 135. 
 
Workers were not the only ones that needed to learn how to work with machines. Engineers 
and administrative staff had to deal with questions such as how many machines were needed, 
of what kind, and how to plan their necessary maintenance and repairs, amongst many others. 
This was not a straightforward process. For instance, the MOP often struggled with the fact 
that their machines had diverse models, which made the provision of spare parts difficult.126 
In 1955, the engineer Gustavo Uribe published an article on the mechanisation of road 
maintenance, focusing on how to organise the works. He suggested dividing the work 
between units that were adapted to particular kinds of work (and not have one type of unit 
dealing with different kinds of tasks).127 Learning how to work with machines meant 
 
126 Misión Técnica COMEC-HARRIS, 142. 
127 He differentiated between eight different types of unit organisation going from the gangs with no 
machines (mostly in charge of repairing potholes and cleaning culverts and ditches over about 2 to 5 km 
of road), to the flying units – a temporary organisation that operated only in times of high demand, like 
the rainy season, performing urgent works with the help of a motor grader, dumper trucks, a loader, and a 
dozen workers and operators. Another type of unit, the local one, was the most common kind of group. In 
charge of the routine maintenance of the same road section all year long (about 100 km long), the local 
units comprised each in their simpler version only three men, one lorry and its driver. Gustavo Uribe, ‘La 
Mecanización de las Operaciones de Conservación de Carreteras’, in Anales de Ingeniería de Colombia, 
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understanding that the quality of mechanised maintenance did not depend solely on the 
availability of the machines. First, for optimal results, each machine should be used for 
particular purposes. For instance, bulldozers, more common in construction than in 
maintenance works, were only used to collect aggregates and additional materials as part of 
the surface improvement process.128 Second, keeping a machine and its operator together, 
working as a team, was considered advantageous. This work organisation improved the 
quality of the work over time and minimised damage to the machines.129 Nevertheless, this 
was often not possible, given that there were more units than machines and often 1 motor-
grader carried out work on more than 200 km of road.130 This division of tasks between 
different types of units was inspired by the example of different American road 
departments.131 In the 1950s, there seems to have been a debate in the US around how much 
ground one maintenance unit should cover. Maintaining a wide terrain facilitated a better use 
of equipment, while staying local gave the workers a sense of belonging and appreciation, as 
well as improved efficiency because they would get to know the terrain in more detail.132 
Uribe sided with the local approach given the long-term benefits it appeared to offer, even if 
the other one seemed cheaper at first.133 For Colombian engineers to apply this type of work 
organisation, however, many adaptations were necessary. One of the most prominent 
differences was the scarcity of specialised road building and maintaining machines, which 
resulted in the adaptation of other, more accessible ones, such as dumper trucks and 
tractors.134 
The limits of maintenance: the administrative obstacles 
Despite the efforts to modernise maintenance, this process was hindered by the poor 
organisation of tasks. The MOP distributed roadworks between 19 public works districts, or 
‘Distritos de Obras Públicas’.135 Until the late 1960s, these Distritos were not only in charge 
of carrying out maintenance, but also of supervising the work of private construction firms 
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and sometimes even of doing some construction themselves.136 The MOP was not supposed 
to carry out construction work, but the Congress had the power to add roads that had been 
built by Departamentos or Municipios to the national network and since these roads had 
usually low technical standards, and were sometimes not even finished, the MOP often had 
to build or rebuild them before being able to start maintaining or paving them.137 Given that 
the MOP did not have sufficient staff, the engineers overseeing maintenance and construction 
were often the same people.138 Moreover, the length of roads for which each Distrito was 
responsible did not reflect its administrative capacity. The jurisdiction of the Distritos 
corresponded roughly to the political division of the country. This geographical division 
meant that the length of roads each Distrito had to maintain varied significantly. Some 
Distritos were responsible for more than 1,500 km of roads, while others oversaw the 
maintenance of less than 500 km – although most of them were in between these two 
figures.139 This distribution of responsibilities disregarded not only the number of kilometres 
per Distrito but also, more importantly, whether each Distrito had the administrative capacity 
to manage its road length. Therefore, while some Distritos struggled to acquire enough 
resources, others were not taking full advantage of theirs.140 
The way each Distrito was managed also caused difficulties and delays. Until 1969, each 
Distrito had the autonomy to choose its own institutional structure, and there was only one 
Distrito that had the official position of administrative manager.141 There were no technicians 
or engineers in charge of organising and supervising maintenance operations, which meant 
that usually the person in charge of maintenance in the field was also responsible for 
coordinating the works at a larger scale.142 Engineers usually delegated these tasks to foremen 
with little experience and limited knowledge of how to coordinate large-scale maintenance 
works, and in particular of how to acquire adequate materials and equipment.143 Machinery 
and equipment were not controlled by each Distrito, but by the central offices of the 
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Equipment Division, which formed part of the Maintenance branch of the MOP. 144 However, 
machine maintenance and repair were not centralised; they were carried out in a central 
workshop in Bogotá and in smaller workshops in each Distrito as well. These processes were 
badly coordinated, and the lack of adequate inventories and norms to regulate maintenance 
and operation caused costly delays.145 The organisation of the operators’ work also wasted 
time and resources. The hasty construction of camps could often result in long commutes for 
workers and machinery.146 Despite the increasing availability of trained operators, the 
Distritos were often short of money to cover the living costs of the operators whenever they 
needed to stay away from their homes.147 In addition, every operator was hired to work with 
a particular kind of machine and, frequently, while a machine was being repaired its operator 
remained idle (while being paid a salary), even if he had the ability to use another type of 
machine.148 The lack of an adequate and coordinated use of machines and tools, as well as of 
their timely and effective maintenance, led to great losses of machinery and equipment. 
Indeed, despite the increasing number of machines, a significant proportion of them were in 
such bad condition that they could not be used. For instance, about half of the machines the 
MOP owned in 1958 were in poor or average condition and, ten years later, a third of the 
motor-graders were no longer usable, as well as almost half of the dumper trucks. 149 This 
was also the result of the use of poor quality materials, of the lack of adequate repairs and 
maintenance of the machines, and of the operation and storage of machines for more than ten 
years, i.e. well over their intended lifespan.150 As a consequence, a great deal of manual 
maintenance was still taking place, even in the early 1970s. For instance, manual labour was 
used to clear vegetation from ditches.151 However, given the large length of unpaved roads, 
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more motor-graders were needed, and while blades were attached to dumper trucks for the 
superficial levelling of unpaved roads, motor-graders were necessary for the deeper levelling 
that these roads required.152 Therefore, in 1969 the MOP commissioned a study to determine 
how best to confront the continuous maintenance problems of the network. The consulting 
firms (Compañía Mexicana de Consultores en Ingeniería SA and Frederic Harris Engineering 
Corporation) concluded the MOP should buy 21 crawler tractors (costing 28,000 US dollars 
each), 38 rock crusher plants (at 90,000 US dollars each), 426 dumper trucks (for a total of 
2.6 million USD) and 89 motor-graders (at 18,500 USD each), amongst other machines.153 In 
total, it was estimated that the MOP needed to invest 21.4 million USD in machinery to 
respond in an appropriate manner to the maintenance demands. The study also recommended 
an administrative reorganisation to make the MOP more efficient. As a part of this new 
organisation, a list of the machines per number of kilometres of maintained road was 
suggested. In this list, dumper trucks still had a central role, as Annexe P illustrates.  
In addition, the amount of paving the MOP carried out during these decades seems to have 
been excessive, according to the World Bank. Although the Bank was on board with paving 
a large proportion of the roads included in road projects in the early 1950s, by the late 1960s 
the Bank considered the Colombian Government was paving more than strictly necessary. In 
1951, in the framework of the World Bank’s first loan for road development, the Bank 
accepted to provide more funds to pave 50 per cent of the roads included in the project –and 
not 15 per cent as originally intended– at the request of the Colombian Government.154 This 
was considered adequate given the rising transport demands and heavy rains. Nevertheless, 
in 1968, the Bank pointed out that the MOP had ‘a tendency… to provide heavier and more 
elaborate pavements than absolutely necessary’.155 This was attributed to the fact that the 
MOP was trying to compensate with paved surfaces the deficiencies of the drainage 
infrastructure.156 However, this was not yielding good results and the World Bank suggested 
the use of more ‘low cost paving methods, such as single and multiple surface treatments, 
which would probably be appropriate for many highways in Colombia’.157 The slow adoption 
of these methods was probably related to the cost of finding adequate materials for this kind 
of soil treatment and stabilisation, as well as to the slow progress of the materials laboratories 
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in the country; nonetheless, it seems that the MOP was spending unnecessary amounts on 
paving.  
Furthermore, the definition of road maintenance was wide enough to include not only the 
physical condition and stability of the road, but also concerns about the information available 
to and the safety of the user. Maintenance works therefore included placing and maintaining 
traffic signs along the roads, as well as ensuring good road visibility.158 In 1955, the first 
speed limit signs were placed in the country, 30,000 manuals about appropriate drivers’ 
behaviour were distributed, and the first road markings were painted.159 Road markings were 
painted with an imported machine and although in 1956 there were only five machines, in the 
same year there were already 474 km of roads with marked carriageways, and 673 km in the 
following year.160 However, the advances on road safety and signage were slow, and the work 
of the road police is an example of this. The ‘Unidad Vial’ grew from having 20 men and no 
vehicles at its creation in 1955, to having 80 men and 25 vehicles in 1958.161 The objective 
of this force was to prevent traffic infractions and accidents, respond and act as an 
intermediary when accidents did happen, offer mechanical support and guidance to drivers, 
and protect roads from damages inflicted by people, animals and machines.162 The protection 
of the road included road maintenance activities as well, both routine and special (see Figure 
5.3). In 1957, traffic infractions and road maintenance interventions were the second most 
frequent activities of the Unidad Vial, the first being offering mechanical support to vehicles 
on the roads.163 Other infractions included driving without a license, overloading vehicles, 
driving to the left, herding cattle on the roads, cycling, and being aggressive towards the road 
police.164 The MOP was also responsible for the health of its staff. The MOP had modern 
medical equipment in the major cities and ports, as well as mobile health units. Concerns 
about hygiene and access to food, medicines and other supplies in construction camps started 
in the mid-1940s.165 By the late 1950s, although construction firms were meant to tend to the 
health of their workers and the hygienic conditions of their camps, the MOP also offered 
dentist services, equipment to test workers’ blood and lungs, and an X-ray machine.166 Thus, 
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the MOP had a relatively comprehensive plan to improve working conditions and the 
experience of the road users. However, this objective was perhaps overambitious for the 
situation at the time, and might have ended up diverting scarce resources into less urgent 
activities, slowing down the modernisation of the road infrastructure.  
 
Figure 5.3 The Unidad Vial learns how to operate a motor-grader, ca 1957 
 
Source: MOP, Realizaciones de Obras Públicas Nacionales, 171.  
 
Finally, security issues also hindered the work of the MOP. Given the context of political 
violence in the country, attacks against transport infrastructure, camps, warehouses and other 
transport and communications works and facilities were common. The actions of subversive 
groups delayed some construction works.167 In 1966, a decree established that any damage, 
destruction or interruption of these (or other related activities, such as petroleum exploitation) 
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was punishable by jail sentences of five to ten years.168 This was a continuous problem during 
the period (and beyond), generating great human and material losses.169  
Already in 1961, the World Bank had pointed out that the existing maintenance organisation 
was ‘inadequate not only to protect the investment being made in new roads but also to 
conserve the existing network’.170 Only in the mid- and late-1960s, however, with the advice 
of foreign consultants, a restructuration of the maintenance operations began. Therefore, by 
1970, and despite the importance and efforts taken to modernise maintenance, the road 
network was still suffering from the interruption of the traffic. Despite poor conditions, roads 
managed, however, to support the heavy traffic of a nation that became dependent on its road 




In the 1950s and 1960s, road transport became the major land transport method in Colombia. 
The massive increase in heavy motor vehicles was only possible due to maintenance efforts 
and to the modernisation of improvement and maintenance operations. These processes were 
not part of a clear national policy, but rather a consequence of the state’s failed railway and 
road construction endeavours. Maintaining roads passable for growing traffic was 
challenging not only because of the constraining traffic and environmental conditions, but 
also due to the low technical standards of the roads, which often made costly reconstruction 
works necessary. In view of these obstacles, the MOP had no choice but to mechanise and 
make the maintenance process more efficient, as well as to promote the adoption of modern 
engineering knowledge and techniques. Colombian engineers learned from not only Europe 
and the US, but also from other Latin American countries.  
Nevertheless, the results of MOP’s efforts were limited by its inability to coordinate 
maintenance, supervise construction, and provide clear technical road standards. Therefore, 
although the road network managed to respond to the transport demands, the condition of the 
network was never optimal but, in fact, highly deficient. This case shows how a developing 
nation struggled to respond to its urgent transport demands by multiplying its work fronts 
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without a clear plan of action, thus limiting its effectiveness. Maintenance was in this case an 
unintended way of keeping roads open to traffic, even if it was still weather dependent. Roads, 
perhaps better than railways, could allow traffic continuity and growth even given deficient 
conditions. This fact, in the context of funds scarcity and a poorly planned and executed 






This thesis is the first historical study of twentieth-century road construction and maintenance 
at a global scale. Roads are obviously a critical component of the expansion of transport in 
the twentieth century, though their development has been ignored, and often misunderstood. 
This thesis has highlighted for the first time the expansion and the modification that road 
networks experienced around the world from 1930 to 1970 – and especially the 
transformation of road construction and maintenance processes after the Second World War. 
This thesis showed that much road development, particularly in the developing world, did not 
revolve around passenger transport, but about around freight traffic. It has also showed the 
crucial importance of unpaved roads. Many roads, including those built in the 1930s, were 
built as what were called low-cost roads. Built down to a price, rather than up to a standard, 
the low-cost roads of the developing world, were designed to be improved over time – hence 
making maintenance and improvements essential to ensure future circulation. In fact, this 
thesis has shown that maintenance and upgradeability were the crucial factors that allowed 
low-cost roads to bear the rapidly growing heavy traffic of the post-1945 period.  
It therefore represents a decisive shift away from the main themes of the existing 
historiography which focus on cars, motorways, tourism and leisure, and policy for road 
building. It also represents a notable shift in how we understand transport globally in the mid-
twentieth century, by focusing on roads, rather than airplanes and railways. 
Moving away from the main focus of the historiography on US road construction and its 
international influence (i.e. mostly traffic engineering and motorways), this thesis has pointed 
out for the first time that American road building and maintaining were the predominant 
model for the evolution of the standards, methods and equipment associated with low-cost 
construction. This significantly adds to our understanding of the influence of the US in the 
post-war period, as it held sway in British and French territories, where one might assume 
that this influence was less pronounced. Professional networks of engineers were crucial for 
the circulation and adaptation of this model across the world.  
The case studies of Argentina, Colombia, Algerian Sahara and French West Africa all tell the 
story of roads acquiring a rising share of the transport of goods in places with both large and 




policies or depending on the export of raw materials, in colonial and independent contexts. 
Natural environments (not only climate and topography but also, in particular, soils and 
rocks) often made construction and maintenance expensive. However, what was truly 
challenging was the lack of knowledge about how to build motorable roads in these 
conditions, rather than the conditions themselves.  
This thesis has made the case for studying the materiality of twentieth-century roads, as road 
length was but one of the factors that ensured the circulation of motor vehicles. In fact, this 
thesis showed that maintenance and improvement works were essential to allow the increased 
use of roads over time, as generally speaking the rate of traffic growth was faster than the 
pace of new road construction after 1945. Studying the physical properties of roads tells us 
not only about the changing load-bearing capacity of roads, but also about the emergence of 
new road construction and maintenance techniques and equipment that originated in the US, 
and quickly spread across the world in the post-war period.  
* 
This thesis has challenged the type of questions that have dominated the histories of 
twentieth-century roads, transport, and technology in several ways. First, by adopting a global 
perspective, this thesis has allowed us to appreciate the magnitude that road development 
acquired in this period, not only in Europe and the US, but also in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. Although the cases of French West Africa, the Algerian Sahara, Argentina, and 
Colombia are explored in more detail, this thesis also examined in broad terms road 
engineering in the US and the French and British empires. This large-scale approach also 
made evident that, despite the diversity of social, political, and economic contexts, road 
construction and maintenance in developing countries and colonies shared significant 
features. Not only did these roads face similar challenges, the techniques and tools at the 
disposal of road engineers and workers were also alike, as they were the product of the 
adaptation of road-related knowledge and equipment that originated mostly in the US. 
Furthermore, the case studies also showed that acquiring experience in the national/colonial 
contexts was vital for the success of road construction and maintenance programmes. 
Twentieth-century roads were therefore not only factors of globalisation, but also the result 
of it, as their evolution cannot be understood without the consideration of these transnational 
exchanges and the varied yet homologous shapes that road-related knowledge and equipment 




Second, although focusing on roads, this thesis builds on recent studies that examine the 
relationship between various transport methods, and between roads and railways in particular. 
This thesis has demonstrated that roads competed with railways as main goods carriers in 
countries whose main routes were not all paved throughout and whose national networks were 
mostly unpaved. In Colombia and Argentina they did so despite the nationalisation of the 
railways. In fact, a transport policy that successfully coordinated roads and railways eluded 
these two countries during the period, as railway networks suffered from a constant decline 
of conditions and service, while roads absorbed a rising share of freight traffic – for which 
they were poorly prepared. The coordination between the two methods appears to have been 
less problematic in French West Africa, where the relatively small railway network and the 
centralisation of transport planning seem to have contributed to avoiding this problem. 
However, roads did carry higher volumes of freight than railways during the period.  
In addition, this thesis added to the debate regarding the competitiveness of roads versus 
railways by suggesting that roads gained an advantageous position because they were more 
easily upgradeable, required a relatively low initial investment, and offered the possibility of 
allowing circulation even with low technical standards and poor maintenance conditions. 
Other factors were indeed important. The lobby of road-related industries and associations, 
the influence of politicians, local populations, and private firms, and the flexibility and 
savings that road transport offered (especially in contexts in which railway networks were 
highly fragmented) are all major phenomena that demand further research, and especially 
regarding the way they interacted with one another. Yet, those analyses should not forget the 
role that the material characteristics of low-cost roads played in these phenomena. In fact, it 
is significant that the provisional and suboptimal character of low-cost roads was not a 
deterrent to build them, but indeed part of the reason why they were built, even if it meant 
risking higher future expenditure. Similarly, although maintenance and upgrades were crucial 
for keeping roads open, the resources and efforts to perform these activities were often less 
readily available than those for new construction. Compared to railways, roads minimised 
public investment in the short- to medium-term and provided a quick, if makeshift, solution 
to transport demands.  
Roads have not only attracted limited attention in comparison to other transport methods in 
the twentieth century, they have also until recently remained largely unproblematic categories 
in the histories of transport, mobility, and technology. Despite the fact that road use has been 
a common topic, lorries and other goods vehicles have remained marginal in most analyses. 




road development in particular, and for transport and globalisation history in general. 
Moreover, what happens on roads is deeply linked to their materiality. As some 
anthropologists have pointed out, paved and unpaved roads generate very different dynamics 
and acquire distinct meanings for both users and authorities.1 This thesis did not focus on the 
impact of roads, but by studying roads’ characteristics and how they came to be, my research 
has shed light on a number of issues that have so far attracted limited attention: the 
transformation and role of unpaved surfaces, the importance of road freight, and the study of 
how the knowledge to build and maintain roads was produced and moved around the world. 
The fact that British and French colonial engineers actively adopted and adapted American 
approaches in order to further the objectives of the colonial state, opens new avenues of 
inquiry for the histories of transport and technology, but also of empire, science, and 
development. Following the example of historians who have questioned the direction in 
which knowledge has usually been considered to circulate, this thesis also highlights the 
influence that the experience of French engineers in Africa exerted in the development of 
materials laboratories in France.  
The conclusions reached by this thesis also hold other broad implications for histories of 
twentieth-century technology in the developing world. Moving beyond issues of local agency, 
taking materiality seriously allows us to understand the challenges, implications and 
consequences of road development. This approach also reveals that these phenomena were 
shaped by dynamic movements of people, money, knowledge and machines related to road 
development at different scales. These exchanges indeed reflect political and economic 
inequalities at different scales, but my research points to the need to take into account 
technical pragmatism and professional engineering networks in order to fully understand the 
way technical knowledge and instruments have moved around the world.  
In addition, maintenance acquired a central role in this thesis, advancing recent initiatives that 
seek to study and underscore this often neglected aspect of technological development. The 
history of roads is a story of maintenance, which begins not after their use, but from their 
design itself. Beyond being a historiographical and methodological move, the centrality of 
maintenance seeks to reflect the importance that engineers accorded to it. In addition, the 
example of roads has illustrated how innovative maintenance can be, as road maintenance 
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was often more about gradually creating something new, rather than about returning roads to 
their original state. Moreover, maintenance is also an instance of the importance of 
management experience. In fact, the successful mechanisation of maintenance was as much 
(or perhaps even more) a matter of distributing the work and planning the purchase of spare 
parts, as it was about importing heavy machinery. In other words, although maintenance was 
rarely prioritised and often disregarded, the limitations to its success came more from the 
approach to maintenance rather than from its absolute neglect. 
This thesis also provided insights into the interactions between roads and the environment in 
a way that went beyond ecological damage and aesthetic concerns – the topics that have 
predominated in this type of analysis. The natural environment was an important influence 
on road development. Topography and climate often made works expensive and difficult, and 
the processes of adaptation of road engineering knowledge to local conditions were highly 
demanding. Funds limitations and the urgency of demands often meant that roads open to 
traffic were experimental, since controlled full-size experiments were concentrated in 
developed countries. Two conclusions stand out in relation to the type of challenge that the 
natural environment represented for road construction and maintenance. First, it was often 
the lack of knowledge about local environments (and in particular about how they would 
interact with road engineering approaches designed for different contexts), rather the 
environmental conditions themselves, that made construction and maintenance truly 
challenging. Second, many of the obstacles that could be identified as ‘natural’ were actually 
the result of human intervention in the first place. As the chapter on Colombia has explained, 
for example, problems related to heavy rains were not just caused by the tropical climate, but 
also by deficient drainage structures, poor maintenance, and by the erosion that originated in 
a lack of vegetation along the roads, among other factors. 
Furthermore, this thesis builds on recent attempts to provide new accounts of the role that 
experts have played within development projects. Experimentation and make-do practices 
were an important part of road development in the developing world, where constraining 
environmental and financial conditions constituted powerful incentives. Engineers were 
conscious of the complexity of the conditions they faced, and constantly sought ways of 
adapting road engineering knowledge, methods, and equipment to local traffic and 
environmental contexts, as well as of creating new approaches and tools if necessary. The 
limited experience of engineers and construction firms in the late 1940s and early 1950s (and 
sometimes later) did result in the rapid failure of some roads, but this does not seem to have 




difficulties, the unprecedented and rapidly increasing traffic densities, the novelty of the task 
of building motorable roads (in the developing world, but also in general), as well as to low-
cost construction. The adoption of palliative solutions was common to projects in both 
colonial and independent contexts. Exploring how pervasive this logic was is a topic that 
would benefit from further research, but it is clear that the model of Seeing like a State does 
not apply to roads or road engineers.2 
* 
Taking a global perspective has come largely at the expense of the detailed analysis of specific 
road projects or secondary and tertiary networks. Further work concentrating, for instance, 
on a particular road and its transformation over time would likely produce valuable insights 
into the adaptation and innovation of engineers’ activities to changing demands and evolving 
tools and techniques. The ancient Great Trunk Road (stretching from Calcutta in Eastern India 
to Kabul in today’s Afghanistan) could be a good case for such study, as it continues to be 
used today, and its evolution in the twentieth century tells a story that combines concrete and 
unpaved surfaces, lorries and bullock carts, as well as modern steel bridges and ancient resting 
facilities for travellers. Moreover, even though traffic surveys are rare for this period, a 
smaller geographical scope would probably facilitate the juxtaposition of traffic data with 
that of the type of surface provided on different stretches of roads. Adopting a reduced scale 
could also make possible an oral history approach, which would no doubt deepen our 
understandings of the life trajectories and daily tasks of engineers, foremen, machine 
operators, and other workers (especially in places where road engineering publications are 
less common or detailed).  
While this thesis has sketched out the importance of mechanisation, due to space and time 
constraints it has not dealt substantively with the evolution of road-building machinery and 
other related equipment – including materials laboratories’ instruments. There is abundant 
material available to further our knowledge on these objects, which have played major parts 
in the construction of the twentieth-century world. The archives of the RRL in London, for 
example, are a rich source of material on the evolution of soil studies in Africa and South 
East Asia, as well as on the increasing use of aerial photography and methods to interpret the 
resulting images. The history of the emergence and evolution of this type of facilities in the 
developing world would likely also tell us a great deal about the patterns of exchange and 
marginalisation that have characterised the spread of technical knowledge around the world. 
 




Further research on the production, adaptation, and use of such transformative objects and 
organisations is needed to better understand how modern infrastructure came to be, as well 
as the implications of such changes. 
Similarly, even though this thesis has pointed out the significance of lorries for road 
development (and that of animal-drawn vehicles in some contexts), it has not addressed the 
evolution of lorries and other types of goods vehicles. Although the use of commercial 
vehicles in Sub-Saharan Africa (and in some cases their substantial modification) has 
attracted some attention, many questions remain unanswered about the vehicles that have had 
the most effect on roads worldwide. What (if anything) was distinctive about the design of 
goods vehicles as compared to automobiles in this period? The way in which goods vehicles 
moved around the world can also provide insights into the priorities and conditions of every 
context. Based on my research and the current historiography on automobiles we can infer 
that the use of a particular goods vehicle depended most likely not only on the production or 
import of a particular model, but also on the costs they incurred (in terms of purchase, 
operation, maintenance) – and thus also on the size and acquisitive power of trucking firms – 
on the type of goods to be transported, as well as on road design characteristics, amongst 
others.  
Finally, this thesis has hinted at the important role of the private sector in road development 
in both independent and colonial contexts and has made evident a number of potential lines 
of inquiry that expand the type of private actors that have previously been studied. Beyond 
the actions of the road lobby, the work and staff of large international construction and 
consulting firms merit careful consideration, as well as that of those with a smaller range. 
There are abundant resources to conduct such studies. The World Bank archives (both at its 
headquarters and online), for instance, offer a great deal of material on the projects they 
financed all over the world, and on the relationship the Bank had with the borrower 
governments. In addition, while this thesis has touched upon the role of the World Bank and 
the FIDES, many other funding agencies had significant roles in road development, and more 
can be done to understand the methods and impact of their work. The way in which cost-
benefit studies evolved over time is, for example, a major topic that deserves more attention. 
The analysis of the crucial part played by the private sector can also be useful to further 
reflecting on the differences between communist/socialist and capitalist countries. Although 
the Eastern Bloc did experience some road development during the period, it remained mostly 
reliant on railways. The shift experienced in some countries from railways to roads has been 




that the world is witnessing a revival of the railway, reflecting on these issues seems all the 














































in km per 
sq. km 
Algeria 35,007 65,200 0,03 741 -  -  - 75,953 - 0,03 











0,34 413 92,975 
(i) 
100 1,11  -  - -  
Belgium 30,407 62,700 
(e) 
2,05 712 91,718 81,4 3,00 92,021 81,4 3,00 
Bolivia 5,768 14,300 
(d) 
0,01 376 24,286 2,5 0,02  -  -  - 
Brazil 121,500 275,200 0,03 523 826,42
5 (g) 
3,82 0,09  939,61
5 
4,51 0,10 
Chile 40,000 52,300 0,07 902 54,394 12,9 0,72 70,549 11,0 0,093 
Colombia 30,997 
(a) 







100 (j) 1,42 788,75
3 (h) 












- 14,600 0,06 324 32,187 
(g) 
11,9 0,13 32,187 12,9 0,13 
Great 
Britain 





















58,218 70,300 0,03 90 84,268 25,0 0,04 84,292 25 0,04 















 -  -  -  - 35,684 3,0 0,11 34,961 3,6 0,10 
Japan 943,965 943,431 
(b) 





Kenya - 32,700 
(e) 







0,07 194 16,312 81,9 0,12 17,456 84,8 0,133 
Mexico 226,700 130,500 0,06 508 65,164 58,5 0,03 71,520 60 0,036 
Morocco 6,298 48,400 
(e) 
0,12 569 23,975 82,7 0,05 24,775 85,0 0,056 
Nigeria - 45,100 0,04 180 88,904 17,2 0,09 88,904 17,2 0,096 










Tunisia 11,454 14,400 0,08 411 17,110 50 0,104 17,856 51 0,109 
Uganda - 13,700 0,05 269 24,173 26,4 
(k) 
0,12 -  -  - 
USSR 1,149,9
99 











(a)     Figure from 1929   
(b)     Figure from 1956   
(c)     Figure from 1926   
(d)     Figure from 1948   
(e)     Figure includes urban roads   
(f)      Does not include roads on rubber estates or mines, which form an important part of the network 
(g)     Figure from 1968   
(h)     Excluding 698,000 km of rural roads   
(i)      Excludes private roads (33,500 km of paved roads and 64,000 km of unpaved private roads) 
(j)      Includes only national roads (as opposed to departmental/regional and local)   
(k)     All unpaved roads are classified as 'all weather'   
(l)      Taking into account about 200,000 km of 'fair weather' earth roads 
(m)    Estimation from R. Lantenois, Director-General of Public Works in French West Africa at the   
          time. Including tracks the network length was about 90,000 km 
(n)     Including tracks 






Sources: Comisión Económica Para América Latina (CEPAL), Boletín Estadístico de América Latina, Vol. 
VI, No. 2 (New York, 1969), 135-137; IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a First Highway Project, Ghana’ 
(Washington D.C., 29 June 1973), 6; IBRD, IDA, ‘Proposal for a Highway Engineering Credit, Ghana’ 
(Washington D.C., 9 June 1969), 2; International Chamber of Commerce, A Statistical Survey of World 
Highway Transport (Paris, 1931), 18-23; International Road Federation, World Road Statistics, Revised 
Second Edition (London, 1953), 11-14; International Road Federation, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971 
(London, 1972), 10-26; Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, 
Historical Statistics, Chapter 12 Transport, Table 12-4 Length of roads and paved roads (CY 1894—1935, 
FY 1936—2004) Available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/12.html (06/06/2019); Lantenois, 
‘Section 1, Road Construction and Maintenance, Question II, Progress made since the Congress at The 
Hague in 1938 in the study of road subgrades, French West Africa’, in Permanent International Association 
of Road Congresses (Lisbon, 1951), 2.
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Annexe B. Main railway network lengths in selected countries and colonies in 1930 




Algeria 2,992 2,548 
Argentina 23,825 27,169 
Australia 26,554 24,933 
Austria 4,453 4,094 
Belgium 3,157 2,760 
Brazil 20,180 20,806 
Bulgaria 1,834 2,383 
Cameroon 313 330 
Canada 42,075 43,355 
Chile 5,549 4,857 
China (excluding Manchuria) 11,807 19,500 
Czechoslovakia 8,027 8,313 
Denmark 3,332 2,476 
Finland 3,186 3,570 
France 26,222 23,729 
Great Britain 20,445 15,319 
Germany (East and West for 1965) 36,250 31,254 
Greece 1,682 1,616 
Hungary 4,785 5,036 
India 41,724 36,210 
Indonesia 4,135 3,788 
Iran 261 2,174 
Iraq 752 1,026 
Ireland 2,668 1,455 
Italy 10,427 10,313 
Japan 9,057 12,886 
Lebanon 136 208 




Madagascar 432 537 
Malawi 129 316 
Malaysia 1,013 1,124 
Mexico 14,789 14,179 
Morocco 556 1,110 
New Zealand 3,295 3,263 
Nigeria 1,758 1,989 
Norway 2,407 2,702 
Pakistan 6,370 7,039 
Paraguay 309 309 
Peru 2,613 1,509 
Portugal 2,124 2,238 
Rhodesia 2,328 2,655 
Romania  6,964 6,838 
South Africa 13,469 13,621 
Spain 7,343 8,296 
Sweden 10,268 8,347 
Switzerland 3,247 3,168 
Syria 483 526 
Tunisia 1,281 1,488 
Turkey 3,264 4,907 
United States (excluding Alaska) 249,052 212,059 
USSR 48,381 80,321 
Total 698,035 690,859 
Total excluding USSR 649,654 610,538 
 
Note: The names of countries and colonies have been kept as in the original source. This table includes 
only the countries for which the yearbook had information on both years. The figures exclude light railways, 
steam tramways and interurban electric lines. The original source warned that the figures are not strictly 
comparable due to the difficulty of adjusting earlier mileages to political boundaries at the time, and to the 
divergence in practices as to what constituted minor railways, light railways and secondary lines.  
Source: Directory of Railway Officials & Year Book 1966-1967 (London, 1967), 572-74. 
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Annexe C. Estimated number of vehicles in circulation in selected countries and 
colonies in 1930, 1952, 1967 and 1970 (in thousands) – Part 1/2 
 
  1930 1952 
  A B C D A B C D E F 
Algeria 36.7 6.3 2 45 50 36 86 9.77 1.31 
Argentina 321.9 80.2 2.6 404.7 221.1 128.3 11.9 361.3 22.44 0.86 
Belgian 
Congo 
- - - - 12 14.8 0.2 27 - - 
Belgium 90 46.5 1 137.5 304 164.7 3 471.7 53.6 7.52 
Bolivia 1.7 0.9 0.1 2.7 4 8.5 0.5 13 3.42 0.9 
Brazil 90 64.5 38.1 192.6 262.5 210.4 16 488.9 9.29 1.77 
Chile 19.3 8.6 4.9 32.8 38 30.9 4.4 73.3 12.64 1.4 
Colombia 10 6 - 16 40.5 34.1 8.9 83.5 6.63 4.26 
France 930.1 366 1290.1 1381.8 883.9 24 2289.7 54.52 2.75 
French West 
Africa 
2.6 4.1 0.08 6.7 12.9 26.7 0.6 40.2 2.44 0.44 
Ghana (Gold 
Coast) 
- - - - 7.1 10.7 17.8 3.96 1.21 
Great 
Britain 








37.7 11.4 31.5 80.6 36 24.6 8.4 69 0.88 0.98 
Iraq 3.1 1.2 0.1 4.4 11 9.2 20.2 4.21 1.04 
Italy 157.4 52.5 31.6 241.5 425.6 237 13 675.6 14.37 3.46 
Ivory Coast 
          
Japan 4.1 26.2 51.2 81.5 - - - 556 (h) - - 
Kenya - - - - 19.2 16.3 35.5 6.57 1.08 




- - - - 53.3 21.4 1.9 76.6 14.73 7.58 




Morocco 17 6.8 23.8 42 28.7 0.3 71 8.35 1.46 
Nigeria - - - - 12.2 14.1 26.3 1.05 0.58 
Pakistan  - - - - 28.8 8.9 11.6 49.3 5.38 4.01 
Spain 127.8 48.5 176.3 95 84 8 187 6.54 0.84 
Tanganyika - - - - - 6.2 7.7 13.9 - - 
Tunisia 11.7 1.5 0.5 13.7 19.2 9.6 0.6 29.4 8.4 2.04 








USSR  10 11.5 2.5 24 - - - - - - 
 
Annexe C. Estimated number of vehicles in circulation in selected countries and colonies 
in 1930, 1952, 1967 and 1970 (in thousands) – Part 2/2 
  1967 1970 
  A G C D E F A G C D E F 











12.4 - 1550 750 33.4 2333.4 - - 
Belgian 
Congo 
            








2301.5 233 - 
Bolivia 26 17.4 2 45.4 11.9 - 11.1 28.3 2.22 52.77 - - 
Brazil 1337 415.2 40.3 1792.5 20.9
2 
- 2695 599 59 3353 36.9 - 
Chile 170.04 51.51 11.2
8 
232.84 26 4.3 177.02 134.9 15.9
5 
327.88 29 4.6 




- 105.4 188.34 32.6
3 
326.37 12.6 6.8 
France 10565 1756 43 12,405 
(a) 


































































43.49 26.33 0.96 73.31 
(a) 





































39.75 25.87 2.02 69.60 
(a) 






182.44 46.5 4.23 233.18 26.9 14.3 238.36 55.82 5.93 312.37 
(a) 
- - 





581.81 1824.65 - 23.7 
Morocco 178.38 63.78 3.45 248.56 
(a) 
17.4 10.2 222.46 83.44 (a) 304.25 
(a) 
19.6 12.3 
Nigeria 69.49 31.37 101.48 
(a) 



































3118.66 91.6 22.3 
Tanganyi
ka 
            
Tunisia 56.6 30.86 1.48 88.94 19.1 5.2 66.43 35.27 1.97 103.68 20.4 5.8 
Uganda 29.16 8.82 0.88 39.62 
(a) 






















USSR  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
A – Automobiles 
B – Commercial Vehicles (i.e. load-carrying motor vehicles such as lorries, ambulances, fire engines and 




C – Buses and coaches 
D – Total  
E – Number of vehicles per 1,000 persons 
F – Number of vehicles per km of road 
G – Goods vehicles 
-  No data 
(a) Figure includes non-agricultural tractors 
(b) Figure includes taxis and estate cars.  
(c) Figure from 1971 
(d) Including light commercial vehicles 
(e) Excluding public service vehicles, mini-buses and  jeeps,  
(f) Including trailers, ambulances and other special vehicles 
(g) Includes three-wheeled vehicles 
(h) Number of registered vehicles 
(i) Figures as of 30th of June  
(*) West Malaysia for 1967 and 1970 
 
Sources: Comisión Económica Para América Latina (CEPAL), Boletín Estadístico de América Latina, Vol. 
VI, No. 2 (New York, 1969), 136; IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a First Highway Project, Ghana’ (Washington 
D.C., 29 June 1973), 6; IBRD, ‘Staff Appraisal Report, Highway Maintenance Project, Bolivia’ 
(Washington D.C., 18 May 1978), Table 2.3 ‘Motor Vehicle Fleet 1967-1974’; International Chamber of 
Commerce, A Statistical Survey of World Highway Transport (Paris, 1931), 12-17; International Road 
Federation, World Road Statistics, Revised Second Edition (London, 1953), 15-18, 118-20; International 
Road Federation, World Road Statistics, 1967-1971 (London, 1972), 27-36, 51-76; Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, Historical Statistics, Chapter 12 Transport, Table 
12-10 ‘Motor Vehicles Owned by Kind’, Available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/12.html 
(06/06/2019); the Grupo Executivo de Integração da Política de Transportes (GEIPOT) in 1970 quoted in 
IBRD, IDA, ‘Appraisal of a Third Construction Project, Brazil’ (Washington D.C., 29 February 1972), 
Table 9 ‘Vehicle Fleet’; Álvaro Pachón and Maria Teresa Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En 








Source: Taken from the website of the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat (SWAC/OECD, 2014). 
Based on Les collections de l’histoire n. 58-63; Encyclopédie d’outre-mer, 1956. Available at  
http://www.oecd.org/swac/maps/maps-atlasofthesahara-sahel.htm (31/08/2019) 
 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Annexe E. Map of roads in French West Africa, big arteries of colonial and inter-
colonial circulation, ca. 1951 
 
 
Source: ANOM 3TP/141, Plans d’équipement, 1938-1951 (Afrique Occidentale Française: routes), 
Sécrétariat d’État aux colonies, Inspection Générale des Travaux Publics. L’équipement économique des 
colonies françaises, Afrique Occidentale Française – les routes, s.d. 
 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
245 
 
Annexe F. Roads and tracks lengths in French West Africa per territory, 1956 (km) 
 
Territories Total of roads (a) Total of tracks Total 
Senegal 8,658 3,000 11,650 
Sudan 6,162 5,000 11,150 
Mauritania 2,675 1,000 3,700 
Guiney 5,092 2,500 7,600 
Ivory Coast 8,752 8,000 16,750 
Dahomey 3,972 1,200 6,200 
Niger 3,504 5,000 8,504 
Upper Volta  8,361 8,100 16,450 
Total French West 
Africa 
47,176 33,800 80,976 
 
(a) General network and roads of local interest 
Source: ANOM 3TP/78, Afrique Occidentale Française, 1953-1957, République Française, Afrique 




Annexe G. Annual and permanent maintenance units and the type of work each 
machine performed, French West Africa, 1955 
 
Annual maintenance unit, French West Africa, 1955 
Annual Maintenance 
Type of work Machine Number of 
machines 
Re-shaping ditches and verges Motor-grader 2 
Re-shaping profile 
Spreading improving course 
Digging borrow-pits  Bulldozer  1 
Road-widening 
Cleaning verges 
Loading, transport and arranging imported 
materials 




Compacting improving course Pneumatically-tyred roller 1 





Source: J. Chauchoy and R. Lantenois, ‘Section 1: Construction and Maintenance, Question 3, Low Cost 
Roads, French West Africa’, in Permanent International Association of Road Congresses (Istanbul, 1955), 
25-26. 
 
Permanent maintenance unit, French West Africa, 1955 
Permanent Maintenance 
Type of work Machine Number of 
machines 
Patching 
Transport of material for patching  




Re-shaping after rainy season Motor-grader 1 
Elimination of corrugations  Planing machine  1 
Trains of tyres 
Light motor-grader 
Compaction of new surface Regular motor traffic - 
 
Source: J. Chauchoy and R. Lantenois, ‘Section 1: Construction and Maintenance, Question 3, Low Cost 









Source: Taken from Guido di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch (eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 
1946-83 (London, 1989), 3. 
 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Annexe I. Map of national road network per type of surface, Argentina, 1961 
 
 
Note: in red, paved roads; in blue, ‘consolidado’ (improved, or ‘compacted’); in green ‘natural’ 
(unimproved, or dirt); in yellow, track.  
Source: República Argentina, Ministry of Public Works and Services, Transportation Planning Group, A 
Long Range Transportation Plan (Buenos Aires, 1962), Appendix 2 Highways. 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Annexe J. Map of national road network per type of surface, Argentina, 1970 
 
 
Note: in red, paved roads; in blue, ‘consolidado’ or improved; in green ‘natural’, or unimproved; in yellow, 
track; in dashed red, in process of being paved; in dashed blue, in process of being improved; blue crosses, 
not opened yet; in red and blue, stabilised with asphalt.  
Source: Dirección Nacional de Vialidad, Panorama Vial de la República Argentina. Situación Actual de la 
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (Buenos Aires, 1970), 24. 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Source: República Argentina, Ministry of Public Works and Services, Transportation Planning Group, A 
Long Range Transportation Plan (Buenos Aires, 1962), Appendix 2 Highways. 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Annexe L. The evolution of Argentina’s national road network according to type of 





Note: in black, paved; blue, improved; green, ‘natural’ (i.e. unimproved earth); and yellow, tracks. 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Vialidad, Panorama Vial de la República Argentina. Situación Actual de la 
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (Buenos Aires, 1970), 27. 
 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Annexe M. Map of transport infrastructure in Colombia, 1950 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Álvaro Pachón and Maria Teresa Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En 
Colombia Durante El Siglo XX: Una Descripción Desde El Punto de Vista Económico (Bogotá, 2006), 
Mapa II-1. 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Source: Adapted from Álvaro Pachón and Maria Teresa Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En 
Colombia Durante El Siglo XX: Una Descripción Desde El Punto de Vista Económico (Bogotá, 2006), 
Mapa II-9. 
[Picture removed from ethesis version on copyright grounds] 
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Annexe O. Total road network in Colombia according to classification, 1950-1970 (km) 
 
 National Deptal. Municipal Particular Total 
Network 
Year Paved Unpaved Total      
1950 100 12,100 12,200 - - - - 
1951 176 12,324 12,500 - - - - 
1952 239 12,768 13,007 6,619 574 592 20,792 
1953 452 13,446 13,898 7,504 681 1,397 23,480 
1954 563 13,335 13,898 8,362 1,035 1,451 24,746 
1955 661 13,711 14,372 8,444 2,118 1,668 25,941 
1956 861 13,312 14,173 10,197 2,353 1,888 28,611 
1957 1,160 12,775 13,935 10,927 2,240 2,101 29,203 
1958 2,220 11,529 13,749 11,595 2,399 2,276 30,019 
1959 2,223 12,844 15,067 12,857 2,528 2,388 32,840 
1960 2,619 13,258 15,877 14,694 2,758 3,561 36,890 
1961 2,784 13,597 16,381 14,716 2,647 3,723 37,467 
1962 2,841 13,671 16,512 15,925 2,627 2,784 37,848 
1963 3,191 13,501 16,692 16,859 2,610 2,925 39,086 
1964 3,217 13,523 16,740 - - - - 
1965 3,497 13,982 17,479 17,931 4,584 3,367 43,361 
1966 3,572 13,954 17,526 - 4,821 3,389 - 
1967 3,853 14,144 17,997 - 1,966 3,024 - 
1968 4,235 14,607 18,842 - 2,081 3,011 - 
1969 4,499 14,768 19,267 - - - - 
1970 4,821 15,094 19,915 - 1,664 3,821 - 
 
- No data 
Source: Álvaro Pachón and Maria Teresa Ramírez, La Infraestructura de Transporte En Colombia Durante 
El Siglo XX: Una Descripción Desde El Punto de Vista Económico (Bogotá, 2006) Anexo II.37. 
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Annexe P. List of machinery needed for routine maintenance according to road 
surface in Colombia, 1969 
 
From 1969, every Distrito was divided in ‘Seccionales’, of 360 km of roads each. The 
following lists correspond to the ideal plant for each Seccional depending on whether the 
roads were paved or not.  
Ideal plant for the routine maintenance of 360 km of paved roads: 
Nº Machine Work 
6 Dumper Truck (3 ½ Yd3) Transporting gangs and carrying equipment 
to clean the road. 
4 Dumper truck (5 Yd3) Carrying materials for re-levelling and 
patching. This equipment is only 
recommended when it is not possible to hire 
a particular to carry materials.  
2 Motor grader Mixing asphalt for re-levelling, patching 
and shaping of lateral areas. 
1 Loader (frontal on wheels)  
2 Tractor with bulldozer (D4) Shaping lateral areas, exploitation of 
materials, landslides, etc. 
2 Tandem roller (6-9 ton)  
1 Tanker  Irrigating asphalt. 
2 Tanker with heater Transporting asphalt. 
3 Gear pump 3” For asphalt. 
3 Lorry with 500 l tank for asphalt 
(Camión-patrulla con tanque de asfalto 
de 500 litros, con calentador e irrigador 
de mano) 
 
1 Lawn mower   




Ideal plant for the routine maintenance of 360 km of unpaved roads: 




6 Dumper Truck (3 ½ Yd3) Transporting gangs and carrying equipment 
to clean the road. 
6 Dumper truck (5 Yd3) Carrying materials for re-levelling and 
patching. This equipment is only 
recommended when it is not possible to hire 
a particular to carry materials.  
4 Motor grader Shaping surface. 
2 Front loader (on wheels, 2 Yd3)  
1 Front loader (on tracks, 2 Yd3)   
1 Tanker  Irrigating water. 
4 Motor pump For water for the tankers. 
1 Lawn mower   




Source: AGN, AO, MOPT, Secretaría General, 166-27, Compañía Mexicana de Consultores en Ingeniería 
SA (COMEC) and Frederic Harris Engineering Corporation, Misión Técnica COMEC-HARRIS, 
Información al Señor Ministro Acerca de las Necesidades de Equipo para la Conservación de Carreteras 









Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (Aix-en-Provence, France) 
TP - Fonds Ministère des Colonies, Inspection Générale des Travaux Publics 
BIB - Bibliothèque 
 
National Archives (London, United Kingdom) 
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Biblioteca Nacional Mariano Moreno (Buenos Aires, Argentina) 
AR-BNMM-ARCH-CEN - Departamento de Archivos, Fondo Centro de Estudios 
Nacionales, Subfondo Arturo Frondizi. 
 
British Library (London, United Kingdom) 
IOR – India Office Records 
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